Pecking order and trade-off explanations of capital structure and the maturity structure of corporate debt obligations by Richards, Paul Howard
Pecking Order and Trade-off  
 
 
Explanations of Capital Structure  
 
 
and  
 
 
The Maturity Structure of Corporate  
 
 
Debt Obligations 
 
 
 
by 
 
Paul Howard Richards 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the  
University of Birmingham 
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
Birmingham Business School 
University House 
Edgbaston Park Road 
Birmingham 
B15 2TY 
Original submission date: 30th September 2014 
Final draft incorporating minor corrections dated 7th Feb 2018 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this thesis is to provide new solutions and outcomes to the over- and under-
investment problems and the information asymmetry that motivates the pecking order 
theory.  By extending the original models, it is shown that i) the under-investment 
problem is caused by the debt-equity mix of the financing rather than the investment 
itself and this problem can be resolved by a post-investment adjustment in capital 
structure – a simpler than reducing debt maturity (as in Myers (1977)) or gearing; ii) 
transfers in value from debt-holders to shareholders to promote over-investment are 
not sustainable since investors will seek to avoid being disadvantaged by demanding 
higher returns, greater restrictions on the company or both;  iii) information asymmetry 
can be managed using bridge financing and other techniques in ways that remove the 
rationale for the pecking order theory; and iv) managers have incentives to engage in 
empire building which is facilitated by a capital structure that reflects the degree of 
concentration among the other companies in the sector: faced with a low (high) degree 
of concentration, companies have lower (higher) gearing.   
 
These outcomes are empirically investigated using an extensive sample and robust 
estimating procedures providing strong support for the hypotheses tested.   
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Research background 
This thesis examines four situations in which conflicts between company stakeholders 
arise.  These conflicts give rise to agency costs that can damage the interests of 
shareholders and/or debt-holders but at the same time benefit a different group of 
stakeholders.  The circumstances in which these conflicts arise are related to changes 
in capital structure associated with an investment opportunity.  Changes in capital 
structure can occur when an investment is financed depending on the mix of debt and 
equity and such changes can disadvantage existing shareholders (and benefit new 
shareholders) or benefit existing debt-holders at the expense of shareholders.  
Management need to manage capital structure ways that address the conflicts that 
arise with the objective of protecting existing shareholders.  However, one of the 
conflicts that arise is between managers and shareholders, so the management of 
capital structure may not address all conflicts. 
 
Changes in capital structure can cause transfers in value between debt-holders and 
shareholders as in the under-investment problem.  However, traditional views of 
capital structure suggest long-run stability in gearing, but more recent research 
suggests that stability is not a comprehensive explanation and that there are dynamic 
aspects associated with capital structure.   
 
DeAngelo and Roll (2015) suggest that capital structure is not stable, and that stability 
is the exception rather than the rule.  They suggest that factors that affect gearing can 
vary over time and so make the process of explaining capital structure behaviour more 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
2 
 
difficult or that capital structure is of second-order importance and is determined as a 
residual.  These results contrast with Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) who report 
capital structures that are stable over long periods and that the major part of variation 
is time-invariant.  Similarly, Frank & Goyal (2009) observe that gearing is stationary 
over the long-term.  Graham, Leary and Roberts (2015) document a century of 
“relatively stable” capital structure in the US. 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) examine market timing issues and present evidence that 
companies time issues of debt to minimise their borrowing costs concluding that 
capital structure at any point in time reflects the cumulative result of past attempts to 
exploit market levels and that such effects persist for a decade.  The ability of 
managers to time market decisions is questioned by the efficient market hypothesis 
and by Berlin (2006).  Butler, Grullon and Westen (2006) point out that after adjusting 
for a structural shift in US monetary and fiscal policy in the 1980s, there is no evidence 
that managers can time debt issues. Contrary to Baker and Wurgler (2002), 
Hovakimian (2006) found that while equity transactions may be timed to exploit 
favourable market conditions, such transactions did not have significant long-lasting 
effects on capital structure.   
 
A different approach in capital structure research has been to recognise that firms may 
deviate from a target capital structure from time to time but then revert to the target.  
The speed of adjustment to the target has been examined in Leary and Roberts 
(2005).  They included the idea of adjustment costs being a factor in the process of 
rebalancing capital structure and conclude that firms actively rebalance their gearing 
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within an optimal range.  However, Hovakimian and Li (2012) suggest that the speed 
of adjustment is not a meaningful measure of the importance of target gearing ratios.   
 
The choice of capital structure is also influenced by the company’s position in the 
sector in which it operates.  Leary and Roberts (2011) show that firms make financing 
decisions by responding to the financing decisions of their peers.  This thesis identifies 
a new factor that affects capital structure – the ambition of the firm to make 
acquisitions. 
 
Graham and Leary (2011) analyse variations in gearing noting that approximately 60% 
of gearing variation is cross-sectional and that the majority is across firms within a 
given industry rather than between industries, consistent with MacKay and Phillips 
(2005).  Intra-industry gearing variation is twice as large as inter-industry variation for 
market-based gearing and three times as large for book value-based gearing.  They 
also suggest that there “likely” is no single theory to explain capital structure for all 
firms but that, given the wide range of factors that affect gearing, the challenge is to 
distinguish first-order importance from second-order importance.  They also comment 
that there are factors which hold weakly in broad panels but strongly in narrow 
samples. 
 
An example of such a factor is reported in Cooper and Lambertides (2016) which 
documents a positive relationship between gearing and dividend payouts (in a narrow 
sample) which contrasts with previously documented negative relationships (in broad 
panels).  The theme in the narrower sample used by Cooper and Lambertides (2016) 
is that large dividend increases are being used as a signal and that an associated 
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increase in gearing is a further signal of firm quality: the sample is restricted to the 
narrow sample of large dividend increases.  They relate their results to DeAngelo and 
Roll (2015) who suggest that gearing variation can be caused by a time-varying capital 
structure target or by a wide range around a target. 
 
These results suggest a context in which capital structure can vary over time, reflecting 
targets that are flexible and that there can be deviations from target from time to time.  
The ideas discussed in this thesis are consistent with this context in which dynamic 
adjustments to capital structure are contemplated. 
 
1.2 Research problems 
Four problem areas in which conflicts between stakeholders arise are considered in 
this thesis: the under-investment problem as described in Myers (1977); the over-
investment problem (or asset substitution problem) as described in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976); the pecking order theory as described in Myers (1984) and Myers 
and Majluf (1984); and the agency costs associated with managers in relation to their 
preferred capital structure. 
 
The first problem area, the under-investment problem, can arise when a company 
acquires an investment opportunity with a positive net present value which benefits 
both the shareholders and the debt-holders.  Any benefit obtained by the debt-holders 
will be at the expense of the shareholders.  If the transfer of value to the debt-holders 
is large, what remains for the shareholders may render the investment opportunity 
unattractive and the company management may be tempted to forego the investment 
– hence the label the under-investment problem.   
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The second problem area, the over-investment problem, is the converse of the under-
investment problem.  When a company acquires an investment opportunity that has a 
negative net present value there will be no benefit for the shareholders nor will it be 
good for debt-holders whose investments will reduce in value.  The loss of value 
suffered by the debt-holders will benefit the shareholders.  There will be a transfer of 
value from the debt-holders to the shareholders and, if it is large enough, it may render 
the net present value of the investment opportunity positive.  This will enable the 
company to pursue a sub-optimal investment – hence the label the over-investment 
problem. 
 
The third problem area gives rise to the pecking order theory of capital structure.  The 
motivation is information asymmetry.  When financing an investment, the company 
may be faced with issuing shares at a value that it considers would be highly beneficial 
to the new investors and hence detrimental to existing shareholders.  Issuing shares 
at such a price will effectively transfer value to the new investors at the expense of the 
old or pre-investment shareholders.  Faced with such a dilemma, managers prefer to 
finance the investment by raising debt.  Hence, in this situation, there is an automatic 
preference for debt over equity capital and hence the pecking order theory. 
 
The fourth problem area relates to the conflicting personal objectives of management.  
Management prefer a strong balance sheet.  This has several important advantages 
that enable the company to operate and compete effectively against the competition 
in the sector in which it operates and to facilitate acquisitions.  The strong balance 
sheet preference contrasts with the trade-off approach to capital structure as in Kraus 
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and Litzenberger (1973) which balances tax shelter against the costs of financial 
distress: choosing less debt and hence lower tax shelter may be less beneficial for 
shareholders. 
 
1.3 Aims and objectives 
The aim of the work conducted in this thesis is to provide new insights into the 
circumstances in which the problems listed above can arise and to identify new 
methods of management of those problems with a view to identifying implications for 
capital structure decisions. 
 
The objective is to extend the models underlying the existing explanatory theories of 
under-investment, over-investment and the pecking order by considering a wider 
range of the financing methods in those models. 
 
A further objective is to develop alternative methods of addressing the problems 
described previously that differ from the current approach and provide insights into the 
management of capital structure. 
 
The model in Myers (1977) can be extended with the addition of simple assumptions 
which link the value of debt to a gearing ratio.  This enables changes in the value of 
existing debt and equity to be modelled in a wider range of situations including internal 
and external financing of the investment opportunity and where the net present value 
of the investment opportunity is either zero or positive.  This analysis produces a wider 
range of possible outcomes.  This enables alternative conclusions to be drawn from 
the analysis and facilitates the articulation of alternative methods of managing any 
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under-investment problem which may include rebalancing capital structure back to its 
target: this process can recapture for shareholders any value transferred to debt-
holders. 
 
The extended model of the under-investment problem can be applied to the over-
investment problem because these two problems are directly related in that they both 
envisage transfers of value between debt-holders and shareholders.  This approach 
provides useful insights into the situation in which the over-investment problem can 
arise.  The possible solution to recapture value transferred to debt-holders can provide 
the circumstances for the over-investment problem.  This process of rebalancing can 
be taken further than simply recapturing value transferred to debt-holders by 
increasing gearing.  This will disadvantage debt-holders and benefit shareholders.  A 
further objective is to consider how debt investors might react to such a strategy. 
 
The model in Myers and Majluf (1984) can be modified to include some alternative 
financing solutions that address the problem of information asymmetry in ways that do 
not provide an automatic preference of debt over equity (except in one narrow sense).  
The aim is to extend the model by including financing options that have two stages: 
an interim stage followed by a refinancing after the problem of information asymmetry 
has been resolved.  The objective is to examine whether this can solve the problem of 
information asymmetry without generating an automatic preference for debt over 
equity. 
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In relation to the conflicts between mangers and shareholders, the aim is to examine 
the motives of management in relation to acquisitions and identify implications for 
capital structure that facilitate the purchase of other companies. 
 
A further overarching objective is to provide empirical support for the solutions 
identified.  This includes explaining existing empirical results that support existing 
solutions to the problems listed above. 
 
1.4 Contributions 
1.4.1 The under-investment problem 
The incremental contributions achieved in relation to the under-investment problem 
show that: 
• The model in Myers (1977) can be extended by the inclusion of some simple 
assumptions to address both internal and external financing and the mix of debt 
and equity in the external financing of the investment clarifying that transfers of 
value to debt-holders occur in only limited circumstances;  
• In the case of internal financing, that there is no under-investment problem and 
hence that such a problem, if it does arise, can only arise in the external financing 
case; 
• The external financing case makes clear that the under-investment problem is a 
consequence of the financing decision rather than the investment decision and that 
it arises only in limited circumstances; 
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• The circumstances of the under-investment problem can only arise where the 
existing debt-holders enjoy a transfer of value caused by a reduction in gearing 
following the financing of the investment; 
• In the case of external financing where the investment opportunity represents a 
positive or zero net present value project, providing gearing is not reduced by the 
financing, there is no under-investment problem and, even if there is some benefit 
enjoyed by debt-holders, they cannot capture all the benefit of a positive net 
present value investment opportunity and so some benefit will accrue to 
shareholders, thus avoiding the under-investment problem; 
• The under-investment problem can be avoided completely by i) ensuring that the 
company’s gearing ratio is not reduced by the external financing; or ii) if gearing is 
reduced by the financing, then reversing any transfer of value from shareholders 
to debt-holders by a subsequent, marginal adjustment to capital structure: this 
solution is much simpler and less costly than those suggested in Myers (1977); 
• The under-investment problem can arise in the case of financial distress but that 
there are incentives for management to pursue investment rather than to under-
invest; 
• The motivation for Myers’ (1977) suggestion to reduce debt maturity (to put the 
investment decision in the hands of the lenders) is unnecessary since the 
management can always negotiate with lenders regardless of the maturity of debt 
if indeed that were necessary; 
• The other solutions (mediation and adjustments to the loan contract) to the under-
investment problem proposed in Myers (1977) are shown to be inappropriate and 
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costly and that more efficient techniques to manage any under-investment problem 
are put forward; 
• The empirical results that are cited in support of the solutions in Myers (1977) – 
essentially the negative relationship between gearing and debt maturity and the 
market to book value ratio – can be explained in other ways that do not support the 
solutions proposed in Myers (1977) for the under-investment problem.  Two 
explanations are provided for this negative relationship: first the accounting 
treatment of investment expenditures; and secondly, the link between the market 
value of the enterprise in i) the gearing ratio; and ii) the market to book value: this 
suggests using a gearing ratio based on book values: this is tested empirically; 
• The empirical results (using gearing and debt maturity based on book values) 
confirm that debt maturity is only weakly related to the market to book value ratio 
and, using gearing measured in terms of book values, a positive relationship 
between gearing and the market to book value ratio is established confirming the 
arguments above and providing no support for the solutions in Myers (1977).  
 
1.4.2 The over-investment problem and the pecking order theory 
The incremental contributions achieved in relation to the under-investment problem 
show that: 
• the over-investment problem is the converse of the under-investment problem in 
that a transfer of value from debt-holders at the expense of shareholders is the 
underlying problem generating over-investment whereas in the under-investment 
scenario, it is a transfer of value from shareholder to debt-holders that can lead 
to the under-investment problem;  
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• the tools proposed in Chapter 2 to manage the under-investment problem can 
be used to achieve a transfer of value from debt-holders to shareholders as in 
the over-investment problem: this mechanism involves reducing the value of 
existing debt by reducing the credit quality which can be achieved quite simply 
by increasing overall gearing by using a suitable amount of debt in the financing 
mix of the new investment: at face value, this could be a source of value creation 
for shareholders (if debt-holders accepted such transfers of value);  
• providers of debt finance will not be content to suffer transfers of value from their 
investments to shareholders (as postulated in the solution to the under-
investment problem): this will make it difficult for a company to promote such a 
transfer and pursue sub-optimal investments; 
• debt investors, aware of the behaviour of a company seeking to transfer value 
from debt-holders to shareholders, will seek a premium in the cost of debt that 
will compensate for the risk of a value transfer occurring: this is demonstrated 
using a simple experiment to model investor behaviour; 
• a good strategy for the company to avoid this increased debt cost is to maintain 
a constant capital structure and so avoid debt investors seeking a premium (to 
compensate for the risk of a transfer in value) and thereby optimise the 
company’s cost of capital; 
• there is a stark contrast between Myers’ (1977) solution to the under-investment 
problem (shortening debt maturity and/or reducing the debt amount) and the 
solution to the pecking order problem (increasing debt): both problems involve 
the risk of under-investment and yet the solutions proposed about debt are 
exactly opposite;  
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• in the case of the pecking order theory, there are several solutions that can be 
used to manage potential transfers of value between old and new shareholders 
in the presence of asymmetric information that enable sensible investment 
opportunities to be pursued without value being lost by shareholders: one 
technique that is proposed is the use of short-term bridging finance.  This is pure 
debt financing and so in a certain narrow sense is consistent with the solution in 
the pecking order theory.  However, the idea of the short-term finance is that it 
will be replaced with long-term finance which could include equity which can be 
issued at a time when the problem of information asymmetry has been resolved.  
In this way, a company can pursue a long-term capital structure strategy (for 
example, constant gearing) with temporary deviations (using bridge financing: a 
lending package offered by banks to enable companies to raise cash quickly for 
acquisitions or to finance gaps between bond issues and where the intention is 
that the loan will be repaid within a relatively short period – up to 12 months is 
common) when information asymmetry precludes an equity issue; 
• the bridge financing technique is tested using the dataset described in Chapter 
2 and shows that while there is support for the pecking order theory in common 
with tests reported in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), that the data also 
support the idea that increases in gearing at the time of investment are 
subsequently reversed and that such temporary increases in gearing are 
suggestive of the use of short-term bridge financing which is one of the solutions 
proposed for problems of information asymmetry; 
• these results suggest that problems of asymmetric information can be managed 
in a way that makes no predictions about capital structure and thus that there is 
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no basis for arguing that there is a natural preference for debt over equity (as 
proposed in the pecking order theory);   
• if there is no motivation for the pecking order theory (since there are solutions to 
problems of information asymmetry) then the implication for capital structure 
theory is that companies should maintain reserve borrowing capacity to be able 
to use bridge financing should the need arise.  This suggests a preference for a 
conservative capital structure – a gearing ratio that is below the maximum level 
that it could be. 
 
1.4.3 Strategic approach to gearing 
The term “strategic approach to gearing” describes a policy of managing capital 
structure that takes account of the level of concentration among other companies in 
the sector in which the company operates.  A company’s capital structure is influenced 
by the level of concentration among other companies in the sector.  
 
The incremental contributions achieved in relation to under-investment problem show 
that: 
• management have an incentive to engage in empire building for two reasons: first, 
a bigger company leads to bigger remuneration; and secondly, growing larger 
reduces the risk of becoming a target for a competitor that grows faster (with the 
downside of management of the acquired company becoming a cost saving with 
obvious implications for personal welfare); 
 
• to be successful in making acquisitions, buyers must compete with other potential 
purchasers: this process is facilitated by a balance sheet that can provide financing 
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for acquisitions easily and quickly.  Bridge financing (described in Chapter 3 as a 
tool to manage problems with asymmetric information) can be deployed quickly to 
finance acquisitions providing the balance sheet is sufficiently conservative to 
support the debt; 
 
• company gearing will reflect a company’s acquisition ambitions and the availability 
of opportunities in the sector in which it operates: so, in a highly fragmented sector, 
company gearing is likely to be low to provide the platform to launch acquisitions 
and vice versa; 
 
• thus, company gearing is related to measures of concentration of other companies 
in the sector in which it operates.  This is a factor that is external to the company 
but affects its decisions about capital structure.  This provides an additional factor 
that explains capital structure decisions.  A measure of concentration is developed 
to assess the ability of a company to finance acquisitions which combines size and 
balance sheet – the firepower index – derived from the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index; 
 
• the hypothesised relationship is tested empirically using firepower (and more 
conventional measures of concentration using market values and sales) and both 
gearing and relative gearing (gearing relative to the other companies in the sector).  
The results provide support for the hypothesised positive relationship between 
company gearing (and relative gearing) and the firepower measure of 
concentration in the sector in which the company operates. 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
15 
 
1.5 Main findings and thesis structure 
In Chapter 2, the model in Myers (1995) is extended to address both internal and 
external financing to show that the under-investment problem arises only in the 
external financing case and that the cause is the financing method – the mix of debt 
and equity.  The external financing of the investment can change the overall capital 
structure and this change in capital structure can lead to a transfer in value from the 
shareholders to the debt-holders where overall gearing is reduced thereby making the 
existing debt less risky and so more valuable – hence the under-investment problem.  
Alternatively, by achieving an increase in gearing, value will be transferred from the 
debt-holders to the shareholders (since existing debt will become riskier): this is the 
solution to the under-investment problem. 
 
The mechanism that links changes in capital structure and transfers in value between 
debt-holders and shareholders can be used to manage the under-investment problem.  
Value that is transferred to debt-holders resulting from a change in capital structure 
can be recaptured by making a subsequent adjustment in capital structure to restore 
the gearing that prevailed before the investment was made.  This technique can be 
used to understand both the over-investment problem and the pecking order theory. 
 
Hypotheses are developed and tested to provide an alternative explanation for the 
results reported in the existing empirical work which appears to support the proposed 
solutions to the under-investment problem in Myers (1977) of shortening debt maturity.  
These empirical results support the analysis and do not provide support for the 
traditional approach to under-investment – namely shortening debt maturity or 
reducing gearing. 
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The solution identified of recapturing value transferred by a post-investment 
adjustment to capital structure is much simpler and cheaper than adjusting debt 
maturity or adjusting the amount of debt in the balance sheet (a solution that can also 
reduce problems of under-investment – if debt is low, any transfer in value will also be 
small).  Marginal adjustments to gearing are much simpler than major changes in 
maturity or gearing.  In any event, the purpose of the solution in Myers (1977) is to 
promote a dialogue with the lenders which can always occur regardless of debt 
maturity. 
 
In Chapter 3, the model in Jensen and Meckling (1976) is extended to identify when 
the over-investment problem arises.  As with the under-investment problem, only in 
certain situations does a transfer of value from debt-holders to shareholders arise and, 
in some cases, this may not be sufficient to convert an unprofitable investment 
opportunity into one that is profitable. 
 
As with the under-investment problem, transfers in value between stakeholders can 
arise when capital structure is changed.  The presence of an investment opportunity 
is not necessary to achieve a change in capital structure – it can happen by retiring 
debt by issuing equity or vice versa.  Value can be taken from debt-holders by simply 
reducing the credit quality of the existing debt by increasing gearing (or by other 
means).  
 
This process of deceiving investors and causing them to suffer a loss of value is tested 
using an experiment on proxy debt investors to see how they react.  The experiment 
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shows that debt investors can identify where such loss of value occurs and can take 
appropriate action.  Investors in debt securities are unlikely to continue to buy bonds 
when there is the expectation that the management will transfer value away from the 
debt-holders.  The investors will react by demanding a greater return to compensate 
for this risk. 
 
This suggests that maintaining a stable capital structure is the best way to reassure 
debt investors that it is unlikely that there will be any loss of value in their investments 
brought about by adverse capital structure changes.  This is consistent with long run 
stability in gearing ratios, although adjustment to the long-run target will be needed 
from time to time. 
 
The model in Myers and Majluf (1984) is extended to include alternative steps to the 
option considered in that paper of a simple preference for debt over equity.  The 
problem of information asymmetry can be resolved by extending the idea of managing 
the capital structure as in the under-investment and over-investment problems.  
Techniques to overcome the information asymmetry problems are described to enable 
the company to make investments when its share price does not reflect the 
management’s perception of value.  One technique is to use bridge financing: the 
company borrows on a short-term basis (usually from banks) to undertake the 
investment and then refinances with debt and equity when the market value of its 
shares reflects all the relevant information.  The providers of bridge finance expect to 
be repaid from the refinancing, so the lending decision they take is dependent on their 
view of the feasibility of the refinancing and the downside risk if the refinancing cannot 
be put in place. 
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This bridge financing technique in some ways supports the pecking order theory since 
it is debt, but it is a temporary financing that is replaced with long run financing in the 
preferred combination of debt and equity within a short period after the bridge finance 
is put in place.  So, strictly, this approach does not support the pecking order theory 
which implies permanent debt.  The use of bridge finance is a more dynamic approach 
where a temporary deviation away from a target gearing ratio is contemplated with the 
objective of subsequent reversion to the target. 
 
Hypotheses are developed to test the proposed solutions where gearing increases 
and is then followed by an adjustment back to the target capital structure.  This is 
achieved by comparing changes in gearing in the periods following a year in which 
there is both a financing deficit and an increase in gearing.  The results support the 
idea that there is an increase in gearing to finance a deficit but that this is followed by 
reductions in gearing as the capital structure is adjusted. 
 
In Chapter 4, the role of management and their personal objectives are examined in 
the context of the competitive landscape of the sector in which they operate.  It is 
argued that managers prefer to be employed by companies that will grow because this 
helps their own remuneration to grow and that this growth can be facilitated by a 
balance sheet that gives the company a competitive advantage over the competition, 
particularly in relation to the ability to make acquisitions.  Expansion by acquisition 
increases company size and reduces the prospect of becoming a target for another 
company’s expansion ambitions.   
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Industry concentration is usually measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl index which 
is based on company sales as in de Jong, Nguyen and van Dijk (2008).  This index 
together with two further measures are used i) where company value is substituted for 
sales and ii) a measure known as firepower is developed to measure the relative 
financial strength of a company within a sector.  Firepower is based on the Hirschman-
Herfindahl measure of industry concentration but in this case, is computed using the 
enterprise value of the companies within the sector within which it operates and 
incorporates the company’s capital structure.  Firepower is designed to capture more 
than market share, that is the extra value associated with financial power such as 
economies of scale in its financing that will be reflected in the value of the enterprise 
and hence in its ability to compete.  The relationship between firepower and gearing 
is analysed and identified.  This relationship helps explain company decisions on 
capital structure in terms of management incentives. 
 
The relationship between gearing and firepower is tested empirically and a positive 
relationship between company gearing and the concentration of other companies in 
the sector is identified.  This supports the idea that where a company is faced with a 
fragmented sector, its balance sheet has less gearing so support acquisitions and vice 
versa. 
 
The data for the empirical tests are taken from Compustat for north American 
companies for the period 1995 – 2014 restricted to non-financial company data: this 
includes data where the company is not present for the full period: this avoids 
survivorship bias.    Yield curve data are taken from the US Treasury website, US 
consumer price index data are downloaded from US Department of Labour website, 
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and yields on corporate bonds by maturity are from Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch/Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Economic Data 
 
The two methods highlighted in Flannery and Hankins (2013) as the most efficient 
among a group of alternative estimating procedures, namely fixed effects and system 
GMM, are used here and the procedure in relation to system GMM used in that paper 
(using Stata's “xtdpdsys” command, two steps, with all the independent variables 
specified as "predetermined" and the maximum number of lags restricted to two or, in 
some cases, more) is followed. 
 
Conclusions derived from the analyses carried out are set out at the end of each 
Chapter.  A summary of those conclusions is set out in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 2 MANAGING THE UNDER-INVESTMENT PROBLEM 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this Chapter is to assess the classical model on under-investment 
developed by Myers (1977) in a critical fashion and to develop further the notions and 
implications underpinning the model reflecting realistic market characteristics and 
managerial objectives.  By extending the model in Myers (1977), new insights into the 
origins of the under-investment problem are revealed including solutions that are 
simpler and easier to implement than those suggested in Myers (1977).   
 
Analysis of the variables used in the empirical support for the solutions in Myers (1977) 
leads to the generation of new testable hypotheses.  Empirical analyses are presented 
to test the analytic and narrative arguments advanced via this set of hypotheses with 
results that do not support the solutions in Myers (1977). 
 
The under-investment problem can arise where the debt-holders receive some benefit 
when the company acquires an investment opportunity with positive net present value.  
This benefit is acquired at the expense of shareholders and so reduces the 
advantages of the investment.  Debt-holders could lose out if management rejects the 
investment opportunity because of the potential transfer of value away from 
shareholders – hence the label “under-investment”.  Myers’ (1977) solution to the 
under-investment problem is to shorten debt maturity so that it matures at a date 
before the expiry of the investment opportunity.  This is the connection to the empirical 
relationship between debt maturity and the market to book value ratio (a proxy for 
investment opportunities) established in Barclay and Smith (1995), Antoniou, Guney 
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and Paudyal (2006), Akdal (2010) and Kleczyk (2012).  Barnea, Haugen and Senbet 
(1980) address the same issue but propose including a call option in the debt contract 
to allow the company to retire the debt early – in effect implementing Myers’ (1977) 
solution but in a different way.  Similarly, Bodie and Taggart (1978) suggested call 
options should be written into bond contracts to facilitate the management of under-
investment problem.  Thatcher (1985) distinguish two forms of the call option to retire 
a bond: either the conventional option to call which is usually after an initial period (say 
5 years); or, within the initial period dependent on certain other conditions being 
satisfied arguing that this represents a tool to manage agency costs of debt. 
 
Banko and Zhou (2010) report that callable bonds are issued by companies with 
problems of information asymmetry and under-investment. Jung, Ellis and Eplin (2012) 
present support for the use of callable bonds in managing agency costs of debt: their 
approach included examining changes in bond ratings – this is a good way to identify 
transfers in value since a change in rating indicates changes in credit quality and 
hence the cost of debt which is directly linked to value. However, Crabbe and Helwege 
(1994) conclude that agency theory is unlikely to be the most important explanation 
for the issue of bonds with call provisions. 
 
Other relevant evidence includes the negative relationship between gearing and the 
market to book value ratio established in Rajan and Zingales (1995), Graham (2000), 
Hovakimian (2006), de Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008), Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal 
(2008), Akdal (2010) and Harrison and Widjaja (2014).  If gearing is minimised, then 
any possible transfer in value from equity holders to debt-holders is similarly minimised 
and hence both debt maturity and gearing are possible solutions to the under-
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investment problem.  However, both solutions have serious implications for cost and 
for the financing flexibility of the company.  Adjusting gearing or maturity to manage 
the under-investment problem associated with the acquisition of investment 
opportunities is not easy and not without cost.  Simpler and lower cost techniques to 
manage any problem are presented in this Chapter. 
 
The incremental contributions achieved in this Chapter show that: 
 
• The model in Myers (1977) can be extended by the inclusion of some simple 
assumptions to address both internal and external financing and the mix of debt 
and equity in the external financing of the investment clarifying that transfers of 
value to debt-holders occur in only limited circumstances;  
• In the case of internal financing, that there is no under-investment problem and 
hence that such a problem, if it does arise, can only arise in the external financing 
case; 
• The external financing case makes clear that the under-investment problem is a 
consequence of the financing decision rather than the investment decision and that 
it arises only in limited circumstances; 
• The circumstances of the under-investment problem can only arise where the 
existing debt-holders enjoy a transfer of value caused by a reduction in gearing 
following the financing of the investment; 
• In the case of external financing where the investment opportunity represents a 
positive or zero net present value project, providing gearing is not reduced by the 
financing, there is no under-investment problem and even if there is some benefit 
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enjoyed by debt-holders, they cannot capture all the benefit of a positive net 
present value investment opportunity and so some benefit will accrue to 
shareholders, thus avoiding the under-investment problem; 
• The under-investment problem can be avoided completely by i) ensuring that the 
company’s gearing ratio is not reduced by the external financing; or ii) if gearing is 
reduced by the financing, then reversing any transfer of value from shareholders 
to debt-holders by a subsequent, marginal adjustment to capital structure: this 
solution is much simpler and less costly than those suggested in Myers (1977); 
• The under-investment problem can arise in the case of financial distress but that 
there are incentives for management to pursue investment rather than to under-
invest; 
• The motivation for Myers’ (1977) suggestion to reduce debt maturity (to put the 
investment decision in the hands of the lenders) is unnecessary since the 
management can always negotiate with lenders regardless of the maturity of debt 
if indeed that were necessary; 
• The other solutions (mediation and adjustments to the loan contract) to the under-
investment problem proposed in Myers (1977) are shown to be inappropriate and 
costly and that more efficient techniques to manage any under-investment problem 
are put forward; 
• The empirical results that are cited in support of the solutions in Myers (1977) – 
essentially the negative relationship between gearing and debt maturity and the 
market to book value ratio – can be explained in other ways that do not support the 
solutions proposed in Myers (1977) for the under-investment problem.  Two 
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explanations are provided for this negative relationship: first the accounting 
treatment of investment expenditures; and secondly, the link between the market 
value of the enterprise in i) the gearing ratio; and ii) the market to book value: this 
suggests using a gearing ratio based on book values: this is tested empirically; 
• The empirical results (using gearing and debt maturity based on book values) 
confirm that debt maturity is only weakly related to the market to book value ratio 
and, using gearing measured in terms of book values, a positive relationship 
between gearing and the market to book value ratio is established confirming the 
arguments above and providing no support for the solutions in Myers (1977).  
The analysis of the model in Myers (1977) is presented in section 2.  In section 3, the 
empirical evidence supporting Myers (1977) is reviewed and two alternative 
explanations for the prior empirical results are presented: this leads to the 
development and testing of a number of hypotheses involving modifications to the past 
empirical approach are tested which provide an alternative explanation of the negative 
relationship between the market to book value ratio and debt maturity and gearing that 
does not support Myers’ (1977) solutions.  Results are set out in section 4 and 
conclusions are set out in section 5. 
 
2.2 The under-investment model in Myers’ (1977)  
This section examines the following: the financial distress case of the under-
investment problem – the debt overhang problem (in section 2.1); the solutions in 
Myers’ (1977) (in section 2.2); the general case in Myers (1977) where volatility is held 
constant (but firm value is allowed to vary) where the model is extended by the 
including some simple assumptions to link the value of debt to the gearing ratio and 
the analysis of internal and external funding (in section 2.3); the general case in Myers 
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(1977) where firm value is held constant (but volatility is allowed to vary) where there 
is no need to consider the method of financing since firm value is held constant (in 
section 2.4); and methods to manage the transfer of value between shareholders and 
debt-holders are developed (in section 2.5). 
 
The analysis in this Chapter focusses on the approach in Myers (1977).  However, it 
is not the only source of the argument that shortening debt maturity is a solution to the 
under-investment problem.  Mauer and Ott (2000) provide a real options framework in 
which the impact of an investment opportunity is examined, and the under-investment 
problem arises, and they show that the agency costs of under-investment can be 
significantly reduced by partially financing the growth option with new debt and that 
agency costs increase as debt maturity is shortened because bankruptcy costs rise.  
This is a major disadvantage to this solution to the under-investment problem. 
 
2.2.1 Under-investment in financial distress  
Essentially, the distress example involves a company whose only asset is the right to 
invest an amount, I (this is an upper case “i”) and thereby obtain an asset with value 
V.  The company has a liability of P.  So, the company has a negative net worth.  There 
is a debt overhang.  Two cases are considered: first, where the debt matures before 
the investment decision is made; and secondly, where the debt matures after the 
investment opportunity expires.  An option not included in Myers (1977) which is to 
negotiate with the lenders is then considered as an alternative solution to adjusting 
debt maturity. 
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This is followed by an analysis of incentives for management to invest.  Arguments 
are presented that managers are more likely to over-invest (to prolong their 
employment) rather than under-invest as suggested by Myers (1977) 
 
2.2.1.1 First case: debt matures before the investment decision is made 
Obviously, if I > V then the investment option will not be exercised in any event as the 
company value is less than the required investment: here the investment opportunity 
must have a negative net present value.   
 
However, if V   I + P, then the company will raise the required amount of funds both 
to finance the investment and to meet the debt repayment.  This investment will enable 
the debt to be paid off and for shareholders to obtain a non-negative net present value 
investment. 
 
However, if I+P > V  I, then clearly the project is still worth undertaking, since it has 
a non-negative net present value (i.e. V  I) but it will not generate sufficient to cover 
both the investment (I) and the repayment of existing debt (P).  Here, under-investment 
could arise since there is no return to shareholders despite the investment opportunity 
offering a positive net present value. 
 
Because in this case, debt matures before the decision to invest arises, the company 
will be unable to make the debt repayment and so will be in default.  The argument in 
Myers (1977) is that the debt-holders will assume control of the company.  The debt-
holders will then be able to exercise the investment option and generate value to 
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achieve a partial repayment of the debt.  In this case, the investment option could be 
exercised by the debt-holders and the under-investment problem need not arise. 
 
Myers' (1977) argument is that as the debt maturity event precedes the exercise time 
for the investment option, that either the management will be forced to negotiate with 
the lenders or the lenders will be able to seize the initiative because there is a default 
(as the debt repayment is not made) and thereby avoid the adverse consequences 
(for the debt-holders) of the investment not being made. 
 
2.2.1.2 Second case: debt matures after the investment decision is made 
As with the previous case, there are three possible outcomes and the first two are 
identical in each of the two cases.  A difference between this case and the previous 
case arises in the third possible outcome.  If I+P > V  I, then because the investment 
returns are insufficient to pay off the debt and leave a positive net present value project 
for the shareholders, Myers’ (1977) argument is that the managers would allow the 
option to expire and the debt-holders would have no opportunity to exercise the 
investment option because their ability to act would arise only after default which would 
occur after the option to invest expires.  Thus, an investment option with a positive net 
present value would be allowed to lapse.  This is Myers' (1977) under-investment 
problem and arises only because, according to his argument, the debt maturity occurs 
after the opportunity or decision to invest has passed. 
 
Myers (1977) concludes that one way of mitigating the problem is for the company to 
use shorter term debt rather than longer term debt.  The idea is to bring the decision 
point for the lenders to an earlier point in time by ensuring that the debt becomes due 
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before the timing of the investment decision and, when it is not repaid, a default ensues 
allowing the debt-holders to take control of the company.  Therefore Myers’ (1977) 
paper is quoted as an explanation for the empirical negative relationship between 
companies with growth opportunities and debt maturity observed by Long and Malitz 
(1983), Barclay and Smith (1995), Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2006) and Kleczyk 
(2012). 
 
The above summarises the argument in Myers (1977).  However, two different 
outcomes that were not considered are possible.  First, Myers (1977) assumed that 
there is no default and that the managers remain in control and take the decision not 
to invest.  But the company is clearly in financial distress and very likely to be in breach 
of company law arising from its negative net worth situation (debt exceeds equity) and 
very likely to be in breach of a loan covenant so it may not be safe to assume that 
managers remain in control and can therefore pass up the investment opportunity. 
 
Secondly, even though the debt may not yet be due for repayment, the management 
would be free to approach the debt providers: such an approach is not dependent on 
a particular maturity date.  Informing the debt-holders of the investment opportunity 
would allow them to consider financing the investment to regain some part of their 
outstanding indebtedness.  It could be in the interests of the management to do this 
as it could prolong their employment even if it were of no benefit to shareholders.   
 
2.2.1.3 The motives of management 
The argument in Myers (1977) is that management would walk away if there were no 
benefit for the shareholders.  Also, it is assumed that managers would be happy to 
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adjust maturity in the way envisaged in the solution.  Both these assumptions are 
questionable and are not supported in the literature.  
 
Stiglitz (1974) provides an irrelevance theorem concerning debt maturity which is 
based on an argument that follows Miller and Modigliani (1958) and their assumptions 
(perfect markets and no financial distress costs).  However, asymmetric information 
distorts that conclusion.  Flannery (1986) presents a simple model of asymmetric 
information in which there are two types of firm (good and bad) but where the firm type 
is not known by lenders who lend to both firm types at the same rate.  In this way, 
good firms subsidise the debt cost of bad firms.  Good firms then seek to refinance at 
the earliest opportunity when the information asymmetry is resolved to reduce the cost 
of debt: good firms therefore prefer shorter maturity or debt with embedded call 
options.  To avoid signalling that they are bad firms, bad firms also prefer shorter 
maturities.   
 
Diamond (1991) develops the model in Flannery (1986) by including liquidation risk 
and in Diamond (1993), control rents (funds consumed by management) are also 
included.  These papers highlight the liquidation risk of shorter maturity debt.  Johnson 
(2010) comments that too much short-term debt can lead to suboptimal liquidation risk.  
Mauer and Ott (2000) suggest that shortening maturity (to manage under-investment 
problems) can be balanced with reducing leverage to avoid the associated liquidity 
risk. 
 
Stulz (2000) points out that in the extreme case of short-term debt, debt-holders have 
an opportunity to monitor the company and management at each loan maturity which 
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is more effective than for longer term debt: the impact of monitoring is reduced as 
maturity increases and as leverage reduces.  Such monitoring reduces management 
flexibility and represents an area of risk.  Management have an incentive to minimise 
the impact of monitoring and any associated risk and this can be achieved with longer 
term debt that reduces the frequency of debt rollover.  Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and 
Raman (2005) identify an inverse relationship between managerial ownership and 
debt maturity. 
 
Similarly, less debt reduces monitoring and the associated risk. Berger, Ofek and 
Yermack (1997) provide evidence that management prefer low gearing.  Stulz (2000) 
comments that conservative capital structures give more discretion to managers by 
mitigating the disciplining effect of debt. 
 
Management are likely to prefer low gearing and debt maturity that does not promote 
frequent monitoring or increased default risk. 
 
Lyandres and Zhdanov (2010) consider the option value of an investment opportunity 
in the presence of debt.  In the absence of agency conflicts and assuming that the 
investment option would be lost in the event of default (for a company with debt) then 
shareholders would prefer the option to be exercised immediately to avoid losing its 
value – an effect they label as the accelerated investment effect.  This risk can be 
mitigated by reducing the default risk including liquidity risk and overall gearing.  
Obviously, if the investment opportunity is not lost in default then the argument to 
accelerate investment falls away. 
 
 Chapter 2 Managing the under-investment problem 
32 
 
It is perhaps possible that the company is in financial distress but that this is known 
only to the management.  Here the information asymmetry is opposite to that 
envisaged in the motivation for the pecking order theory as in Myers and Majluf (1984) 
where the firm’s true value (as perceived by management) is not recognised by 
investors.  In this case, investors including lenders do not perceive the situation of 
distress.   
 
However, management have an incentive to prolong their employment so would prefer 
to exercise investment options that facilitate the achievement of that objective.  By 
pursuing an investment project, the management remain employed and at least 
generate some value for the lenders even if ultimately, there is no net benefit for the 
shareholders.  Indeed, in this situation, management might be tempted to overstate 
the merits of the investment to persuade the debt providers either to invest or to 
cooperate in finding new investors.  Management have an incentive to over-invest 
rather than under-invest as in Jensen (1986) to be able to consume perks and other 
benefits. 
 
Guedj and Scharfstein (2004) highlight managers of single-product early stage 
pharmaceutical firms who are reluctant to abandon development of their only viable 
drug candidates compared to the managers of mature firms with multiple products in 
development who are more willing to drop unpromising drug candidates.  This is a 
relevant example because single-product companies without regulatory approval for 
their product may not be in distress, but their future is clearly uncertain.  These are 
circumstances that are similar to those of the under-investment problem.  However, 
here, the managers do not walk away as suggested in Myers (1977).  Managers of 
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such companies want to stay employed rather than shut the company/project down 
as they perhaps should if they were to follow the example of larger companies. 
 
Myers (1977) points to a weakness in his own argument that the managers control the 
preparation of the investment case for the investment opportunity.  They have all the 
information and projections which are needed to evaluate the opportunity.  In this 
situation, it is perfectly possible for managers interested in continuing to be employed, 
to construct a suitably convincing (or exaggerated) case (i.e. showing a positive net 
present value) for prospective external investors (whether bank or equity providers) 
and thereby obtain the necessary finance. 
 
The structure of management compensation arrangements is usually designed to align 
the interests of management with shareholders.  This is often achieved by annual 
bonuses linked to earnings and with the award of share options where the value 
depends directly on the company’s share price.  Such arrangements are not usually 
designed explicitly to protect the debt-holders as their interests are not perfectly 
aligned with those of the shareholders.  This difference in interests is recognised in 
the contractual arrangements between the company and lenders which include legal 
obligations and covenants that are intended to protect the lenders against any adverse 
consequences arising from the potential conflict of interests.   
 
Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010) distinguish the effects of the two types of 
management incentivisation arrangements: share ownership and share options.  They 
report a negative relationship between managers with share ownership and short-term 
debt (more share ownership implies less short-term debt).  Short-term debt increases 
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monitoring and refinancing risk for managers.  In the case of managers with share 
options, a different relationship is reported: higher volatility (which enhances the value 
of share options) is associated with more short-term debt (although high volatility 
usually discourages lenders, so this relationship also reflects lenders’ preferences).   
 
However, as a minimum, being remunerated by means of a salary (ignoring share 
ownership or share options) is likely to motivate managers to find ways to pursue 
investment projects even where there might have been an under-investment problem 
since it leads to the opportunity to consume perks as in Jensen (1986).  In the 
circumstances of distress described by Myers (1977), there is a clear and obvious 
incentive for management to find ways to undertake any investment opportunity (even 
negative net present value projects) as this will prolong their employment and other 
benefits. 
 
There is one other way (not considered in Myers (1977)) for the managers to maintain 
their employment.  The investment opportunity could be transferred into a subsidiary 
into which external investors could be introduced.  This transfer may only be possible 
if either the lenders agreed (if their consent was required) or the lenders could not 
prevent such a transfer.  Such an arrangement would protect the external investors 
from suffering sub-optimal returns and allow the balance of profits (if any) to accrue to 
the lenders.  This conveniently allows the management to prolong their employment 
and it avoids the existence of the prior claims of existing debt-holders interfering with 
the financing of the investment option.  In this way, the under-investment option will 
not arise.  But this option could only work if the lending arrangements with the lenders 
to the parent company did not prohibit such a structure. 
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Bhattacharya (1977) proposed a solution to the distress case in Myers (1977) which 
involved the use of new lenders that would be guaranteed senior access rights to the 
cash flows generated by the new investment.  This mechanism, if permitted by the 
existing lenders (and usually there are restrictions on granting prior access to a new 
lender contained in loan agreements) would at least ensure that the investment would 
proceed.  However, any surplus left over after servicing the new lenders would still be 
directed first towards the existing debt-holders rather than the equity holders.  This 
solution is similar to the alternative described above where the investment opportunity 
is transferred into a subsidiary (if that avoids breaching any loan covenants) which can 
then be financed on a senior basis. 
 
Bhattacharya and Faure-Grimaud (2001) analysed the question of whether there is a 
way of restructuring the existing debt in a way that encourages the existing equity 
holders to provide the funds for the new investment?  Their answer was, in general, 
no.  If the company is in the situation where the debt exceeds the total assets of the 
company, then the equity holders’ value is effectively extinguished and so the 
company is really in the hands of the lenders who are likely to convert that part of their 
debt which can’t be serviced in the future into new equity.  The financing of the new 
investment is a matter for the new shareholders, not the old.  So, there should be no 
under-investment problems in the distress case. 
 
These arguments are discussed here in the context of the financial distress case, but 
they can be applied to general case which is considered below. 
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2.2.2 Myers’ (1977) solutions 
This section analyses the three solutions proposed in Myers (1977) to manage the 
under-investment problem: i) a requirement on companies to invest in positive net 
present value projects; ii) mediation; and iii) shortening debt maturity.   
 
It would be possible for lenders to include clauses in the debt instrument which 
stipulate that the company must undertake positive net present value investment 
opportunities.  But compliance could require the company to raise new capital – 
something a company is unlikely to commit to in a legal document. In fact, it is more 
likely that lenders impose limitations on investment in loan agreements rather than 
positive requirements.   
 
In a sense, there is already such an obligation on directors whose job is to maximise 
shareholder wealth.  So, it could be argued that it is unnecessary to impose such a 
requirement.  Indeed, the usual response of banks faced with financial distress is to 
discourage new investment and seek to get their money back. 
 
The construction of an agreement to impose such a positive obligation on a company 
would involve problems of definition and would still suffer the difficulty that the 
managers would ultimately control the information and therefore the investment 
decision.  In any event, such an agreement would not provide much protection to 
lenders since if the managers or company did not comply and the option lapsed, what 
recourse would lenders have?  The lenders could sue the directors but what they might 
recover might not be substantial.   
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Myers’ (1977) second solution is mediation.  Thus, the debt contract would specify that 
a mediator be appointed at the time of exercise of the investment option.  The role of 
the mediator would be to ensure that managers did not prejudice the position of 
lenders by passing up the investment opportunity.  The involvement is like the situation 
which arises at times of financial distress where lenders appoint an administrator to 
protect the interests of lenders. 
 
Successful implementation of this procedure would depend on the management 
alerting the lenders to the need to involve the mediator.  If managers were to take such 
a positive step, then they could also be relied on not to pass up profitable investment 
opportunities and so mediation would not be necessary. 
 
Myers’ (1977) third solution is that debt maturity should be shorter rather than longer 
since early maturity (i.e. before the exercise of the investment option) would force 
management into renegotiation with lenders and thereby avoid the under-investment 
problem.  Thus, companies with growth opportunities where they use debt (to finance 
their business) should use short-term debt (rather than longer term debt) to avoid the 
under-investment problem.  Therefore Myers’ (1977) paper is quoted as an 
explanation for the negative relationship between investment opportunities (as 
identified by a high market to book value ratio) and debt maturity observed in Barclay 
and Smith (1995), Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2006, 2008) and Kleczyk (2012).  
There is also a link to the solution proposed in Haugen and Senbet (1981) where the 
suggestion is to include a call option that can be exercised by the company 
management to shorten debt maturity. 
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The difficulty with Myers’ (1977) argument about maturity is that it is unlikely that 
management would take a decision to protect the lenders in this way as the threat is 
from the management themselves.  If the management could not be relied upon to 
behave appropriately, why is it logical to assume that the management would feel a 
need to take preventative action by shortening debt maturity?  By shortening debt 
maturity for these reasons, management are saying to the lenders, that management 
cannot be relied upon or trusted to look after the interests of lenders hence the 
preference for shorter maturity.  It is more logical to argue that lenders should require 
a mechanism to be included in the debt contract to manage the risk (if that was 
appropriate) rather than relying on management to select a suitable maturity. 
 
Rather than adjusting debt maturity, it would make more sense for the company to 
explain the timing of the exercise of the investment option – in which case the lenders 
would take steps to protect their position if that was necessary. 
 
But this is an example of the conflicts between the interests of equity and debt-holders.  
Management are expected to take decisions that are in the interests of equity holders.  
It is for the lenders to seek such protections.  It is for the management to resist such 
requests in the interests of preserving the best position for the shareholders. 
 
If management wished to renegotiate with the debt-holders, then the maturity of the 
debt would not matter although the cost of such renegotiation could be affected by the 
maturity of existing debt.  Myers (1977) argues that renegotiation only arises when 
debt maturity occurs before the exercise of the investment option.  But it is always 
open to the management to renegotiate with debt-holders regardless of maturity.  
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Management can meet lenders and point out that a problem will arise and invite 
lenders to take such action as they would otherwise take if the debt was maturing at 
the earlier time.  So, careful choice of debt maturity is not necessarily a solution to the 
under-investment problem – it does not assist the problem at all and is most unlikely 
to be adopted by management.  Shortening debt maturity brings forward refinancing 
risks for the company which could otherwise be avoided and provides signals to debt 
providers that might be misinterpreted as implying financial distress.  Shorter maturity 
increases liquidity risk and creates earlier monitoring events for lenders which 
managers would prefer to avoid as explained in Stulz (2000). 
 
It is most unlikely that corporate treasurers would recognise the strategy proposed by 
Myers (1977).  Indeed, the work of Graham and Harvey (2001) confirm that this is the 
case.  They find very little support for this approach based on a survey of 392 CFOs 
seeking their views on the under-investment problem. 
 
The conclusions of this section are that in the distress example (where the debt-
holders can capture some of the cash flows accruing from a positive net present value 
investment opportunity) the under-investment problem does not present a difficulty 
that needs the adjustment of debt maturity for the following reasons: 
 
1 Management have an incentive in the distress example to pursue the 
investment opportunity as it will prolong their employment.  This means that 
management are unlikely to let a profitable investment opportunity lapse even if it is 
not directly beneficial to shareholders – at least they are not disadvantaged.  Hart and 
Moore (1995) comment that management’s empire building tendencies are sufficiently 
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strong to ensure that they will always take on new investments even if the net present 
value is negative (management is more likely to over-invest rather than under-invest).   
 
2 Regardless of the maturity of debt, management always have the option to 
negotiate with the company’s existing debt providers and thereby avoid the problem.  
It is not necessary to adjust debt maturity to create the option to negotiate with the 
debt providers.  Allowing the investment option to expire is a static approach that 
ignores the dynamics of the option to negotiate. 
 
3 The circumstances of the distress example suggest that the company is already 
in a financial distress situation and therefore is likely to be under the control of the 
lenders, and, if so, the under-investment problem should not arise: in distress, the 
lenders expect to become shareholders by swapping part of their debt in the 
restructuring process.  Management aware of this, will treat the lenders as the new 
shareholders in waiting. 
 
4 Shortening debt maturity is an option designed to prevent management taking 
a decision that is not in the interests of lenders.  If management can be relied on to 
adjust debt maturity, then they surely could be relied upon not to take the decision that 
the change in maturity is designed to prevent – that is, to pass up a profitable 
investment opportunity. 
 
These arguments indicate that for the distress case, company debt maturity need not 
be shortened to control for the under-investment problem.   
 
 Chapter 2 Managing the under-investment problem 
41 
 
2.2.3 Generalised case of the argument in Myers (1977) 
The key components of the model in Myers (1977) are presented in this section within 
an analytic structure to facilitate the extension to Myers’ (1977) model achieved in the 
subsequent sections of this Chapter.  The extension of the model incorporates both 
internal and external financing and the financing mix (debt and/or equity) for the 
investment: both zero and positive net present value investment opportunities are 
considered. 
 
Myers' (1977) proof for the general case follows closely the distress case described 
above but without the debt overhang.  It is based on the following equality: 
Enterprise value (V) = value of the debt (VD) + value of the equity (VE) or 
 V = VD + VE (2.1) 
The approach is to examine how the values of existing debt and equity change and 
how value can be transferred from debt-holders to shareholders and vice versa.  
Additional assumptions are introduced as the model is developed beyond the original 
design of Myers (1977). 
 
To examine how the values in the equation change in relation to investment, the 
variables in the above equation are differentiated with respect to I, the investment 
variable.  Thus 
 dV/dI = dVD/dI + dVE/dI    or,  (2.2) 
rate of change of V = rate of change of VD + rate of change of VE 
 
VD is a function of V, the value of the company (or enterprise) and 2 which is the 
variance rate of the estimated future value of the company.  Thus, VD can be described 
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as a function depending on two variables: first, the enterprise value, V; and secondly, 
it’s associated variance as follows: VD = f[V, 2]. 
 
Myers (1977) derives the differential of VD with respect to I.  As VD is not a direct 
function of I, the investment variable, partial differentials must be used.  This involves 
differentiating with respect to V (and 2) and multiplying by dV/dI (and d2/dI) as 
follows: 
dVD/dI = f/V x dV/dI + f/2 x d2/dI  (2.3) 
where the use of "" indicates partial derivatives. 
 
The next step is to consider each of the two products on the right-hand side of equation 
(2.3) separately when the other term (on the right-hand side of the equation) is made 
equal to 0.  In this way, it is possible to examine first, how the value of debt changes 
with investment when volatility is constant (i.e. d2/dI = 0); and secondly, how the value 
of debt changes when the value of the company is unaffected by the investment (i.e. 
dV/dI = 0).  By considering separately these two cases, an insight into how a 
combination of changes in the two variables will affect VD can be obtained.   
 
In the next section, Myers’ (1977) argument is extended with certain additional 
assumptions to address these two cases with subsidiary scenarios: 
 
i) When volatility is constant: internal and external financing including zero and 
positive net present value projects and the financing mix; and 
ii) When enterprise value is constant (volatility varies): internal financing only (since 
the enterprise value is constant by assumption). 
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To identify the impact of investment on the value of existing debt and equity securities, 
it is assumed that the value of debt is related to the gearing ratio in the obvious way: 
if gearing increases/reduces, then the value of existing debt securities will fall/rise.  
Gearing is taken to be the ratio of the value of debt to the enterprise value (the sum of 
the values of debt and equity).  It is assumed that no other factors (such as tax) have 
an impact on the value of existing securities. 
 
2.2.3.1  Internal financing of the investment 
Myers’ (1977) argument did not envisage the possibility of dV/dI = 0 (which implies 
internal financing of a project with zero net present value).  This followed from his 
assumption that dV/dI  1 (which implies a positive increase in the value of the 
enterprise following investment).  In this section, internal financing is considered in two 
separate cases: first, where the net present value of the investment opportunity is zero; 
and secondly, where the net present value is positive (i.e. non-zero). 
 
Distinguishing between internal and external financing is very important because it will 
be shown that the under-investment problem does not arise in the internal financing 
case (with volatility constant).  So, in the external financing case, where the under-
investment problem can arise, it must be because of the financing rather than of the 
investment.   
 
For zero net present value projects which are financed internally, then dV/dI = 0.  If 
the value dV/dI = 0 is substituted in equation (2.4) then it follows that dVD/dI = 0.  So, 
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there is no transfer of value to the debt-holders.  Since V = VE + VD then the rates of 
change of these variables is given by 
 dV/dI = dVD/dI + dVE/dI  
In this case, as there is no change in gearing (because of internal financing) then 
dVD/dI = 0 and therefore, it follows that dVE/dI = 0.  Hence there is no transfer of value 
between shareholders and debt-holders and so there is no under-investment problem. 
 
For positive net present value projects, it is assumed that the following inequality 
applies, dV/dI > 0.  Myers’ (1977) argument relied on equation (2.3) namely, 
dVD/dI = f/V x dV/dI        (2.4) 
 
where the sign of the value of the left-hand side of this equation depends on the sign 
of the value of f/V (since in this scenario dV/dI > 0, by definition).  Myers’ (1977) 
assumes that f/V > 0 as this implies that the debt value increases as enterprise value 
increases (when volatility is constant).  This means that the two terms on the right-
hand side of equation (2.4) are positive and hence the product is also positive.  Hence 
the sign of the left-hand side of equation (2.4) is positive and so there is an increase 
in the value of debt.   
 
The extended model (examining discrete changes in the variables) can be used to 
examine whether the predicted increase in value of the debt results in the under-
investment problem.  The sign “” is used to indicate change in the variable.  It is 
assumed that changes in the value of existing debt and equity are driven by changes 
in gearing. 
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It is assumed that each variable changes because of an investment, I, financed 
internally.  Therefore, after the investment is made, the value of the enterprise must 
equal the sum of the values of the equity and debt, so  
 (V + V) = (VE + VE) + (VD + VD) 
Since V = VE + VD, it follows that  
V = VE + VD         
By assumption, V > 0, because only projects with positive net present values have 
been specified.  The post-investment gearing ratio will be given by 
(VD + VD)/ (V + V)         
Three different outcomes can be contemplated: gearing is unchanged, gearing rises 
or gearing falls.  In case 1: gearing is unchanged, so pre-investment and post-
investment gearing are identical.  Hence  
(VD + VD)/ (V + V) = VD/V which can be simplified to  
VD/V = VD/V        (2.5) 
 
However, since the gearing ratio, VD/V, is always less than unity, it follows that VD/V 
<1 which implies that VD < V.  Hence, the debt-holders enjoy an increase in value 
in their debt securities but they do not capture all the increase in value generated by 
the investment so there must be an increase in value for the shareholders and so no 
under-investment problem arises – the investment is still beneficial for shareholders 
even if the debt-holders capture some of the benefit of the investment.   
 
While there is a transfer of value to the debt-holders, the investment remains profitable 
for the shareholders and management have no incentive to pass up the opportunity.  
It should be noted that it is not obvious that gearing could remain unchanged.  As there 
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is an increase in the value of debt (but not a commensurate increase in debt service), 
the existing interest stream would be spread over a larger value and this would amount 
to a reduction in return for the debt-holders that would be out of line with the return on 
the existing debt prior to investment so VD would be smaller to ensure that gearing 
will reduce as in the next case. 
 
In case 2, it is assumed that gearing falls in which case, there must be an improvement 
in the value of the debt securities so VD > 0.  Post investment gearing must be less 
than pre-investment gearing and hence 
(VD + VD)/ (V + V) < VD/V which simplifies to VD/V < VD/V.   
 
As before, since the pre-investment gearing is less than unity, it follows that VD < V 
and so no under-investment problem arises.  In contrast to the previous case, it is 
more likely that gearing would fall given an investment in a project with positive net 
present value. 
 
In case 3, it is assumed that gearing rises although it is not easy to see how this could 
arise given the assumption of internal financing of an investment with positive net 
present value.  Using the steps set out in case 2, the following inequality is obtained 
VD/V > VD/V.  But gearing is less than unity although still a positive number.  
However, since gearing has increased, VD < 0 which implies that V must also be 
negative to satisfy the inequality.  But V is positive by assumption, so the result is a 
contradiction implying that gearing cannot rise and so there is no under-investment 
problem.  
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The conclusion is that the over-investment problem does not arise in the situation of 
internal financing.  So, if there is an under-investment problem with external financing, 
it must arise because of the financing mix for the investment.  This insight is not 
addressed in Myers (1977). 
 
2.2.3.2 External financing 
The implication of the above analysis is that there may be a change in the values of 
existing securities arising simply because of a change in overall gearing rather than 
because of the investment.  For instance, financing the investment entirely with debt 
may increase overall gearing and damage the value of existing debt securities.  
Alternatively, if the new investment is financed entirely with equity, there may be an 
improvement in the value of existing debt securities resulting from the reduction in 
gearing.  The financing effect needs to be distinguished from the effects of the 
investment.   
 
This suggests that the analysis of investment opportunities should include estimates 
of the benefits or costs of any transfers in value from or to shareholders.  Such an 
approach would follow the principles behind the adjusted present value approach 
which seeks to include the financing effects (including tax shelter) within the 
investment evaluation framework (see Myers (1974) for the original description). 
 
For zero net present value projects financed externally, three cases are considered: 
all debt financing, all equity financing and a combination of debt and equity.  First, case 
1: all debt financing: let the increase in debt to finance the investment = D.  Let the 
change in value of existing debt = VD and let the change in value of the existing equity 
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= VE as before.  Therefore, the total value of all debt in issue after investment will be 
= VD + D + VD and the post-investment value of equity = VE + VE.  The post-
investment enterprise value will be = V + D and so V + D = (VE + VE) + (VD + D + 
VD) and since V = VE + VD, it follows that VE + VD = 0.  This means that any change 
in value of the two types of securities is split between them as in the internally financed 
case.  But here, there has been an increase in gearing.  The gearing ratio can be 
computed as above: pre-investment gearing ratio will be VD/V and the post-investment 
gearing ratio will be (VD + D + VD)/ (V + D).   
 
In this case, for D > 0 the post-investment gearing ratio is greater than the pre-
investment gearing ratio (by assumption) hence (VD + D + VD)/ (V + D) > VD/V.  Given 
such an increase in gearing, it is reasonable to assume that the value of the existing 
debt will reduce and hence that VD < 0 and since VD + VE = 0, it can be concluded 
that VE > 0 and hence there is no under-investment problem. 
 
This analysis assumes that the new finance is equivalent in type, maturity and security 
as the existing debt securities.  However, the existing debt securities could be senior 
ranking to the new debt and so be somewhat protected from a reduction in debt value.  
However, it is likely that there would be a reduction in value simply because of the 
overall increase in gearing.  Any reduction in value would be less where there is 
seniority in security for the existing holders of debt securities. 
 
If the existing debt were to be refinanced, then the new cost of debt would represent 
the credit risk of the enlarged company and there would be no transfer of value to or 
from the existing debt-holders as they would be refinanced.  However, the cost of such 
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refinancing would depend on the terms of the existing debt as to pre-payment 
penalties.  In any event, there may be restrictions in the loan documentation that 
prevent or limit the issue of additional debt ranking equally with existing debt and are 
designed to limit transfers of value from debt-holders to shareholders.  So, the 
assumption throughout this analysis is that such additional debt can be issued and 
can dilute the credit quality of existing debt.   
 
So, in this case, there is no under-investment problem as there is an increase in the 
value of equity.  This example is exactly the situation of the over-investment problem 
described in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and discussed more fully in Chapter 3.  The 
basic idea is that a transfer in value from the debt-holders to the shareholders as above 
is, in effect, a subsidy.  This may allow management to pursue an investment 
opportunity with a negative net present value that becomes a positive net present 
value project by the receipt of the subsidy – hence the label the over-investment 
problem: management could pursue sub-optimal investments. 
 
The second case of external finance is where the investment in the zero-net present 
value project is financed entirely by new equity.  The analysis follows the argument 
above for external financing by debt.  Let the increase in equity = E; let the change in 
value of existing debt = VD; and let the change in value of the existing equity = VE.  
Therefore, the total value of debt after investment = VD + VD and the post-investment 
value of equity = VE + E + VE and the post-investment enterprise value is = V + E. 
 
Assuming as before that a change in capital structure has no impact on the value of 
V, then pre- and post-investment enterprise values will be identical and so 
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 V + E = (VE + E + VE) + (VD + VD) 
and since V = VE + VD, it follows, as before, that VE + VD = 0.                 
         
In this case gearing reduces because of the all-equity financing.  Using the 
expressions for pre-investment and post-investment gearing ratios set out above and 
since E > 0, the post-investment gearing ratio must be lower than the pre-investment 
gearing ratio and so (VD + VD)/ (V + E) < VD/V. 
 
Given such a reduction in gearing, it is reasonable to assume that the value of the 
existing debt will increase and hence that VD > 0 and since VE + VD = 0 it can be 
concluded that VE < 0.  So, in this case, for a zero-net present value investment 
opportunity there is a reduction in the value of existing shareholders’ equity and the 
under-investment problem can arise.  However, this is a consequence of changes in 
gearing affecting the value of securities rather than as a direct result of the investment.  
The method of financing of the investment has created the opportunity for a change in 
capital structure to take place.  Transfers in value between shareholders and debt-
holders have occurred simply because of changes in capital structure and not directly 
because of the investment.  The investment has created the opportunity to adjust the 
capital structure.  It is the change in capital structure that has caused the transfer in 
value between the two groups of stakeholders.  The effects of changes in gearing on 
the values of debt and equity need to be distinguished from the effects of investment. 
 
So, the effect of the investment on the value of pre-investment debt or equity depends 
on how the investment is financed.  This can be illustrated by considering the third 
case where the external financing is a combination of debt and equity in the same 
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proportions as the existing capital structure.  In such a case, the gearing ratio after 
investment will be equal to the gearing ratio before investment.  Then, ceteris paribus, 
the value of pre-investment debt will remain unchanged.  So, VD = 0 and since VE 
+ VD = 0 then VE = 0 and there will be no under-investment problem.  So, unchanged 
gearing is the neutral case for financing zero net present value projects: increases in 
gearing can shift value from the debt-holders to the equity holders and vice versa.  So, 
the under-investment problem is a consequence of financing decisions rather than 
investment decisions. 
 
If a company were to change its capital structure by simply buying in shares financed 
with an issue of debt (or vice versa) then there would be a transfer of value from the 
debt-holders to the equity holders (or vice versa) – as described in Frank and Goyal 
(2009) (see stylised fact number 16).  This restructuring of the mix of debt and equity 
can be examined using the simple model above.  The only change to the model above 
is that the investment is the acquisition of securities issued by the company – leading 
to the reduction in gearing and vice versa rather than an expansionary investment. 
 
Changes in capital structure that are not accompanied by an expansionary investment 
can cause transfers in value between debt and equity holders and the phenomenon 
can be explained using this simple model.   
 
Distinguishing the investment from the adjustments to the capital structure caused by 
choices about how the investment is financed points to the solution to the under-
investment and over-investment problems.  If, following the financing of an investment 
opportunity, value is transferred from shareholders to debt-holders (e.g. by issuing 
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shares as in the example above and reducing gearing), the value can be recaptured 
by a subsequent transaction to reverse the effects.  This would mean the company 
would need to issue debt and then retire equity to get the company back to its pre-
investment gearing ratio.  This would recapture any transfer in value.   
 
Transfers of value in the reverse direction (from debt-holders to equity holders) could 
be recaptured (if desired) by an issue of shares after the investment that would be 
used to reduce debt and thereby restore gearing to its pre-investment level.  
 
This analysis suggests that where there are transfers of value between debt-holders 
and shareholder occur, companies may need to adjust capital structure continuously 
to ensure that such transfers can be reversed.  The implications of such a policy isare 
considered in a discussion about capital structure theories in section 2.2.4 below. 
 
Finally, the case of a company which has no existing debt is worth considering.  
Regardless of how the investment is financed, there can be no transfer of value to or 
from existing debt-holders since there are none.  So, one solution to avoid under-
investment is to have no existing debt.  Also, where there is debt, the transfer in value 
can be minimised by ensuring shorter maturity since if there is a transfer of value by 
means of a reduction in gearing then the amount of benefit transferred will be related 
to the maturity of the debt.  For example, if there are only 2 years of loan life remaining 
then the old debt-holders get either 2 years of excessive interest if credit quality is 
improved or vice versa.  However, such solutions (mentioned in Dennis, Nandy and 
Sharpe (2000)) are quite excessive:  being able to adjust gearing post-investment is 
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much simpler and cheaper and there are no implications for gearing or the maturity 
profile of debt. 
 
Positive net present value projects financed externally are considered next.  Here the 
post-investment enterprise value will be greater than the sum of the value of the 
enterprise pre-investment and the value of the securities issued to finance the 
investment.  If D is the value of debt securities issued and E is the value of equity 
securities issued then, this assumption can be expressed in terms of the model above 
as V + V + D + E > V + I, where V is the value of the enterprise before investment.   
 
As before, I = D + E.  So, the above inequality implies V > 0 which simply reflects 
the assumed positive net present value of the investment project.  After the 
investment, the enterprise value must be equal to the pre-investment values of the 
securities in issue plus any change in their values.  So, the following relationship holds  
 V + V + D + E = VE + VE + E + VD + VD + D  
Since V = VE + VD and eliminating D and E, it follows that, as before,  
V = VE + VD and therefore, since V > 0 
it follows that V = VE + VD > 0.   
The pre- investment gearing ratio is VD/V and the post-investment gearing ratio will be 
given by (VD + D + VD)/ (V + V + D + E). 
  
As above, three cases are considered.  Instead of considering all debt or all equity 
financing, changes in gearing are considered since this is the factor which determines 
the change in debt value as described above.  Alternative financing strategies were 
not considered in Myers (1977). 
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Case 1 is where the investment is financed with debt and equity in the same 
proportions as the existing capital structure.  It could be postulated that, ceteris 
paribus, the value of existing debt remains unchanged as is argued above for the zero-
net present value case.  However, the positive net present value case is not quite so 
straightforward because there is an increase in enterprise value associated with the 
investment having a positive net present value.  So, it is more appropriate to consider 
the change in gearing arising because of the investment.  The change in gearing is 
simply the post-investment gearing ratio less the pre-investment gearing ratio which is 
given by:  
(VD + D + VD)/ (V + V + D + E) – VD/V.      (2.6) 
 
Since it is assumed that the new investment is financed with a combination of debt 
and equity that is equal to the existing gearing ratio, the expression for the change in 
gearing ratio simplifies to VD/V – VD/V.  Three subsidiary scenarios can be 
considered in this case where the mix of debt and equity financing of the investment 
matches the company’s existing gearing ratio: scenario i) gearing increases but this 
would contradict the assumption of investment in a positive net present value 
investment; scenario ii) gearing is unchanged in which case VD/V = VD/V and since 
VD/V < 1, it follows that VD < V.  So, while there may be an improvement in the value 
of the existing debt, there will be a simultaneous improvement in the value of the 
existing equity and so there will be no under-investment problem (as before, it is 
difficult to see how gearing could remain unchanged in view of the assumptions); and 
in scenario iii) gearing is reduced (the most likely outcome) in which case  
(VD + D + VD)/ (V + V + D + E) - VD/V < 0 which can be simplified to  
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(D + VD)/ (V + D + E) - VD/V < 0     (2.7) 
Since the new debt represents a fixed proportion of the total investment that is equal 
to the existing gearing ratio (by assumption) then 
D/ (D + E) = VD/V and so it follows that  
VD/V < VD/V and since VD/V < 1, it follows that VD < V and hence that VE > 0.  
So, there is no under-investment problem as the debt-holders cannot capture all the 
surplus value.  So, while the debt-holders get a benefit, they cannot obtain all the 
surplus value and there is value remaining for the shareholders. 
 
In case 2, a number of scenarios are considered to cover a range of possibilities: in 
scenario i) it is assumed that the investment is financed using a mix of debt and equity 
that ensures that the post-investment gearing ratio is equal to the pre-investment 
gearing ratio.  This equality can be expressed in the following equation.  
(VD + D + VD)/ (V + V + D + E) = VD/V     (2.8) 
Since gearing is unchanged, there can be no change in the value of existing debt.  
Hence VD = 0 and there is no under-investment problem. 
 
In case 2, scenario ii) the mix of debt and equity in the new financing represents a 
gearing ratio that is greater than that in scenario i) then overall gearing will rise and so 
the value of existing debt will fall and so there will be no under-investment problem.   
 
However, in case 2, scenario iii) where the mix of debt and equity in the new financing 
mix is less than in scenario i) (the unchanged gearing scenario) but more than in case 
1 then overall gearing will fall and so VD > 0.  So, the expression for the change in 
gearing becomes 
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(VD + D + VD)/ (V + V + D + E) - VD/V < 0    (2.9) 
And if it is assumed that the amount of debt = D’ + A where D’ is the amount of debt 
that arises in case 1 and A is the balance of debt then the change in gearing simplifies 
to: 
(A + VD)/(V) - VD/V < 0 and so 
(A + VD)/(V) < VD/V < 1 and hence that  
A + VD < V 
and since by assumption, A > 0 (the example of A = 0 amounts to the zero-net present 
value case and is addressed in case 1 above), it follows that VD < V and so the 
debt-holders cannot capture more than the net present value of the investment and 
the circumstances of the under-investment problem do not arise. 
 
In case 3, it is assumed that the investment is financed using a mix of debt and equity 
that represents a gearing ratio that is less than the pre-investment level and so overall 
gearing falls below the pre-investment level, so VD > 0, but it does not follow 
immediately whether VE is positive or negative.  The outcome depends precisely on 
the post-investment gearing ratio.  Here, if sufficient equity is used, there can be a 
transfer of value from equity holders to debt-holders.  So, the under-investment 
problem is driven by the financing mix for the new investment. 
 
In these circumstances, there may still be a reduction in equity value, but such a 
reduction can be addressed by the management techniques discussed further below.  
Any transfer of value between equity and debt-holders is a consequence of the 
financing structure rather than the investment itself.  This was not considered in Myers 
(1977). 
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2.2.3.3 Changes in the value of existing debt (assuming the enterprise 
value is constant, but volatility varies) 
The above analysis considered the differential of VD with respect to investment while 
volatility was kept constant.  In the analysis that follows, it is assumed that the 
enterprise value is unchanged following the investment (equivalently, zero net present 
value investment projects) and instead, changes in firm volatility only are considered.  
The starting point is equation (3)  
dVD/dI = f/V x dV/dI + f/2 x d2/dI. 
 
Here, it is assumed that the first product on the right-hand side of the equation is zero 
because V is kept constant and so dV/dI is zero.  So, the equation simplifies to 
dVD/dI =  f/2 x d2/dI. 
 
Examining the right-hand side of this equation, f/2 will be < 0, since rising 
uncertainty will lead to a reduced value for the debt assuming no changes in gearing.  
However, d2/dI could be positive, negative or zero.  The three alternatives are: 
Case 1: volatility increases following the investment, so d2/dI > 0.  Therefore dVD/dI 
= (negative number) x (positive number) = negative number.   
 
Thus, the value of debt declines, and the transfer of value is favourable to 
shareholders.  This is the example in Jensen and Meckling (1976) who comment that 
this transfer in value could be so large as to induce managers to pursue negative net 
present value projects since the subsidy from debt-holders could make the projects 
yield positive returns for the shareholders.  This is the asset substitution problem or 
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over-investment problem (the converse of the under-investment problem).  However, 
it is not so easy to see how volatility can be increased by investment.  Simply 
expanding in an existing business activity is more likely to leave risk unchanged or 
possibly reduce volatility because of the enhanced diversification associated with an 
increase in scale of operations.  An acquisition in a different country with high risk 
might achieve higher volatility deriving from country risk.  However, asset substitution 
in its strictest sense is addressed by existing regulation requiring companies to publish 
information on acquisitions and to reveal relevant information to those investing that 
would preclude such an option. 
 
Case 2, volatility reduces following the investment, so d2/dI < 0 and risk declines 
because of the investment.  Thus dVD/dI = (negative number) x (negative number) = 
positive number 
 
Therefore, the value of debt rises supporting Myers’ (1977) assertion.  This is the 
situation in which Myers' (1977) argument works without the need for the debt-holders 
to capture cash flows ahead of the shareholders.  Here, the debt-holders enjoy an 
increase in value because of lower volatility.  This could be achieved by an acquisition 
in a sector different to the existing business of the company: this is one of the benefits 
that conglomerates enjoy.   
 
Case 3, volatility is unchanged by the investment so d2/dI = 0.  In this case, dVD/dI = 
0 and so there is no change in the value of debt.   
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As before, internal financing will not affect the outcome.  However, external financing 
is not considered in this scenario since the assumption is that the enterprise value is 
constant.  The impact of internal and external financing has already been considered 
in the case of constant volatility. 
 
The results of the above analysis are summarised in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.  For simplicity, 
the algebra in the discrete case is used to illustrate the results. 
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Table 2.1 The range of outcomes for an investment (volatility is constant) 
This table sets out the outcomes of a non-negative net present value investment 
opportunity financed either internally or externally and where volatility is assumed 
constant, but the enterprise value can vary 
Scenario Outcome 
Investment is financed internally: 
For the zero-net present value 
project, then 
V =  VE + VD = 0 
So VD = 0 = VE because there is no change in gearing pre- 
or post-investment: no under-investment problem. 
 
For the positive net present value 
project, then 
 
V =  VE + VD > 0 
Case 1: gearing is unchanged then VD = 0 (although it is 
difficult to see how this can arise given the assumption): no 
under-investment problem.  
Case 2: gearing falls so VD > 0 however, the debtholders 
are not able to capture more than the overall increase in 
company value, so the equity holders are not disadvantaged 
and so no under-investment problem. 
Case 3: gearing rises and so VD < 0 and so there is no 
transfer of value from equity holders to debt-holders rather 
the opposite occurs so no under-investment problem (but it is 
difficult to see how gearing could rise given the investment in 
a positive net present value project). 
 
Investment is financed externally:  
For the zero-net present value 
project 
 
Case 1: investment is financed entirely with debt so gearing 
rises so VD < 0 and so  
VE > 0 and hence there is no under-investment problem. 
Case 2: investment is financed entirely with equity so gearing 
falls VD > 0 and so  
VE < 0 and hence there could be an under-investment 
problem caused by the financing decision. 
Case 3: the investment is financed by a mix of debt and equity 
in the same proportions as the existing capital structure.  This 
will produce unchanged gearing so VD = 0 = VE and there 
is no under-investment problem. 
 
It is the particular mix of debt and equity in the financing of 
the investment that causes the under-investment problem to 
arise. 
 
For the positive net present value 
project 
 
Case 1: the investment is financed 
with debt and equity in the same 
proportions as the existing capital 
structure.   
 
Scenario i): gearing rises so VD < 0 and so  
VE > 0 and hence there is no under-investment problem 
(although it is difficult to see how this could occur given the 
assumptions). 
 
 
Scenario ii): gearing is unchanged so VD = 0 and VE > 0 
and hence there is no under-investment problem (although it 
is difficult to see how this could occur given the assumption). 
Scenario iii): gearing falls and so VD > 0 but the debt-holders 
cannot capture all the increase in value resulting from the 
positive net present value investment and so there is no 
under-investment problem. 
In case 2, it is assumed that the 
investment is financed using a mix of 
debt and equity that ensures that the 
Scenario i): where the overall gearing ratio is unchanged after 
the investment then VD = 0 and there is no under-investment 
problem.  
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post-investment gearing ratio is 
equal to the pre-investment level 
(scenario i)); and higher gearing than 
in scenario i) (scenario ii)); and lower 
gearing (scenario iii)) that is less than 
scenario i) but higher than case 1.   
 
Scenario ii): where overall gearing increases post-investment 
in which case VD < 0 and there is no under- 
 
investment problem. 
 
Scenario iii): where overall gearing falls by a mix of debt and 
equity in the financing of the investment that is less than in 
scenario i) but more than in case 1.  Here, VD > 0 but the 
debt-holders cannot capture more than the increase in firm 
value, so shareholders are not disadvantaged and so there is 
no under-investment problem. 
Case 3, it is assumed that the 
investment is financed using a mix of 
debt and equity that represents a 
gearing ratio that is less than the pre-
investment level  
Overall gearing falls below the pre-investment level, so VD 
> 0, but it does not follow immediately whether VE is positive 
or negative.  The outcome depends precisely on the post-
investment gearing ratio.  Here the under-investment 
problem can arise but only because of the mix of financing of 
the new investment. 
 
As before, it is the particular mix of debt and equity in the 
financing mix of the new investment and its impact on overall 
gearing that determines whether there is an under-
investment problem. 
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Table 2.2 The range of outcomes for an investment (enterprise value 
constant) 
This table sets out the outcomes of a non-negative net present value investment 
opportunity financed either internally or externally and where it is assumed that 
the enterprise value is constant, but volatility varies 
Scenario  
 
Outcome 
Investment is financed internally  
 
By assumption, V is constant so there is no external 
financing and VE + VD = 0. 
Case 1: Volatility increases because of 
the investment.   
 
Increased volatility implies VD < 0 and so VE   0.  No 
under-investment problem. 
 
Case 2: Volatility decreases because of 
the investment.   
Reduced volatility implies VD > 0 and so VE < 0 and 
the circumstances of the under-investment problem do 
arise.   
 
Case 3: Volatility is unchanged 
because of the investment.   
Volatility is unchanged so VE = 0 = VD.  No under-
investment problem. 
 
 
 
The under-investment problem can arise in those situations where the debt-holders 
enjoy an improvement in their position caused by reducing risk or rising enterprise 
value (equivalent to a reduction in the gearing ratio) other things being equal.  This is 
the under-investment problem.  Billett, King and Mauer (2004) document increases in 
the value of a target company’s bonds (i.e. when it is acquired) if there is the prospect 
of either a reduction in gearing or a reduction in risk (equivalent to a reduction in 
volatility) – the circumstances in which there is a transfer of value to another party 
which potentially reduces the viability of the transaction for the acquirer. 
 
However, there are tools available to management that mitigate this problem.  The 
analysis points to the solution which is essentially to reverse the effects of the financing 
by a post-investment adjustment in capital structure. 
 
2.2.4 Managing the transfer of value from shareholders to debt-holders 
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It has been shown that while shareholders benefit from positive net present value 
projects, but that there may still be a transfer of value from shareholders to debt-
holders if VD > 0.  Of course, managers may ignore it.  After all, ultimately, the debt-
holders are very likely to get the same repayment regardless of any intervening 
temporary increases in value: however, the debt-holders will benefit from less risk 
during the life of their investment.  In other words, the company will pay too much to 
the debt-holders compared with the risk suffered.  The managers of the company have 
several ways of mitigating this difficulty.   
 
Where the investment needs to be financed externally, management will have the 
option to arrange this additional finance in a way that can minimise the transfer of 
value to the existing debt-holders.  The obvious way would be to finance the 
investment entirely with sufficient debt so that there was no net benefit to the holders 
of the pre-investment debt: for instance, a combination of debt and equity in 
proportions that resulted in there being no change in the credit quality of the existing 
debt as above (in case 2 scenario i)).  This should ensure that there is no transfer of 
value to the existing debt-holders. 
 
An obvious strategy is to increase gearing so much that there is a reduction in the 
value of existing debt.  The existing debt would suffer a reduction in credit quality since 
overall gearing would have increased and so there would be a fall in the value of the 
existing debt.  This would have the effect of transferring value to the equity holders.  
This is the scenario in Jensen and Meckling (1976).  However, there are 
disadvantages as described more fully in Chapter 3. 
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Instead of examining the changes in value of existing debt and equity caused by 
investment as above, it is possible to examine changes in value of the existing debt 
and equity caused by changes in capital structure alone without the presence of an 
investment.  These changes can be modelled using the model above.  Instead of an 
investment in a project, a reduction of debt or equity is considered which is financed 
by means of an issue of equity or debt respectively.  This approach separates the 
impact of changes in capital structure from the impact of the investment. 
 
It can be assumed that this restructuring of capital is a zero-net present value project 
(ignoring tax shelter considerations) so the analysis summarised in Table 2.2 above 
applies and V = VE + VD = 0. 
 
The value transferred to the holders of pre-investment debt can be recaptured by 
increasing gearing (by issuing debt to finance the purchase of shares).  This will 
transfer value back to the shareholders.   
 
Conversely, the opposite action will make VE negative and so create the 
circumstances of Myers’ (1977) under-investment problem. 
 
Decisions about financing can be used to manage the under-investment problem.  If 
the company sets as its capital structure objective an unchanged gearing ratio (post-
investment) then there should be no transfer of value to the existing debt-holders and 
the under-investment problem will be avoided. 
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If there were a transfer of value to the debt-holders then the longer the maturity of that 
debt, the larger would be the transfer in value.  However, this assumes that the capital 
structure remains at the same level until redemption, so that the debt-holders would 
benefit throughout the remaining life of the debt.  If, after a transfer of value to debt-
holders, the company increased gearing to a level that reduced the credit quality of 
the pre-investment debt, then there would be a fall in value of that debt and the transfer 
in value would be more than recaptured.  Such an increase could occur before 
redemption.  So, the valuation of the transfer in value is not simply a question of 
maturity.  The valuation will depend on whether it is likely that the company will seek 
to recapture value from debt-holders. 
 
Frank & Goyal (2009) include the observation that gearing is stationary over the long-
term as one of their stylized facts.  If this is the case, then such a policy of stable capital 
structure would be consistent with companies avoiding transfers of value between the 
holders of their securities by maintaining stable gearing ratios.  However, the stability 
of capital structure is by no means settled as there is substantial variation behind the 
apparent stability. 
 
Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) examine market timing issues and present 
evidence that companies time issues of debt to minimise their borrowing costs 
concluding that capital structure at any point in time reflects the cumulative result of 
past attempts to exploit market levels rather and that such effects persist for a decade.  
The ability of managers to time market decisions is questioned by the efficient market 
hypothesis and by Berlin (2006).  Butler, Grullon and Westen (2006) point out that 
after adjusting for a structural shift in US monetary and fiscal policy in the 1980s, there 
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is no evidence that managers can time debt issues and criticize the techniques 
employed in Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003). 
 
Such results do not support more orthodox theories of capital structure such as the 
trade-off and pecking order theories.  Consistent with these results, Leary and Roberts 
(2005) ask if firms rebalance their capital structure?  Such a policy is in line with the 
solution proposed in this section of reversing value transfers (from shareholders to 
debt-holders) by restoring the previous gearing ratio.  Leary and Roberts (2005) 
included the idea of adjustment costs being a factor in the process of rebalancing 
capital structure. 
 
However, contrary to Baker and Wurgler (2002), Hovakimian (2006) found that while 
equity transactions may be timed to exploit favourable market conditions, such 
transactions did not have significant long-lasting effects on capital structure.  Lemmon, 
Roberts and Zender (2008) report capital structures that are stable over long periods 
and that the major part of variation is time-invariant. 
 
These approaches assume a target capital structure to which firms revert over time.  
Research has focussed on estimating the speed of adjustment.  However, Hovakimian 
and Li (2012) suggests that the speed of adjustment is not a meaningful measure of 
the importance of target gearing ratios.  DeAngelo and Roll (2015) suggest that factors 
that affect gearing can vary over time and so make the process of explaining capital 
structure behaviour more difficult and/or that capital structure is of second-order 
importance and is determined as a residual. 
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These quite different approaches do not preclude the proposed method of 
management of the under-investment problem – namely reversing value transfers by 
capital structure adjustments after the adverse transfer.  Firms can make such 
adjustments in a way that is consistent with a stable capital structure target or with a 
capital structure policy that was more dynamic or flexible. 
 
Where the market believes that the company would recapture value transferred to 
debt-holders by a subsequent issue of additional debt to return the company to its long 
run gearing ratio, then the market price of its debt and equity would reflect such a 
perception.  There would not be an initial transfer of value to the debt-holders since 
the market would judge that the transfer of value to debt-holders would be temporary 
and that it would be reversed.  In this way, the market price of the debt would not 
reflect a permanent transfer of value.  Thus, the willingness of a company to rebalance 
its capital structure will ensure that the company does not suffer a value transfer from 
its shareholders to its debt-holders. 
 
This strategy reverses the steps under which value is transferred to the debt-holders.  
Value can be recaptured by shareholders by putting the debt-holders back into the 
same (or worse) position that they enjoyed prior to the value transfer.  This is achieved 
by restructuring the balance sheet to restore the value transferred to the debt-holders 
back to the shareholders. 
 
The recapture strategy is clearly superior to the solution in Myers (1977) which 
requires the company to either shorten its existing debt maturity in the face of an 
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investment opportunity (which would be costly) and lead to increased default risk; or 
the company should avoid longer maturities which would also increase default risk. 
 
The recapture strategy is also superior to a related solution of minimising debt.  Either 
the company would have to reduce its gearing in the face of an investment opportunity 
(which would require the issue of equity or the sale of assets); or the company would 
stick to a very conservative balance sheet. 
 
Both options are clumsy, costly and excessive compared to the simple strategy of 
value recapture by restoring and maintaining a constant capital structure. 
 
Solutions related to those in Myers (1977) include options embedded in debt 
instruments that allow the company to retire the debt issue.  This allows the company 
the option to repay an existing debt issue if it was advantageous.  Such a mechanism 
could be used to prevent value being transferred to debt-holders.  However, such debt 
instruments which allow the company to retire the debt issue prematurely have a 
higher cost than a similar bond without the embedded option so there is a cost 
associated with such a mechanism.  This option is less attractive than the strategy of 
value recapture. 
 
The strategy of value recapture suggests that management will need to manage 
capital structure on a continuous basis.  For instance, if, following successful operating 
performance, the company were to achieve a reduction in its gearing ratio, this would 
enhance the value of existing debt.  Such an improvement could also be brought about 
by the company enjoying an unexpected windfall in the returns from its investment or 
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the sale of a subsidiary.  Any increase in value for the debt-holders would need to be 
recaptured.  This could be achieved by rebalancing the capital structure by buying in 
equity financed by an increase in gearing. 
 
The main conclusions deriving from the analysis developed in this Chapter are that 
the under-investment problem arises in only limited situations and that it may depend 
on how an investment is financed.  However, even if the problem does arise, it can be 
managed in such a way that any transfer in value from equity holders to debt-holders 
is reversed by an adjustment in gearing.  Even if debt cannot be issued to finance the 
investment itself (in a way that mitigates any transfer in value from the shareholders 
to the debt-holders), the company may have an opportunity to recapture the transfer 
of value by a subsequent adjustment in its capital structure which increases its gearing 
ratio to such an extent that the transfer of value is reversed.  The exercise to recapture 
value transferred to debt-holders can be undertaken after the financing of the 
investment opportunity with the aim of returning the company to its long run target 
gearing ratio. 
 
The solutions proposed by Myers (1977) need to be reconsidered.  Management do 
not need to shorten debt maturity to create an opportunity to negotiate with lenders.  
That opportunity can always be created.  Secondly, to prolong employment, 
management have an incentive to pursue positive net present value opportunities 
even if there is a transfer of value to the debt-holders.  There is an argument that this 
incentive could encourage them to pursue any investment project when it prolongs 
their employment. 
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The next section considers the empirical evidence supporting Myers (1977).  This 
analysis seeks to establish whether the tools suggested in Myers (1977) for managing 
the under-investment problem (the selection of shorter maturities) can be observed in 
practice. 
 
2.3 Debt maturity and investment opportunities: empirical evidence 
The empirical evidence that provides support for Myers’ (1977) solution to the under-
investment problem is the observed negative relationship between debt maturity and 
the market to book value ratio where the market to book value ratio is deemed a proxy 
for investment opportunities.  So, the negative relationship is considered to be 
evidence that firms adjust their debt maturities to manage the under-investment 
problem arising from the presence of investment opportunities.  The observed 
negative relationship is reported in several papers including Barclay and Smith (1995), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal 
(2006) and Kleczyk (2012). 
 
The analysis in Myers (1977), suggests that the under-investment problem can be 
managed by reducing the maturity of debt and/or the amount of debt.  Hence the 
observed negative relationship between gearing and the market to book value ratio 
could also be considered to support the method of management of under-investment 
as proposed in Myers (1977). 
 
In this section, analytical and empirical evidence is presented that provides an 
alternative explanation of the observed relationships (between gearing and debt 
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maturity and the market to book value ratio) that does not provide support for Myers’ 
(1977) solution to the under-investment problem.   
 
Section 2.2.4 above set out alternative techniques that can be employed to manage 
the under-investment problem that does not require either shortening debt maturity or 
adjusting gearing.  Therefore, the hypothesis that is tested in this section is that there 
is an alternative explanation for the observed relationships (between gearing and debt 
maturity and the market to book value ratio) that does not provide support for Myers’ 
(1977) solutions to the under-investment problem.   
 
2.3.1 Literature review 
Agency costs do not provide the only theory of debt maturity: tax, signalling and 
liquidity and market conditions are also relevant.  In the tax hypothesis, it is argued 
that the term structure of interest rates, the marginal tax rate and the volatility of 
interest rates affect a firm’s decision on maturity.  A survey of literature relating to debt 
maturity is contained in Ravid (1996). 
 
Brick and Ravid (1985) argue that when the yield curve is upward sloping, long-term 
debt is optimal since tax gains are optimised whereas Kane, Marcus and McDonald 
(1985) use a simulation model to argue that optimal maturity is negatively associated 
with the tax advantage of debt. 
 
The signalling hypothesis addresses or explains problems of information asymmetry.  
Where a firm suffers from misperceptions of its quality and is unable to communicate 
its true state, it will tend to issue short-term debt if its quality is good and vice versa.  
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In Ross (1973) firms signal their quality by their strong capital structure.  Gao and Zhu 
(2013) review information across countries and find that firms with more informational 
asymmetries tend to use more debt but less long-term debt. 
 
Dividends are also a potential signal as in Cooper and Lambertides (2016) who find a 
positive relationship between large dividend increases and increases in gearing 
contrary to the established negative relationship between dividends and gearing. 
 
The market timing hypothesis suggests firms can take advantage of market conditions 
to time issues of securities – see Baker and Wurgler (2002). 
 
Other factors explaining debt maturity include size (large companies tend to issue for 
longer time periods but are also active issuers of commercial paper which is 
particularly short in maturity); and asset maturity (companies with long life assets tend 
to issue longer term debt and vice versa).  Mitchell (1991) observes that companies 
on Nasdaq and companies with convertible debt are more likely to issue bonds with a 
maturity of less than 10 years.  Of course, in general, convertible bonds do not have 
maturities which are much longer than 10 or 12 years. 
 
Morris (1976) identified a positive relationship between the weighted average maturity 
of debt and company size, gearing, liquidity and asset maturity.  He argues in favour 
of matching assets and liabilities to avoid financial distress problems arising at the time 
of rollover.  This is also an objective of the lenders.  The lenders usually plan 
repayments on a basis that coincides with the company's ability to repay – hence the 
matching.  Long-term debt is most likely to be used by larger, less risky companies 
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with relatively poor growth prospects – Stohs and Mauer (1996).  Such companies 
offer the best credit risk by their size, stability, market position (mature) and reduced 
risk arising from lower growth. 
 
Barclay and Smith (1995) observe 1) that companies with many growth opportunities 
(as measured by the market to book value ratio – the ratio of the market value of the 
enterprise to its book value) have less long-term debt; and 2) that larger companies 
with good credit ratings have more long-term debt.  The authors argue that this 
supports Myers’ (1977) view that companies with significant growth opportunities can 
avoid certain agency costs of debt (including the under-investment problem) by 
shortening debt maturity. 
 
However, Stohs and Mauer (1996) argue that the Barclay and Smith (1995) debt 
maturity regressions are not specified correctly because they do not control for 
differences in gearing.  Stohs and Mauer (1996) included the gearing ratio as an 
independent variable in their regression of debt maturity finding that the coefficients of 
the investment opportunity set of variables (such as the market to book value ratio) 
decline in both magnitude and statistical significance.  Their conclusion is that the 
agency cost explanations of debt maturity are not supported. 
 
All the above studies examined debt maturity on a company basis.  The study by 
Guedes and Opler (1996) examined the maturity of incremental debt issues, observing 
that large companies with high credit ratings are the most likely to issue long-term debt 
and the most likely to issue short-term debt.  Guedes and Opler (1996) also observed 
(as did Barclay and Smith (1995)) that companies with strong growth prospects (as 
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measured by the market to book value ratio) tend to issue shorter term debt supporting 
Myers’ (1977) view. 
 
Diamond (1991) argues that poorly rated companies may not be able to borrow long-
term at all.  This is because investors prefer to hold long-term corporate debt in stable 
companies with high credit quality.  Companies not satisfying these criteria will be 
unlikely to access this type of finance.  This highlights an important aspect of the debt 
maturity and capital structure choices made by companies in that they can only choose 
what is offered.  If lenders are not happy with companies with low credit quality then 
debt may not be available or, available only on unacceptable terms. 
 
Barclay, Morellec and Smith (2006) examined the relationship between debt capacity 
(the additional amount of debt that could be borrowed based on an additional asset) 
and growth options. They examined the relationship between gearing (as measured 
by book values) and several variables including the market to book value ratio.  The 
coefficient of the market to book value ratio was estimated at a negative value of 0.01 
implying that an improvement in the market to book value ratio from 1.0 to 3.0 would 
decrease the book gearing ratio by 2% – a very small amount.  They contrast this 
result with an earlier study, Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995), where they regressed 
market value-based measure of gearing (book value of debt as a proportion of the 
market value of assets) against the market to book value ratio, obtaining a negative 
value coefficient of 0.06: their argument is that growth options reduce debt capacity. 
 
The observed negative relationship between debt maturity and the market to book 
value ratio is also reported in Rajan and Zingales (1995) who cover the US, Japan, 
 Chapter 2 Managing the under-investment problem 
75 
 
Germany, France, Italy, UK and Canada.  Johnson (2003) reported a negative 
relationship.  Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2006) identify determinants of debt 
maturity in France, Germany and the UK incorporating factors from the tax, liquidity 
and agency cost explanations of debt maturity.  However, their results do not confirm 
the negative relationship between debt maturity and the market to book value ratio 
with statistical significance.  Kleczyk (2012) studies US data and reports a negative 
relationship between debt maturity and the market to book value ratio: also reported 
are negative relationships between debt maturity and excess bond returns, abnormal 
earnings, the term spread (essentially a measure of the yield curve) and inflation.  Also 
identified is the positive relationship between debt maturity and firm size. 
 
There are a number of reports of the negative relationship between debt and the 
market to book value ratio which can be argued supports the arguments in Myers 
(1977) for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995), Dennis, Nandy and Sharpe (2000) 
who studied revolving credit agreements, de Jong, Nguyen and van Dijk (2007) (who 
studied both gearing and debt maturity), de Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008) (who 
studied data from 42 countries), Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008) studied gearing 
in G5 countries and reported negative coefficients for the market to book value ratios 
which were statistically significant except for the US. Akdal (2010) measured maturity 
as debt exceeding 1 year of maturity and total gearing (expressed as a proportion of 
market and book value) and found negative coefficients for UK data.  Dang (2011) 
found a negative relationship between gearing and the market to book value ratio that 
was not observed for debt maturity.  Harrison and Widjaja (2014) studied the 
relationship between gearing and the market to book value ratio before and after the 
financial crisis in 2008 and reported a negative relationship in both periods and for the 
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whole period.  Some of these results and those in relation to debt maturity are 
summarised in the Appendix to this Chapter. 
 
Billett, King and Mauer (2007) investigate the relationship between covenants in loan 
agreements and i) debt maturity; ii) gearing; and iii) investment opportunities.  They 
find that covenant protection increases with growth opportunities, debt maturity and 
gearing.  Credit risk increases as debt maturity rises or as gearing increases.  To 
manage the risk, lenders seek more legal protection in the form of covenants so a 
positive relationship between each of debt maturity and gearing and covenant 
protection is to be expected.  The positive relationship between investment 
opportunities (as proxied by the market to book value ratio) and covenant protections 
suggests that lenders perceive such companies as having higher credit risk suggesting 
a further rationale for the negative relationship between gearing and investment 
opportunities. 
 
Chava, Kumar and Warga (2010) conclude that “firms voluntarily proscribe their 
operational flexibility to lower agency risk for bondholders and reduce the cost of debt 
financing”: however, this suggests that covenants are proposed by firms but in fact 
they are demanded by lenders to protect their position: borrowers would rather avoid 
all covenants if that were possible.  The position of the firm is that they will negotiate 
covenants in the interests of obtaining finance at a suitable cost and with an acceptable 
degree of restriction on operational flexibility.  It is not the firm seeking to protect the 
debt-holders by inserting covenant protections. 
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Rajan and Winton (1995) point out that monitoring increases in the presence of a 
separate class of creditor encouraging lenders to seek additional security and, when 
lenders are collateralised, monitoring reduces since lenders have the best possible 
position available.  The incidence of taking collateral increases in the period prior to 
financial distress. 
 
The main conclusion of the empirical studies in relation to agency costs is that there 
is a negative relationship between debt and debt maturity and companies with growth 
opportunities as proxied by the market to book value ratio.  This negative relationship 
is included in Frank and Goyal (2009) as one of their stylised facts.   
 
2.3.2 Developing testable hypotheses 
The analysis described and conducted in this section extends the methodology 
employed in the empirical studies reported above with the objective of testing whether 
the hypothesis that the negative relationship between debt maturity and gearing and 
the market to book value ratio is consistent with Myers’ (1977) solution for the under-
investment problem or whether alternative explanations for these negative 
relationships are available in the light of the various analyses conducted in section 2.2 
above and below.   
 
In designing the hypotheses, two alternative explanations for the negative relationship 
between gearing and debt maturity (since they are related as in Stohs and Mauer 
(1996)) and the market to book value ratio are presented.  The first considers an 
accounting perspective behind the calculation of the market to book value ratio (the 
accounting treatment of investment expenditures); and the second examines the 
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construction of the market to book value ratio and the gearing ratio and shows how 
their structure can produce a negative correlation between the two. 
 
The accounting for different types of investment expenditure can affect the market to 
book value ratio as the following analysis demonstrates.  Suppose a new company 
seeks to invest an amount “A” at a rate of return equal to its cost of capital – in other 
words, an investment in a project with zero net present value.  Suppose that this 
investment comprises two different types of expenditure; first, investment in plant and 
equipment – capital expenditure – and other expenditure on items that will be recorded 
in the balance sheet as tangible assets including working capital; and secondly, 
expenditure on items that are not tangible such as advertising, promotion, research, 
marketing, exploration and so on and in respect of which, the company’s auditors 
require such expenditure to be expensed – written off in the income statement.   
 
Suppose the proportion of the total investment that is invested in assets that are 
recorded in the balance sheet is .  The balance sheet will therefore consist of assets 
with value .A immediately after investment.  The quantity  will vary from company to 
company depending on the nature of the activity of the company.  Those companies 
operating in capital intensive industries will tend to have higher values for  than say 
businesses with high levels of expenditure on off-balance sheet items. 
 
These two types of expenditure can be defined as balance sheet investment (because 
the investment is recorded there); and off-balance sheet investment (since, by 
definition, such expenditure is written off and so it cannot appear in the balance sheet). 
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If a lender were invited to provide some debt for this project and that they might take 
a simple view offering to lend a proportion, , against the book value of the assets in 
the balance sheet.  Then, the maximum amount of debt will be given by ..A.  It is 
reasonable to assume that the lender considers that the off-balance sheet investment 
is not suitable as support for a loan and so the lender takes no account of its value for 
the same reasons the auditors require such expenditure to be expensed (written off). 
 
The market value of the enterprise (the sum of the market values of the company’s 
debt and equity) is assumed to be given by the present value of its cash flows which 
must be A, since by assumption, it is assumed to be an investment with zero net 
present value.  Hence the market to book value ratio will be A divided by the book 
value, .A, which is simply 1/. 
 
The gearing ratio computed using market values is the amount of debt (..A) divided 
by the company’s enterprise value (at market values which is equal to A) which 
simplifies to ..   
 
So, in a regression model, the dependent variable, gearing (based on market values) 
is . and one of the independent variables, the market to book value ratio, is 1/.  If  
is large, then the amount of debt and gearing will be large but the market to book value 
ratio will be small and vice versa.  The two quantities are clearly inversely related.  
Attempting to fit a regression line for gearing (based on market values) against the 
market to book value ratio will inevitably produce a negative coefficient for the market 
to book value ratio.  The negative relationship is simply the consequence of the 
lender’s approach to the amount of a loan that can be supported by the assets in place 
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coinciding with the auditor’s approach to recognition of assets that can be shown on a 
balance sheet. 
 
This analysis presents an alternative explanation for the negative relationship between 
gearing (based on market values) and the market to book value ratio that provides no 
insight into the management of the under-investment problem.   
 
Interestingly, if the value of  is a maximum of unity, then the minimum value for the 
market to book value ratio is unity. 
 
This model although somewhat simplistic can be extended to many investments with 
the same criteria where the company makes new investments each year.  The same 
relationship between gearing and the market to book value ratio will arise.  This model 
needs a label and is hereafter referred to as the on-off model (distinguishing between 
on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet expenditure). 
 
2.3.2.1 Alternative measures of investment opportunities 
The above analysis is also relevant to alternative measures of investment 
opportunities.  The alternative measures are also affected by the split between balance 
sheet investment and non-balance sheet investment. 
 
An alternative measure of the investment opportunity set suggested in Barclay and 
Smith (1995) and Adam and Goyal (2008)) is the price earnings ratio which is a 
measure of value.  This is tested in Adam and Goyal (2008) who compute a value for 
the company’s investment opportunities by focussing on mining companies since such 
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companies publish information on their reserves which can be valued using an option 
pricing model: the estimated company valuations are then compared to the alternative 
measures of the investment opportunity set.  Mining companies with reserves of 
minerals in the ground are investment opportunities and can be valued using option 
pricing techniques as can producing mines. 
 
The authors find the market to book value ratio to be the best performing proxy. They 
also find that the price earnings ratio is significantly correlated with firms’ investment 
opportunities; and that the purely accounting-based proxy (capital expenditure to 
assets in place), also appears to be positively related to the value of investment 
opportunities, but that this relation is not robust.  
  
Mining companies (as used in Adam and Goyal (2008)) and oil exploration companies 
illustrate the difference between balance sheet expenditure and expenditure that must 
be written off.  A mining exploration company which drills holes seeking minerals is 
required under conventional accounting policies to write off the costs of unsuccessful 
exploration – which is obviously sensible.  Eventually, it is hoped that the company will 
make a discovery at which time the value of the potential resources identified will be 
reflected in the company’s share price but not necessarily in its balance sheet.  The 
company will then have higher market value but no corresponding higher balance 
sheet value and certainly little ability to borrow on balance sheet assets (at least not 
until the discovery has been proved by further appraisal work such as additional 
drilling).  This is a good example of high market to book value ratio but low gearing – 
an inverse relationship.  Here the value of  for this type of activity will be low since 
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exploration expenditure that is unsuccessful will not be recorded as an asset in the 
balance sheet. 
 
The market to book value ratio will reflect potential value as well as existing value – 
so the value of existing mines and potential mines will be reflected in the share price.  
For a mine to be developed, there will need to be substantial capital expenditure that 
will be recorded in the balance sheet and the market to book value ratio will then fall 
as the balance sheet expands without necessarily any increase in market value.  
 
An option pricing model was used in Adam and Goyal (2008) to estimate market values 
of mining companies with existing mines and discoveries.  Option valuation is a 
technique that is suitable for the valuation of mining companies, so it is to be expected 
that there will be a good correlation between the market to book value ratio and the 
value of investment opportunities based on an option pricing model as was observed.   
 
The authors also find some evidence of a relationship between the price earnings ratio 
and the option valuation approach.  The valuation methodology based on price 
earnings ratios works when companies produce earnings but mining discoveries that 
are investment opportunities (i.e. not developed) produce no earnings.  Companies 
that have both mines in production and discoveries will have some earnings (from 
producing mines) that will be reflected in the share price, but the potential value of 
discoveries will also be reflected in the share price thus increasing the price earnings 
ratios beyond that of a company that has only producing mines.  So, if a company 
makes a discovery that is not producing earnings and is not reflected in the balance 
sheet, then this will increase the value of the company and hence the market to book 
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value ratio and similarly will increase the price earnings ratio.  So, there is likely to be 
a positive relationship between the market to book value ratio and the price earnings 
ratio as reported in Adam and Goyal (2008). 
 
Barclay and Smith (1995) also considered alternative proxies for investment 
opportunities: research and development expenditure (as a proportion of firm value); 
depreciation (as a proportion of firm value); and the earnings price ratio (the inverse 
of the price earnings ratio).   
 
Research and development expenditure will be associated with companies that 
generate intangible value.  Current accounting practice is to write off research 
expenditure (an example of which is exploration expenditure) but to capitalise (i.e. 
include in the balance sheet) development expenditure (as with the construction costs 
of a mine).  Writing off research expenditure has the effect of reducing book values 
and so enhances the market to book value ratio: for this type of expenditure the value 
of  is zero.  Research expenditure is like marketing or promotional costs for a brand 
and cannot be included in the balance sheet and must be written off.  High expenditure 
on research and development (expressed as a proportion of firm value) will tend to be 
correlated with companies with low  and hence have higher market to book value 
ratios and be negatively related to debt maturity: this was confirmed by Barclay and 
Smith (1995). 
 
Equally, companies with higher levels of depreciation (expressed as a proportion of 
firm value) will tend to be associated with companies that have investments in tangible 
assets such as plant and machinery and are likely to have higher  values and hence 
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lower market to book value ratios.  So, a positive relationship is to be expected 
between depreciation (as a proportion of firm value) and debt maturity: this relationship 
was confirmed in Barclay and Smith (1995). 
 
The earnings/price ratio used in the Barclay and Smith (1995) study is the inverse of 
the price earnings ratio used in Adam and Goyal (2008) who identified a good 
correlation with the investment opportunity set (and indirectly the market to book value 
ratio).  So, it is to be expected that the earnings/price ratio will be positively related to 
gearing as was confirmed in Barclay and Smith (1995).  These comments are 
summarised in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 Comparison of proxies for investment opportunities 
This table sets out a comparison of alternative proxies for the measurement of 
investment opportunities and their relationship to gearing and possible alternative 
explanations 
 
Proxy for investment 
opportunities 
 
Predicted 
relationship  
 
Alternative explanation 
 
Market to book value ratio 
 
Negative 
confirmed by Barclay 
and Smith (1995) 
 
High market to book value ratios tend to be 
associated with companies with asset-light 
balance sheets which borrow less than 
companies with tangible assets in their 
balance sheets; a lesser borrowing capacity 
is associated with shorter maturity. 
Research and 
development 
expenditure/firm value 
Negative 
confirmed by Barclay 
and Smith (1995) 
A high value for this proxy tends to be 
associated with companies with asset-light 
balance sheets that are not ideal candidates 
for debt 
Depreciation/firm value Positive 
confirmed by Barclay 
and Smith (1995) 
Higher depreciation tends to be associated 
with companies with tangible assets so a 
lower market to book value ratio and so 
more debt including longer term debt. 
Earnings/price ratio 
 
Positive 
confirmed by Barclay 
and Smith (1995) 
 
Earnings/price is inversely related to the 
price earnings ratio which is positively 
related to investment opportunities and 
hence to the market to book value ratio as 
reported in Adam and Goyal (2008). 
 
Adam and Goyal (2008) identified a non-robust relationship between the ratio of capital expenditure 
to book assets and the estimated market value of the company (as a proxy for the investment 
opportunity set). 
 
These alternative measures of the investment opportunity set do not overcome the 
link between the market to book value ratio and gearing (based on market values) that 
is caused by the proportion of investment expenditure that is recorded on the balance 
sheet (which is the factor  discussed above).   
 
There is a further factor that contributes to the negative relationship between gearing 
and the market to book value ratio which is considered below. 
 
2.3.2.2 Spurious negative correlation due to structural links between the 
market to book value ratio and gearing (based on market values) 
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If the market to book value ratio is a good proxy for investment opportunities, then a 
company with stable capital structure and without any investment opportunities with 
significantly positive net present value should exhibit a stable market to book value 
ratio over time.   
 
If a company obtains an investment opportunity which has a significantly positive net 
present value, then its equity value will rise to reflect the increase in shareholder value 
once the details of the investment are known to the market.  When the equity value 
increases so will the market to book value ratio (as the book value will be unchanged 
until the time when investment begins).   
 
However, there will also be a corresponding reduction in gearing when it is measured 
by the ratio of debt to the market value of the enterprise (assuming no changes in the 
amount of debt issued by the company).  The amount of debt should be unchanged 
until the investment begins or until the company takes a step to adjust its capital 
structure.  An investment opportunity with positive net present value will therefore tend 
to increase the market to book value ratio and decrease the gearing ratio (when 
measured by the ratio of debt to the market value of the enterprise value) at the time 
of revelation to the market.  This causes a negative correlation between the two 
variables. 
 
Similarly, for the under-investment problem, if a company obtains an investment 
opportunity with a negative net present value then, once known in the market, the 
share price and market value would fall and at the same time gearing (measured by 
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the ratio of debt to the market value of the enterprise value) would rise contributing to 
the same negative correlation as above. 
 
This negative movement in the variables caused by their structure could explain some, 
or all, of the negative relationship detected between these two variables.  It might be 
that the negative relationship detected is due entirely to this effect and that the 
observed relationship provides no insight into the management of capital structure or 
the under-investment problem. 
 
Parsons and Titman (2008) commented on the “mechanical” link between gearing and 
the market to book value ratio and suggested caution when using this variable.  
Barclay and Smith (2005) also acknowledge this link. 
 
The use of gearing based on market values is to capture the absolute amount of debt 
rather than a split between time periods.  The absolute amount of debt captures the 
potential transfer of value more precisely than the ratio of long-term debt to total debt.  
The appropriate regression equation would include the dependent variable as i) the 
ratio of debt with maturity longer than 3 years expressed as a proportion of total debt; 
and ii) gearing expressed as a proportion of the market value. 
 
If gearing or debt maturity is measured by a fraction which has the market value of 
equity in the denominator then since the market to book value ratio has the market 
value of equity in the numerator, an inverse relationship is to be expected between 
gearing/debt maturity and the market to book value ratio.  As equity value increases, 
the market to book value rises and gearing/debt maturity falls and vice versa. 
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It is also possible to consider computing a gearing ratio based on the amount of debt 
with maturity longer than say 3 years as a proportion of market value as this addresses 
the absolute amount of debt (with longer maturity) which might be responsible for the 
major part of a transfer of value from shareholders to debt-holders. 
 
Suppose the market to book value ratio is (E+D)/BVTA where E = market value of 
equity; D = debt; and BVTA = book value of total assets; suppose also that the gearing 
ratio is D/(E+D) where it is expressed as a proportion of the enterprise value; and that 
a measure of debt maturity is D3/E which expresses the amount of debt with a maturity 
more than 3 years (i.e. D3) as a fraction of the enterprise value (E+D). 
 
Then the dependent variables are i) gearing = D/(E+D); and ii) debt maturity = 
D3/(E+D)  
 
In the situation where the company does not have any investment opportunities with 
substantially positive net present value, then the market to book value will be stable 
other things being unchanged. Suppose there is a sudden increase in the equity value 
arising from the acquisition of a new and highly profitable investment opportunity – 
having substantial positive net present value.  This can be modelled using a quantity, 
∆, which represents the increase in shareholder value.  This will affect the dependent 
variables as follows: i) gearing = D/(E+D+∆); and ii) debt maturity = D3/(E+D+∆). 
 
The adjusted market to book value ratio will be given by (E+∆+D)/BVTA.  In the 
dependent variables, ∆ is in the denominator and in the explanatory variable, the 
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market to book value ratio, ∆ is in the numerator.  As ∆ rises, the values of the 
dependent variables fall and the value of the market to book value ratio rises (and vice 
versa).  There is a negative relationship that arises as a direct consequence of the 
construction of the two variables.  This construction effect can explain the negative 
relationship between debt maturity and the market to book value ratio as reported in 
Barclay and Smith (1995) and others. 
 
This analysis assumes that the market to book value residual reacts to the acquisition 
of a significantly positive net present value project but that the corresponding 
investment has not been made.  But as time passes, the investment will be financed 
and appear on the company’s balance sheet and this will impact upon both the market 
to book value ratio and the gearing ratio.  There will be a further change in these two 
quantities. 
 
Assume that the investment amounts to J and that this is financed by using a mix of 
debt and equity in the same gearing ratio based on market values as prevailed before 
the investment opportunity was acquired.  This will restore the gearing ratio to the long 
run level.  It is also assumed that an investment of J will increase the book value of 
the enterprise value – here the reality that there will be some non-balance sheet 
expenditure that will be expensed can be included using the ratio  as above: the 
increase in the book value will therefore be .J. It is also assumed that the expenditure 
of J will increase the market value of the enterprise by the same amount.  Some 
additional labels are needed.  Let the gearing ratio be G and let the market to book 
value ratio be M, in both cases, these are the values that apply prior to the acquisition 
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of the investment opportunity.  Assume also that the ratio of debt with a maturity of 
more than 3 years is G3 and that it is also stable over time. 
 
After financing the new investment, gearing will return to the long run gearing ratio of 
G and the book value of the enterprise will increase from BVTA to BVTA+J; and the 
market value of the enterprise will increase from D+E+∆ (the level after acquisition of 
the investment opportunity but prior to any investment spending) to D+E+∆+J.  The 
new market to book value ratio will be (D+E+∆+J)/ (BVTA+.J).  This quantity can be 
compared to the market to book value ratio after the acquisition of the investment 
opportunity but before investment of: (D+E+∆)/BVTA.  The difference is 
(D+E+∆)/BVTA less (D+E+∆+J)/ (BVTA+.J) which can be simplified by inserting in 
place of (D+E) the term M.BVTA.  The above expression then simplifies to 
(M.BVTA+∆)/BVTA less (M.BVTA+∆+J)/ (BVTA+.J)  
 
By inserting (.M.J - .M.J) into the top of the right-hand fraction, the expression 
becomes 
(1+Δ/BVTA) less (1+Δ+J - .M.J)/ (BVTA+.J) 
 
As it is assumed that M = 1/ so the expression simplifies further to 
 
Δ/BVTA less Δ/ (BVTA+.J) which is clearly positive for  > 0 and hence the market to 
book value declines at the same time as gearing rises.  Once again, a negative 
correlation occurs between changes in these variables.  This approach applies to debt 
maturity which will also demonstrate a negative correlation to the market to book value 
ratio thus providing a further explanation for the negative relationship between debt 
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maturity and the market to book value ratio reported in Barclay and Smith (1995) and 
elsewhere. 
 
A similar argument follows for the ratio of the amount of debt with maturity longer than 
3 years as a proportion of market value (assuming that debt maturity remains at a 
constant proportion of total debt). 
 
The variables, gearing and the market to book value ratio will change as set out in 
Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4 Causes of changes in the market to book value ratio, gearing and 
maturity 
This table demonstrates how changes to the market to book value ratio, gearing 
(based on market values) and maturity (based on market values) are driven by 
changes in the market value of the enterprise caused by the acquisition of a 
profitable investment opportunity 
 
Time of measurement 
 
Gearing based on 
market values 
 
Gearing with 
maturity > 3 years 
 
Market to book value 
ratio 
1 Before the acquisition 
of the investment 
opportunity 
D/(D+E) = G D3/(D+E) = G3 (D+E)/BVTA = M 
2 Once the opportunity 
has been acquired and 
is disclosed to the 
market but before the 
investment has been 
made 
D/(D+E+∆) < G 
 
 
Gearing falls 
D3/(D+E+∆) < G3 
 
The amount of debt 
maturing after 3 
years (as % of 
market value) falls 
(D+E+∆)/BVTA > M 
The market to book 
value ratio rises 
3 After the investment 
has been made and 
based on maintaining 
the long run gearing 
and maturity ratio 
G 
 
Gearing rises and 
returns to its long run 
level 
G3 
 
The amount of debt 
maturing after 3 
years (as % of 
market value) rises 
(D+E+∆+J)/(BVTA+  
.J)  
 
< (D+E+∆)/BVTA 
The market to book 
value ratio falls after 
investment  
 
 
Table 2.4 indicates that over time, changes in the market to book value ratio are 
negatively linked to changes in gearing.  When gearing falls, the market to book value 
ratio rises and vice versa.  The relationship is negative for the proportion of debt 
maturing after 3 years (expressed as a proportion of the market value).  This could 
explain some, or all, of the inverse relationship between the market to book value ratio 
and gearing/debt maturity that has been observed. 
 
This inverse relationship can be modelled using a simple Monte Carlo simulation.  
First, two sets of numbers are generated randomly, M and G.  These have no 
correlation so that when they are regressed against each other, no statistically 
significant relationship can be detected.  These numbers are then used as proxies for 
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the stable values of the market to book value ratio (M) and a measure of gearing or 
maturity (G). 
 
A random number was then used to generate changes in equity value (i.e. ∆).  This 
was then used to model changes in both M and G as follows: 
M is translated into M x (1 + ∆); and 
G is translated into G / (1 + ∆) 
M and G are generated using Excel’s random number function, so they are numbers 
between zero and one.  To ensure that ∆ is scaled appropriately, it is set as a fraction 
of a random variable and rescaled by deducting 0.5 so that it can also model the under-
investment problem (i.e. negative net present value projects).  The translated variables 
are then regressed.  An inverse relationship was detected as predicted.   
 
The strength of this relationship depended on the scale factor.  Where the size of ∆ in 
relation to M and G was high (say around 50%) then the detected negative relationship 
was statistically significant.  This is only a simulation to illustrate the possibility that the 
relationship detected between gearing and the market to book value ratio (and 
residual) could be explained in part by the structure of these variables. 
 
The change in market value of the company could instead be caused by any change 
in market values – not necessarily the acquisition of an investment opportunity with 
positive or negative net present value.  Suppose some news causes the market to 
judge that share prices are low in relation to prospects for corporate profits: this would 
lead to an increase in share prices generally.   This effect might be restricted to a group 
of companies rather than all companies (e.g. to a sector or to those companies with a 
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significant exposure to a country or region).  This effect could create the ∆ as described 
in the analysis above in relation to an investment opportunity. 
 
In a similar way, bad economic news could cause a negative movement in share 
prices.  Good (bad) economic news will put up (down) the market to book value ratio 
and at the same time reduce (increase) gearing (measured by the ratio of debt to the 
market value of the enterprise) and debt maturity (measured by the ratio of debt 
beyond a specified time horizon to the market value of the enterprise).  This will cause 
a negative correlation between these variables as the analysis above demonstrates 
and as is reported in Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003) and elsewhere. 
 
This source of negative correlation between gearing (based on market values) and the 
market to book value ratio is hereafter referred to as the structural connection between 
the two variables. 
   
So, general movements in share values will also contribute to the negative correlation 
(between gearing measured against market values and the market to book value ratio) 
in the same way as the presence of a significantly positive net present value 
investment opportunity.  Together these two effects (the on-off model and the 
structural problem) may explain all the negative correlation between gearing (based 
on market values) and the market to book value ratio.  There may be no implications 
for the under-investment problem.   
 
The market to book value ratio includes the market value of the enterprise in the 
numerator.  The implications of the on-off model and the structural link identified above 
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between gearing (based on market values) and the market to book value ratio apply 
directly to the measure of the company’s size which is taken as the natural logarithm 
of the market value of the enterprise.  It is therefore to be expected that size (market 
value of the enterprise) and the natural logarithm of size will be negatively correlated 
with gearing (based on market values). 
 
2.3.2.3 Developing hypotheses to explain the relationship between debt 
and maturity and the market to book value ratio 
Given the analysis above, testing gearing based on market values against the market 
to book value ratio will identify a negative relationship that doesn’t necessarily 
represent evidence of the management of the under-investment problem; and 
similarly, for the ratio of debt maturing after 3 years expressed as a proportion of the 
market value of the enterprise.  Hypotheses 1 and 2 broadly replicate what has already 
been reported in the literature and summarised in the Appendix to this Chapter.  This 
amounts to a test on the data to confirm past results.  Both hypotheses are implied by 
the on-off model and the structural problem described above and possibly also by 
Myers’ (1977) solution for the under-investment problem. 
 
• Hypothesis 1: Debt maturity (measured as the amount of debt maturing after 3 
years as a proportion of the total debt) will be negatively related to the market to 
book value ratio.  This is implied by the on-off model and the structural problem 
described above and possibly also by Myers’ (1977) solution for the under-
investment problem. 
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• Hypothesis 2: Gearing (expressed in market value terms) will be negatively related 
to the market to book value ratio.  This is implied by the on-off model and the 
structural problem described above and possibly also by Myers’ (1977) solution for 
the under-investment problem.   
 
This definition of debt maturity used in hypothesis 1 (and in previous studies) is not 
perfect.  Company A with a low level of gearing could have a high proportion of debt 
maturing after 3 years whereas company B might have a higher level of gearing with 
a large proportion of debt maturing before 3 years.  The method of characterising 
maturity as the proportion of debt maturing after say 3 years would show company A 
as having a higher proportion of debt maturing after 3 years compared with company 
B.  However, company B might have more long-term debt as a proportion of total book 
value.  The problem of agency costs is not just about maturity but also about the 
amount of debt.  Shortening debt maturity is one solution (as argued in Myers (1977)) 
but reducing the amount of debt also reduces the potential transfer of value from 
shareholders to debt-holders.  Here, additional variables can be used to assess the 
relationship between debt maturity and the market to book value ratio.  The amount of 
longer-dated debt can be addressed by computing a gearing ratio based on debt 
maturing after 3 years expressed as a proportion of market value or book value.  This 
provides an alternative measure of debt maturity. 
 
The measure of debt maturity that is used in hypothesis 3 is the amount of debt that 
has a maturity greater than 3 years expressed as a proportion of market value.  This 
has the advantage that the amount of longer term debt is used rather than a proportion 
of total debt (as hypothesis 2).   
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• Hypothesis 3: Maturity (the amount of debt with a maturity longer than 3 years 
expressed as a proportion of the market value of the enterprise) will be negatively 
related to the market to book value ratio for the reasons given above.  
 
To examine whether there is a negative relationship between gearing and the market 
to book value ratio that avoids the problems identified above, gearing (and debt 
maturity) can be expressed in terms of the book value of assets rather than the market 
value.  In the on-off model above, debt amounted to ..A and the market value of the 
enterprise value amounted to A so that the gearing ratio measured using market 
values simplified to . whereas the market to book value ratio was simply A divided 
by .A or 1/.  If instead of market values, book values are used to compute gearing, 
then gearing will be ..A/.A which simplifies to  and hence  does not feature on 
the left-hand side of the regression equation and so the negative relationship inherent 
in the model is avoided.   
 
Similarly, if the company acquires a positive net present value project, then while this 
affects the market to book value ratio, it won’t affect the gearing ratio (based on book 
values).  The choice of book value to measure gearing avoids the structural problems 
described above.  In addition, if debt is provided by lenders by reference to the amount 
of the book value of the enterprise value, then to the extent that the company has a 
high market to book value ratio, this is more likely to encourage lenders to lend more 
than would be indicated by the book value of assets rather than less since the 
additional value inherent in the market to book value ratio is likely to be linked to 
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additional future profitability which would encourage lenders rather than discourage 
them. 
 
Therefore, there should be a positive relationship (or, as a minimum, not a negative 
relationship) between gearing (measured using book values) and the market to book 
value ratio.  Accordingly, additional hypotheses can be formulated. 
 
• Hypothesis 4: Gearing (debt expressed as a proportion of the book value of the 
enterprise) will be positively (or at least not negatively) related to the market to 
book value ratio.  This hypothesis, if substantiated, contradicts Myers’ (1977) 
solution for the under-investment problem; and similarly 
 
• Hypothesis 5: Maturity (the amount of debt with a maturity longer than 3 years 
expressed as a proportion of the book value of the enterprise) will be positively (or 
at least not negatively) related to the market to book value ratio. As before, this 
hypothesis, if substantiated, will contradict Myers’ (1977) solution of the under-
investment problem. 
 
However, there may be a further alternative explanation.  Since the market to book 
value ratio is strongly negatively related to company size and since debt maturity (as 
measured by the proportion of debt maturing after 3 years and as the ratio of debt 
maturing after 3 years as a proportion of total book value) is positively related to size 
(these relationships are confirmed in the correlation statistics in Table 2.7 below) then 
it is to be expected that even when maturity is measured using book values that a 
negative relationship between debt maturity and the market to book value ratio will be 
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seen.  The common factor is size.  To adjust for this size effect, the market to book 
value ratio can be scaled by the size variable (the natural logarithm of the enterprise 
value) to create a new independent variable which is defined in Table 2.5 (scaled 
MTBV is the market to book value ratio divided by the size variable). 
 
A modified hypothesis can be formulated: 
• Hypothesis 6: the amount of debt maturing after 3 years expressed as a proportion 
of the book value will not be negatively related to the scaled market to book value 
ratio.   
 
The strategy of value recapture suggests that adjustments to gearing (should they be 
needed) will occur from time to time.  This implies a negative relationship between 
changes in gearing (based on market values) and changes in the market to book value 
ratio.  Such a relationship would tend to confirm the validity of the model that gearing 
(based on market values) and the market to book value ratio are negatively related 
due to the way they are constructed rather than providing evidence of the management 
of agency costs.  This negative relationship should also be seen when changes in debt 
maturing after 3 years (expressed as a proportion of market value) is used in place of 
changes in total gearing. 
 
In direct contrast, if gearing (based on book values) is positively related to the market 
to book value ratio then we would expect to see changes in gearing (based on book 
values) positively related to changes in the market to book value ratio. 
 
Three further hypotheses can therefore be formulated: 
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• Hypothesis 7: Changes in gearing (based on market values) are negatively 
associated with changes in the market to book value ratio; 
 
• Hypothesis 8: Changes in debt maturity (measured by expressing the amount of 
debt with a maturity longer than 3 years as a proportion of the market value of the 
enterprise) will be negatively related to changes in the market to book value ratio; 
and 
 
• Hypothesis 9: Changes in gearing (based on book values) are positively associated 
with changes in the market to book value ratio. 
Changes in the market to book value ratio and gearing can be computed as the 
difference between the value in one year and the value in the previous year.  This 
quantity can be used in substitution for the actual market to book value ratio and 
similarly for gearing.  
 
The method of testing these hypotheses is described in the next section.  
 
2.3.3  Data and methodology 
The data are taken from Compustat for North American companies for the period 1995 
– 2014: this sample includes data where the company is not present for the full period, 
thereby avoiding survivorship bias.  A total of 195,600 company-year observations in 
respect of 23,600 companies are included.  However, not all company-year 
observations are complete and so the usable data are smaller in number: the sample 
size available varies between each regression depending on the variables employed.  
A further constraint is the requirement to use lagged values of the variables: this 
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requires that each company-year observation has a corresponding value for the 
previous year.  This requirement leads to a further reduction in sample size where 
there is no previous company-year value.  For instance, using system GMM with two 
lags requires 3 consecutive company-year observations and so the sample size for 
this approach is smaller than for fixed effects modelling where only two consecutive 
company-year observations are required.  For these reasons, the sample size varies 
between regression analyses. 
 
The sample excludes financial companies (with SIC codes between 6,000 and 6,499). 
 
Yield curve data are taken from the US Treasury website, US consumer price index 
data are downloaded from US Department of Labour website and yields on corporate 
bonds by maturity are from Bank of America Merrill Lynch/Federal Reserve Bank of St 
Louis, Economic Data.   
 
Not all companies provide data for all years and so this is an unbalanced panel dataset 
(of the small “T” large “N” type).  Also, certain values for some variables are extreme 
and need to be modified.  It has therefore been necessary to winsorize variables at 
the 1% level following Johnson (2003).  Summary statistics of the data are set out in 
Table 2.6. 
 
The next part of this section addresses the variables, the equations and the methods 
of estimation. 
 
2.3.3.1 Variables 
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The regression equation used in Barclay and Smith (1995) includes the following 
independent variables: the market to book value ratio; a regulation dummy; the 
logarithm of company size, an abnormal earnings measure; and a measure for the 
term structure.  Stohs and Mauer (1996) use similar variables but include also 
company gearing, tax rates, asset maturity, credit rating, and a measure of earnings 
volatility.  Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003) also include profitability but exclude 
abnormal earnings, tangibility (the proportion of fixed assets to total assets); tax 
variables, asset maturity and a commercial paper dummy.  Similarly, Barclay, Smith 
and Morellec (2006) used the market to book value ratio, a regulation dummy, the 
logarithm of real sales, a tax credit dummy, the fixed asset ratio, profitability and a net 
operating loss dummy. 
 
Johnson (2003) used predicted leverage, the market to book value ratio, asset life, 
size and size squared, volatility, investment tax credit dummy, net operating losses, a 
rating dummy, abnormal earnings and the yield curve. 
 
Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2006) included an extensive set of regressors covering 
the main hypotheses of debt maturity namely tax minimisation, liquidity risk and 
signalling (see Connelly, Certo, Ireland and Reutzel (2011) for a review of these 
ideas), contracting/agency costs and equity market conditions.   
 
Kleczyk (2012) includes the market to book value ratio, a regulation dummy, size 
(logarithm of market value), abnormal earnings, excess bond returns, the term spread, 
inflation, the short-term real rate of interest and dummy variables for each month in 
which debt is issued. 
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In the empirical analyses conducted in this Chapter, the primary concern is to explain 
the reported negative relationship between debt and debt maturity and the market to 
book value ratio as this is considered to support Myers’ (1977) solutions to the under-
investment problem.  However, additional independent variables are included within 
the modelling structure to ensure that the model specifications are not subject to 
under-specification biases.  This selection is also informed by the choice of 
explanatory variables employed in testing the relationship between gearing and the 
market to book value ratio.  The definitions of the variables employed are set out in 
Table 2.5 below. 
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Table 2.5 Definitions of the variables and expected signs of coefficients 
This table sets out the definitions of all the variables used in the regression analyses and their expected 
signs 
Debt maturity The amount of debt maturing after 3 years expressed as a proportion of total debt 
following Barclay and Smith (1995) and Kleczyk (2012).  Johnson (2003) uses the 
complementary proportion of debt maturing within 3 years. 
  
Debt maturity 
(book value) 
The amount of debt maturing after 3 years expressed as a proportion of the book 
value of the company.  This is the definition used in Barclay and Smith (1995). 
  
Gearing (market 
value) 
The total amount of debt expressed as a proportion of the market value of the 
company.  This formulation is commonly used (see Kleczyk (2012)). 
 
Gearing (book 
value) 
The total amount of debt expressed as a proportion of the book value of the 
company.  This formulation is commonly used (see Kleczyk (2012)). 
 
The market to 
book value ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected sign 
The enterprise value (the sum of the market values of debt and equity) divided by 
total book value of assets as used in Barclay and Smith (1995), Antoniou, Guney 
and Paudyal (2006), Johnson (2010), Kleczyk (2012) and elsewhere.  This 
variable is considered to represent the company's investment opportunity set.  To 
the extent that a company has valuable investment options (i.e. having a positive 
net present value) the company's market value will reflect this potential value.  The 
greater the value of these options the greater will be the market to book value 
ratio.  Such companies are potential candidates for the under-investment problem 
as envisaged in Myers (1977).  
 
“–” to track existing results in the literature except where positive coefficients are 
hypothesised above. 
 
Regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected sign 
A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the company is regulated (ie has a SIC 
code between 4000 and 4999) but is otherwise zero.  It is argued in Barclay and 
Smith (1995) that regulated companies have less discretion over investment 
decisions so the need for the supposed discipline of shorter term debt maturity is 
lower with the result that regulated companies should have longer maturity debt 
than non-regulated companies. Since such regulated companies are likely to be 
large and with relatively modest growth prospects, they are ideal candidates to 
issue long-term bonds.  Regulated companies represent approximately 10% of 
the total dataset. 
 
“+” since such companies have less need to manage under-investment problems. 
 
Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected sign 
The natural logarithm of the enterprise value adjusted by US inflation (the 
Consumer Price Index) following Johnson (2012).  Larger firms will be able to 
issue longer maturity bonds with lower issue costs and lower cost of debt in 
general (because of lower volatility) compared to smaller firms and hence size 
should be associated with longer maturity as reported in Barclay and Smith (1995), 
Johnson (2003) and Kleczyk (2012).  However, some large companies use 
commercial paper which is short-term (less than 1 year) and can be a permanent 
source of cheap debt.  If this is present, it will counteract the tendency for larger 
firms to have longer maturity debt.   
 
“+” as, in general, larger companies can borrow for longer: however, for gearing 
based on market values, a negative relationship is implied by the on-off model and 
the structural model since the logarithm of market value is on the right-hand side 
of the regression equation in the numerator but is in the denominator in the left-
hand size of the regression equation.  This should not be the case where gearing 
is measured using book values where the structural problems are avoided. 
 
Commercial 
paper dummy 
A dummy variable that takes the value of unity if the company has a short-term 
credit rating and is zero otherwise.  This addresses the possibility that some 
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Expected sign 
companies, particularly large ones, issue commercial paper and so will tend to 
have shorter maturity overall than companies that do not issue commercial paper.  
This variable is included in Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003). 
 
“–” as companies that can issue commercial paper thereby shorten their debt 
maturity. 
 
Abnormal 
earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected sign 
The proportionate change in earnings, year on year (i.e. next year’s earnings 
compared with the current year) as in Barclay and Smith (1995).  This variable 
assesses the management's private knowledge of the future and is a measure of 
information asymmetry.  If future earnings are unexpectedly good, then this would 
enhance the value of the company's bonds.  So, to avoid such a transfer of value, 
the company should minimise the maturity of its debt and vice versa.  By 
minimising the maturity, the potential transfer of value is reduced (as discussed 
above).  Hence a negative relationship between future earnings and maturity is to 
be expected.  However, significant changes in debt maturity are not easy to 
achieve on an annual basis.  It is not practical for a company to change its maturity 
profile each year to reflect the management's expectations about the following 
year's earnings.  There could be substantial costs involved.  A policy that required 
annual adjustments to the maturity profile of debt could require the debt 
instruments to include call provisions.  This of itself would involve additional cost 
which would need to be evaluated against the possible benefits. 
 
In practice, the abnormal earnings variable is likely to proxy for other variables.  A 
high measure of abnormal earnings could be associated with higher growth (and 
may also be linked to a higher market to book value ratio).  But higher growth is 
also associated with smaller companies.  As smaller companies tend to have 
shorter maturity debt, a higher value for abnormal earnings will be associated with 
shorter debt maturity.  Also, higher abnormal earnings could be linked to higher 
volatility (including smaller companies) and so such companies will tend to be 
regarded adversely by lenders.  Such companies will tend to have less debt and 
shorter maturities.  So, there are at least two reasons why companies with high 
abnormal earnings will tend to have shorter term debt and where those reasons 
do not support the method of the management of the under-investment problem 
in Myers (1977). 
 
Equally, higher abnormal earnings are likely to be associated with higher market 
to book value ratio and if there is a negative relationship between the market to 
book value ratio and debt maturity then this will also imply a negative relationship 
between abnormal earnings and debt maturity.  This variable is sometimes 
described as “firm quality”: see the survey work of Dichev, Graham, Harvey and 
Rajgopal (2013) which describes the significance of this single measure of 
performance and the steps management take to manipulate it. 
 
“–” as better prospects should discourage longer maturities as that could amount 
to a transfer of value to the debt-holders at the expense of shareholders. 
 
Average asset life 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected sign 
The value of fixed assets divided by annual depreciation.  This produces a crude 
measure of the number of years of deprecation and hence asset life.  It is quite 
common for companies and lenders to match debt maturity to asset life.  Loans 
are amortised over the life of the asset.  This variable is included in Barclay, Marx 
and Smith (2003). 
 
“+” as lenders tend to match loans to asset life. 
 
Fixed asset ratio 
 
 
 
 
The ratio of fixed assets to total assets.  Lenders prefer fixed assets as security 
compared with non-fixed assets such as current assets.  Therefore, the total 
amount of debt is likely to be governed by the amount of available fixed assets 
rather than total assets.  The impact of the fixed asset ratio on maturity derives 
from the connection between debt and maturity which are positively and 
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Expected sign 
significantly correlated.  This variable is sometimes labelled “tangibility”.  This 
variable is included in Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003). 
 
“+/–” although a higher fixed asset ratio encourages lenders, the effect on maturity 
is not so easy to predict. 
 
Debt market 
conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected sign 
In addition to the above company specific variables and to reflect debt market 
conditions, the following variables are included.  The impact of these variables 
reflecting debt market conditions is likely to be affected by the problem identified 
in relation to firm quality, namely that companies are not able easily to amend the 
maturity structure of their liabilities because of short-term changes in debt market 
conditions.  The Yield curve, Bond spread, Inflation and Short-term real interest 
rate are all included as independent variables as in Kleczyk (2012). 
 
“–” based on a simple consideration of cost. 
 
Yield curve The difference in yield between a long-term risk-free asset (20-year US 
government bond) and a short-term risk-free asset (3 months Treasury bill).  The 
idea is that maturity may reflect the differences in costs between short and long-
term debt as their respective costs are linked to the returns on risk-free assets of 
similar maturity.  The cost of debt is usually expressed as a margin over the risk-
free asset and such margin is not necessarily independent of maturity.  This 
margin generally increases with maturity and is measured by the excess corporate 
bond return variable described below.   
 
Bond spread The difference between the yield on a portfolio of investment grade bonds with 
maturity of 15 years less the yield on a portfolio of investment grade bonds with 
maturity of less than 3 years.  This measures the additional borrowing costs of 
longer dated debt (compared with shorter term borrowing costs). 
 
Inflation This is computed by reference to changes in the US consumer price index. 
 
Short-term real 
interest rate 
The difference between the interest rate on the 6-month US treasury bill and 
inflation.  
 
ScaledMTBV 
(in relation to 
hypothesis 6) 
 
Expected sign 
The market to book value ratio divided by the Size variable and is designed to 
reduce the effect of size on the relationship between debt maturity and the market 
to book value ratio. 
 
“+” thus contradicting the solution in Myers (1977). 
 
Lagged 
dependent 
variable 
 
Expected sign 
To take account of a policy of adjusting capital structure and debt maturity to a 
target, lagged values of the dependent variables are included as explanatory 
variables as in Fama and French (2002). 
 
“+” except where the dependent variable represents changes in gearing or debt 
maturity where the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable will be negative 
suggesting that changes are returning the ratio to a long run target. 
 
In the regression tests using gearing or changes in either debt maturity or gearing as the dependent 
variable, similar signs to those indicated above are expected. 
 
 
The effects being studied here are considered to persist through time and, as such, 
are not time-dependent thereby removing the need to include time dummy variables: 
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this approach follows Guney, Li and Fairchild (2011) and Barclay, Marx and Smith 
(2003). 
 
Industry dummies are also excluded from the modelling.  That is, while industry effects 
do have an impact on the market to book value ratio and gearing such industry effects 
are reflected in the models by using variables that are expressed as proportions of 
sector values.  For instance, in some cases, relative gearing is used to reflect the 
position of the subject company in relation to others in the same sector. 
 
2.3.3.2 Model equations 
The regression equation used to test each hypothesis is set out below the hypotheses. 
 
Static models do not provide for delays in adjusting capital structure as is argued 
above in relation to the value recapture strategy.  Accordingly, a lagged value of the 
dependent variable is included as an explanatory variable.  The subscripts indicate 
firm (i) and time (t). 
 
• Hypothesis 1: Debt maturity (measured as the amount of debt maturing after 3 
years as a proportion of the total debt) will be negatively related to the market to 
book value ratio.  This is implied by the on-off model and the structural problem 
described above and possibly also by Myers’ (1977) solution for the under-
investment problem. 
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Debtmati,t =  + β1Debtmati,(t-1) + β2MTBVi,t + β3Regi,t + β4Sizei,t + β5CPDi,t + β6Abegsi,t 
+ β7AALi,t + β8FARi,t + β9Ycurvet + β10Bondspreadt + β11Inflationt + β12Shortintt + εi,t     
           (2.10) 
 
Dependent variable: Debtmati,t = the amount of debt maturing after 3 years expressed 
as a proportion of total debt. 
Independent variables: 1) lagged value of Debtmati,t; 2) MTBV = market to book value 
ratio; 3) Reg = regulation dummy; 4) Size = natural logarithm of the enterprise value; 
5) CPD = commercial paper dummy; 6) Abegs = abnormal earnings; 7) AAL = average 
asset life; 8) FAR = fixed asset ratio; 9) Ycurve = yield curve; 10) Bondspread = bond 
spread; 11) Inflation = inflation; and 12) Shortint = short-term interest rate.  Finally, εi,t 
is the error term.     
 
• Hypothesis 2: Gearing (expressed in market value terms) will be negatively related 
to the market to book value ratio.  This is implied by the on-off model and the 
structural problem described above and possibly also by Myers’ (1977) solution for 
the under-investment problem.   
 
Gearmkti,t =  + β1Gearmkti,(t-1) + β2MTBVi,t + β3Regi,t + β4Sizei,t + β5CPDi,t + β6Abegsi,t 
+ β7AALi,t + β8FARi,t + β9Ycurvet + β10Bondspreadt + β11Inflationt + β12Shortintt + εi,t     
           (2.11) 
 
Dependent variable: Gearmkti,t = gearing (measured using market values). 
Independent variables: 1) Gearmkti,(t-1) = lagged value of Gearmkti,t; 2) the other 
independent variables as per equation (2.10) for hypothesis 1; and εi,t is the error term. 
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• Hypothesis 3: Maturity (the amount of debt with a maturity longer than 3 years 
expressed as a proportion of the market value of the enterprise) will be negatively 
related to the market to book value ratio. As before, this hypothesis is in 
contradiction of Myers’ (1977) solution of the under-investment problem. 
 
Gearmkt3i,t =  + β1Gearmkt3i,(t-1) + β2MTBVi,t + β3Regi,t + β4Sizei,t + β5CPDi,t + 
β6Abegsi,t + β7AALi,t + β8FARi,t + β9Ycurvet + β10Bondspreadt + β11Inflationt + 
β12Shortintt + εi,t              (2.12) 
 
Dependent variable: Gearmkt3i,t = amount of debt with a maturity greater than 3 years 
expressed as a proportion of book values. 
Independent variables: 1) lagged value of Gearmkt3i,t; 2) the other independent 
variables as per equation (2.10) for hypothesis 1; and εi,t is the error term. 
 
• Hypothesis 4: Gearing (total debt expressed as a proportion of the book value of 
the enterprise) will be positively (or at least not negatively) related to the market to 
book value ratio.  This hypothesis contradicts Myers’ (1977) solution for the under-
investment problem; and similarly 
 
Gearbki,t =  + β1Gearbki,(t-1) + β2MTBVi,t + β3Regi,t + β4Sizei,t + β5CPDi,t + β6Abegsi,t 
+ β7AALi,t + β8FARi,t + β9Ycurvet + β10Bondspreadt + β11Inflationt + β12Shortintt + εi,t 
(2.13) 
 
Dependent variable: Gearbki,t = gearing (measured using book values). 
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Independent variables: 1) lagged value of Gearbki,t; 2) the other independent variables 
as per equation (2.10) for hypothesis 1; and εi,t is the error term. 
 
• Hypothesis 5: Maturity (the amount of debt with a maturity longer than 3 years 
expressed as a proportion of the book value of the enterprise) will be positively (or 
at least not negatively) related to the market to book value ratio. As before, this 
hypothesis is in contradiction of Myers’ (1977) solution of the under-investment 
problem. 
 
Gearbk3i,t =  + β1Gearbk3i,(t-1) + β2MTBVi,t + β3Regi,t + β4Sizei,t + β5CPDi,t + β6Abegsi,t 
+ β7AALi,t + β8FARi,t + β9Ycurvet + β10Bondspreadt + β11Inflationt + β12Shortintt + εi,t     
           (2.14) 
 
Dependent variable: Gearbk3i,t = amount of debt with a maturity greater than 3 years 
expressed as a proportion of book values. 
Independent variables: 1) lagged value of Gearbk3i,t; 2) the other independent 
variables as per equation (2.10) for hypothesis 1; and εi,t is the error term. 
 
• Hypothesis 6: the amount of debt maturing after 3 years expressed as a proportion 
of the book value will not be negatively related to the scaled market to book value 
ratio.  
  
Gearbk3i,t =  + β1Gearbk3i,(t-1) + β2ScaMTBVi,t + β3Regi,t + β4Sizei,t + β5CPDi,t + 
β6Abegsi,t + β7AALi,t + β8FARi,t + β9Ycurvet + β10Bondspreadt + β11Inflationt + 
β12Shortintt + εi,t              (2.15) 
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Dependent variable: Gearbk3i,t = amount of debt with a maturity greater than 3 years 
expressed as a proportion of book values. 
Independent variables: 1) lagged value of Gearbk3i,t; 2) ScaMTBV = scaled MTBV; 3) 
the other independent variables as per equation (2.10) for hypothesis 1: and εi,t is the 
error term. 
 
• Hypothesis 7: Changes in gearing (based on market values) are negatively 
associated with changes in the market to book value ratio; 
 
ΔGearmkti,t =  + β1ΔGearmkti,(t-1) + β2ΔMTBVi,t + β3Regi,t + β4Sizei,t + β5CPDi,t + 
β6Abegsi,t + β7AALi,t + β8FARi,t + β9Ycurvet + β10Bondspreadt + β11Inflationt + 
β12Shortintt + εi,t              (2.16) 
 
Dependent variable: ΔGearmkti,t = changes in gearing (measured using market 
values). 
Independent variables: 1) lagged value of ΔGearmki,t; 2) β2ΔMTBVi,t is the change in 
the market to book value ratio; 3) the other independent variables as per equation 
(2.10) for hypothesis 1; and εi,t is the error term. 
 
• Hypothesis 8: Changes in debt maturity (measured by expressing the amount of 
debt with a maturity longer than 3 years as a proportion of the market value of the 
enterprise) will be negatively related to changes in the market to book value ratio;  
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ΔGearmkt3i,t =  + β1ΔGearmkti,(t-1) + β2ΔMTBVi,t + β3Regi,t + β4Sizei,t + β5CPDi,t + 
β6Abegsi,t + β7AALi,t + β8FARi,t + β9Ycurvet + β10Bondspreadt + β11Inflationt + 
β12Shortintt + εi,t              (2.17) 
 
Dependent variable: ΔGearmkt3i,t = amount of debt with a maturity greater than 3 
years expressed as a proportion of market values. 
Independent variables: 1) lagged value of ΔGearmkt3i,t; 2) ΔMTBVi,t is the change in 
the market to book value ratio; 3) the other independent variables as per equation 
(2.10) for hypothesis 1; and εi,t is the error term. 
 
• Hypothesis 9: Changes in gearing (based on book values) are positively associated 
with changes in the market to book value ratio. 
 
ΔGearbki,t =  + β1ΔGearbki,(t-1) + β2ΔMTBVi,t + β3Regi,t + β4Sizei,t + β5CPDi,t + 
β6Abegsi,t + β7AALi,t + β8FARi,t + β9Ycurvet + β10Bondspreadt + β11Inflationt + 
β12Shortintt + εi,t              (2.18) 
 
Dependent variable: ΔGearbki,t = changes in gearing (measured using book values). 
Independent variables: 1) lagged value of ΔGearbki,t; 2) ΔMTBVi,t is the change in the 
market to book value ratio; 3) the other independent variables as per equation (2.10) 
for hypothesis 1; and εi,t is the error term. 
 
The testing methodology is described in the next section. 
 
 
2.3.3.3 The methods of estimation 
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A key assumption underlying ordinary least squares regression is that the error terms 
are not correlated with the independent variables.  Violation of this orthogonality 
assumption can lead to biased and inconsistent estimates.  In corporate finance, the 
structure of the panel data is short (defined as a combination of small T (number of 
years per company) and large N (number of companies) and the nature of the data 
can impose challenges to the estimation of coefficients by conventional methods such 
as ordinary least squares: in particular, error terms are likely to be correlated with 
regressors. 
 
A random/fixed effects approach can be employed where an element (the individual 
effect) within the error term is assumed to be correlated with the regressors.  In the 
random effects model, it is assumed that there is an individual effect but that it is not 
correlated with the regressors.  The Hausman test can determine which of the two 
approaches (random or fixed effects) is the more appropriate. 
 
For example, leverage ratios have a significant time-invariant component that is 
correlated with some of the independent variables.  A traditional ordinary least squares 
approach will ignore both firm-specific effects and serial correlation in the error 
structure.  To address this difficulty, a fixed effects model can be employed.  Lemmon, 
Roberts and Zender (2008) provide a comparison of the effects of using the two 
methods (ordinary least squares and fixed effects).  Significant differences in the 
estimated coefficient values are obtained (see Table V in that paper).   
 
An improvement on the fixed effects model is available in the system generalised 
method of moments (system GMM) estimator which was developed by Arellano and 
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Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) and which addresses concerns about the 
estimation of dynamic panel data models in the presence of firm specific effects.  
System GMM can deal with lagged levels and differences of the dependent variable 
and exogenous variables. 
 
The effectiveness of seven different estimation approaches is considered in Flannery 
and Hankins (2013) covering ordinary least squares, fixed effects, Arellano and Bond’s 
(1991) difference GMM method, Blundell and Bond’s (1998) system GMM, four period 
long differencing which replicates Huang and Ritter’s (2009) implementation of the 
estimator in Hahn, Hausman and Kuersteiner (2007); long differencing allowing for 
unbalanced panels (an alternative adaptation of the method in Hahn, Hausman and 
Kuersteiner (2007)); and least squares dummy variable correction which corrects for 
the biased fixed effects estimated coefficient using an estimate of the of the short-
panel bias estimated from each firm’s data.   
 
The analysis concluded that for unbalanced panel data, system GMM and fixed effects 
worked the best (on data generated by Monte Carlo simulation) and that the results 
were only slightly impacted by endogeneity. 
 
An excellent and comprehensive analysis of the appropriate methods of estimation for 
unbalanced dynamic panel data sets is contained in Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal 
(2006) who argued that system GMM is the most appropriate estimation method to 
use in addition to fixed effects.  System GMM offers the flexibility to identify 
independent variables as i) exogenous (being determined externally to the model and 
the other equation variables); ii) predetermined (being determined by previous or 
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lagged values of the variable); and iii) endogenous (being determined by other 
equation variables in the model).  Flannery and Hankins (2013) tested the option of 
describing all their variables as “endogenous” (in the Stata command xtdpdsys) but 
found little difference to using the option “predetermined” which is why this choice has 
been made here and their recommendation followed. 
 
The two methods highlighted in Flannery and Hankins (2013) as the most efficient, 
namely fixed effects and system GMM, are used here and the procedure in relation to 
system GMM used in that paper (using Stata's “xtdpdsys” command, two steps, with 
all the independent variables specified as "predetermined" and the maximum number 
of lags restricted to two or, in some cases, more) is followed. 
 
There are two tests used with system GMM, the Sargan test (see Sargan (1958)) and 
Hansen’s J test (see Hansen (1982)).  Hansen’s test is not available in Stata in 
conjunction with xtdpdsys.  However, both tests must be used with care and as pointed 
out in Roodman (2009a and 2009b) can be unreliable and can give unreliable positive 
results.  One problem highlighted in Roodman (2009a) is the presence of too many 
instruments. 
 
In the empirical analysis, the emphasis is primarily on the sign and size of the 
coefficient of the market to book value ratio as this is the basis of support for the 
solutions for the under-investment problem in Myers (1977).  Comments on the other 
variables in the regression equations will focus on those coefficients which are 
significant in both a statistical and an economic sense.  Economic significance is 
considered in terms of the impact on the dependent variable of a change in the 
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independent variable which is computed as the product of the coefficient variable and 
the range of values for the variable between the 10th and 90th percentiles: an impact 
in excess of 5% on the dependent variable of the indicated range for the independent 
variable is reported as economically significant.  A further test of economic significance 
is based on changes in the dependent variable expressed as a proportion of standard 
deviation relating to a change in an independent variable of one standard deviation: 
this is included as appropriate. 
 
2.3.3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Summary statistics are set out in Table 2.6 and correlation statistics in Table 2.7. 
 
Over the period 1995-2014, the mean amount of debt maturing after 3 years is 40% 
with wide variation as indicated by the standard deviation.  The mean value of the 
market to book value ratio is quite high although the median value less but still 
significantly more than one indicating valuable investment opportunities in the absence 
of an alternative explanation. 
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Table 2.6 Summary statistics 1995-2014   
 
Observ-
ations Median Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Var-
iance 
Skew-
ness 
Kur-
tosis 
Min-
imum 
Max-
imum 
Debt maturity (%>3 
years) 107,623 0.342 0.396 0.377 0.142 0.263 1.466 
 
-0.050 
 
1.000 
Market to book value 
ratio 114,838 1.265 3.130 4.992 24.916 2.823 10.030 
 
0.391 
 
21.282 
Regulation dummy 195,841 0.000 0.100 0.301 0.090 2.660 8.073 0 1 
Size 115,359 5.181 5.185 2.634 6.936 -0.196 3.515 -12.51 18.79 
Commercial paper 
dummy 195,839 0.000 0.048 0.215 0.046 4.206 18.692 0 1 
Abnormal earnings 103,544 -0.006 0.294 1.056 1.116 2.403 8.701 -1.087 3.972 
Average asset life 158,126 5.208 8.318 9.005 81.088 1.913 6.043 0.604 36.46 
Fixed asset ratio 167,081 0.203 0.299 0.275 0.076 0.837 2.487 0 0.953 
Yield curve 195,841 0.024 0.022 0.015 0.000 -0.008 1.756 -.003 0.045 
Bond spread 195,841 0.014 0.020 0.014 0.000 0.015 1.644 -.005 0.042 
Inflation 195,841 0.024 0.023 0.010 0.000 -0.256 2.564 0.001 0.041 
Short-term interest 
rate 195,841 0.000 0.003 0.020 0.000 0.153 1.683 -0.029 0.037 
Debt >3 years (% of 
market) 75,058 0.047 0.136 0.183 0.034 1.541 4.835 -0.002 0.784 
Debt >3 years (% of 
book) 107,296 0.063 0.151 0.199 0.040 1.683 5.872 -0.004 0.948 
Gearing (gross, 
market) 115,359 0.136 0.232 0.260 0.068 1.148 3.444 0.000 0.989 
Gearing (gross, 
book) 169,990 0.205 0.307 0.417 0.174 2.931 13.557 0.000 2.324 
Scaled market to 
book value ratio 114,812 0.252 0.844 1.836 3.371 3.908 19.950 -1.330 11.740 
Differences in:          
Debt maturity (%>3 
years) 83,924 0.000 -0.005 0.267 0.071 0.038 7.872 -1.050 1.050 
Debt >3 years (% of 
market) 57,160 0.000 -0.001 0.121 0.015 0.198 13.393 -0.785 0.784 
Debt >3 years (% of 
book) 83,605 0.000 -0.002 0.126 0.016 -0.346 19.567 -0.951 0.951 
Gearing (gross, 
market) 95,723 0.000 0.007 0.276 0.076 -0.289 34.964 -0.989 0.989 
Gearing (gross, 
book) 149,092 0.000 -0.043 3.432 11.779 -0.065 18.916 -2.324 2.324 
Market to book value 
ratio 95,165 0.000 -0.005 0.267 0.071 0.038 7.872 -20.89 208.9 
Definitions of the variables are set out in Table 2.5 
 
 
Correlation statistics are set out in Table 2.7.  
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Table 2.7 Correlation statistics 1995-2014 
 
Debt 
maturity 
(%>3 
years) 
Market to 
book 
value 
ratio 
Reg-
ulation 
dummy Size 
Comm-
ercial 
paper 
dummy 
Abnormal 
earnings 
Average 
asset life 
Market to book value 
ratio -0.283***       
Regulation dummy 0.220*** -0.077***      
Size 0.495*** -0.133*** 0.184***     
Commercial paper 
dummy 0.180*** -0.084*** 0.189*** 0.425***    
Abnormal earnings -0.179*** 0.175*** -0.023*** -0.264*** -0.081***   
Average asset life 0.214*** -0.120*** 0.196*** 0.122*** 0.071*** -0.054***  
Fixed asset ratio 0.247*** -0.120*** 0.279*** 0.197*** 0.108*** -0.038*** 0.637*** 
Yield curve -0.013*** 0.039*** -0.012*** 0.025***    -0.001 0.066*** 0.016*** 
Bond spread 0.001   0.031*** -0.017*** 0.015***     0.000 0.060*** 0.020*** 
Inflation   -0.009** -0.033*** 0.013*** -0.035***     0.003 -0.014*** -0.017*** 
Short-term interest rate -0.014*** -0.028*** 0.023*** -0.052***     0.002 -0.068*** -0.052*** 
Debt >3 years (% of 
market) 0.715*** -0.272*** 0.227*** 0.296*** 0.060*** -0.093*** 0.255*** 
Debt >3 years (% of 
book) 0.751*** -0.167*** 0.199*** 0.332*** 0.055*** -0.069*** 0.165*** 
Gearing (gross, market) 0.270*** -0.287*** 0.181*** 0.071*** 0.037*** 0.050*** 0.184*** 
Gearing (gross, book) 0.043*** 0.355*** 0.076*** -0.064*** -0.010*** 0.185*** -0.024*** 
Scaled market to book 
value ratio -0.288*** 0.783*** -0.072*** -0.292*** -0.099*** 0.210*** -0.123*** 
Differences in:        
Debt maturity (%>3 
years) 0.244*** -0.028***    0.002  -0.010**     0.006 -0.015*** 0.025*** 
Debt >3 years (% of 
market) 0.271*** -0.002 0.000 0.024*** 
       
0.008** -0.017*** 0.029*** 
Gearing (gross, market)    0.011** -0.068*** 0.004 -0.057***      -0.009* 0.054*** 0.024*** 
Gearing (gross, book) 0.003 0.168*** -0.003    -0.001      -0.004 0.047*** -0.012*** 
Market to book value 
ratio 0.000 0.378*** 0.000 0.095***      0.003 -0.014*** -0.018*** 
Asterisks represent significance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) confidence levels. 
The definitions of the variables are set out in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.7 is continued on the next page. 
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Table 2.7 Correlation statistics, continued from previous page 
 
Fixed 
asset ratio 
Yield 
curve 
Bond 
spread Inflation 
Short-
term 
interest 
rate 
Debt >3 
years (% 
of 
market) 
Debt >3 
years (% 
of book) 
Yield curve 0.009***       
Bond spread    0.002 0.771***      
Inflation -0.020*** -0.413*** -0.147***     
Short-term interest rate    0.003 -0.767*** -0.759*** 0.078***    
Debt >3 years (% of 
market) 0.275***   0.003 0.025*** -0.005   -0.008**   
Debt >3 years (% of 
book) 0.217***  -0.005* 0.000 -0.015*** -0.001 0.835***  
Gearing (gross, market) 0.256***   0.001 0.017*** 0.002 0.019*** 0.671*** 0.492*** 
Gearing (gross, book) 0.079*** 0.025*** 0.024*** -0.017*** -0.019*** 0.178*** 0.341*** 
Scaled market to book 
value ratio -0.110*** 0.028*** 0.029*** -0.014*** -0.031*** -0.232*** -0.169*** 
Differences in:        
Debt maturity (%>3 
years)    0.004 0.039*** 0.063*** -0.025*** -0.011*** 0.338*** 0.237*** 
Debt >3 years (% of 
market) 0.013***  -0.006* 0.003 -0.014*** 0.001 0.247*** 0.310*** 
Gearing (gross, market) 0.020*** 0.030*** 0.050*** -0.031***    0.007** 0.149*** 0.070*** 
Gearing (gross, book) 0.040*** 0.007** -0.003 -0.031*** 0.003 0.004 0.075*** 
Market to book value 
ratio 0.015*** -0.026*** -0.055*** -0.018*** 0.036*** -0.023***    0.010** 
    Differences in: 
 Gearing 
(gross, 
market) 
Gearing 
(gross, 
book) 
Scaled 
market to 
book 
value 
ratio 
Debt 
maturity 
(%>3 
years) 
Debt >3 
years (% 
of 
market) 
Gearing 
(gross, 
market) 
Gearing 
(gross, 
book) 
Gearing (gross, book) 0.446***       
Scaled market to book 
value ratio -0.187*** 0.402***      
Differences in:        
Debt maturity (%>3 
years) 0.124*** 0.010** -0.011*** 0.644***    
Debt >3 years (% of 
market) 0.028*** 0.023***   -0.007* 0.719*** 0.710***   
Gearing (gross, market) 0.330*** 0.139*** -0.030*** 0.062*** 0.459*** 0.163***  
Gearing (gross, book) 0.067*** 0.379*** 0.147*** 0.028*** 0.079*** 0.209*** 0.260*** 
Market to book value 
ratio -0.065*** 0.084*** 0.215***    -0.013** -0.083***    0.011** -0.230*** 
        
 Differences in      
Differences in: Gearing (gross, book)      
Market to book value 
ratio 0.245***       
Asterisks represent significance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) confidence levels. 
The definitions of the variables are set out in Table 2.5. 
 
 
 
Table 2.7 contains a matrix of correlation coefficients among the dependent and 
independent variables.  These measurements indicate simple relationships between 
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the variables that for the most part are statistically significant.  These include a 
negative relationship between the proportion of debt maturing after 3 years and the 
market to book value ratio as expected given the results in Barclay and Smith (1995), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), Johnson (2003), Antoniou, 
Guney and Paudyal (2006) and Kleczyk (2012).  Similarly, a negative correlation is 
reported between gearing (based on market values) and the market to book value ratio 
in line with the debt maturity measure.  However, when gearing is measured using 
book values, a positive correlation with the market to book value ratio is observed.   
 
Table 2.8 describes debt maturity as an average for each year in the sample period 
(1995-2014) by maturity bands.  The bands are for each of 1 to 5 years where the 
statistic is the average of debt maturing after that maturity band expressed as a 
proportion of total debt.  It is apparent that the maturity bands broadly move in tandem 
showing that, overall, debt maturity has increased over the sample period although 
slowly.  For example, the amount of debt that is longer than 3 years is around 60% (of 
total debt) at the beginning of the period rising to around 70% (of total debt) nearly 20 
years later.  (This may reflect the steady reduction in interest rates over the period 
reducing the relative cost of shorter maturity debt compared to longer maturity debt.) 
  
 Chapter 2 Managing the under-investment problem 
121 
 
 
Table 2.8 Chart of average maturity over the period 1995-2014 
This table sets out the average debt maturity where maturity is measured as the 
proportion of debt with a maturity longer than specified time periods (exceeding 1, 2, 
3, 4 and 5 years) as a proportion of total debt 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Results 
This section reports the regression results for each of the hypotheses described 
above. 
 
The results of the test of hypothesis 1 are set out in Table 2.9.  This replicates past 
results in that debt maturity (the amount of debt with maturity longer than 3 years 
expressed as a proportion of total debt) is regressed against the market to book value 
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ratio and certain other control variables.  The expectation is that there will be a 
negative coefficient for the market to book value ratio.  The results confirm this 
expectation and do not reject the hypothesis.  These results are consistent with past 
results such as those reported in Barclay and Smith (1995) and Barclay, Marx and 
Smith (2003). 
 
A lagged value of the dependent variable is included in the fixed effects regression: in 
the case of system GMM, two lagged values of the dependent variable are included 
(since two lags are specified – this has the effect of reducing the sample size).  The 
coefficients of the once-lagged dependent variable are positive and statistically 
significant.  The fixed effects coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is less than 
in the system GMM reflecting the downward bias in this estimator. 
 
The coefficient of the market to book value ratio is negative and statistically significant 
in both columns as predicted, supporting the hypothesis.  Using the fixed effects 
coefficient value of 0.007 and applying it to the difference in the values of the market 
to book value ratio at the 10th and 90th percentile levels, the associated change in debt 
maturity would amount to approximately 4.9% – a relatively modest adjustment in the 
amount of debt with a maturity longer than 3 years.  Equivalently, a one standard 
deviation movement in the market to book value ratio would trigger a change in debt 
maturity that would represent just 8% of the standard deviation of that variable. 
 
However, this is only a proportion so does not provide an insight into absolute 
amounts.  If this represented only a small amount of debt, it would be less convincing 
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evidence that companies managed the under-investment problem by adjusting debt 
maturity than would be the case if the absolute amount of debt were large. 
 
The fixed effects results are similar in size and significance to the system GMM results 
except for the commercial paper dummy and the constant (no significance in system 
GMM).  The signs are as expected except that the bond spread coefficient is positive: 
this is a variable that measures the cost of long-term bonds and as indicated previously 
should be negatively related to the amount of long-term debt. 
 
The economically significant variables are size, average asset life and regulation.  The 
coefficient of size is positive as expected suggesting that larger companies borrow for 
longer and this contrasts with the implications of the on-off model and the structural 
model (which predicts a negative coefficient for the market to book value ratio when 
tested against gearing is based on market values). 
 
The coefficient of average asset life is positive as predicted, confirming that lending is 
linked to asset life.  The coefficient of the regulation dummy is also positive, as 
predicted, confirming that regulated companies do not use short debt maturity to 
manage problems of under-investment as argued in Barclay and Smith (1995).  
 
The coefficient of the commercial paper dummy is statistically significant and negative 
as predicted, confirming that the use of such a financing technique reduces debt 
maturity in the obvious way.  The debt market variables have low economic 
significance – as suggested in Table 2.5: it is not easy (but is costly) to adjust either 
debt maturity or the amount of gearing to short term changes in debt market conditions.  
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Table 2.9 Determinants of debt maturity (proportion greater than three years) 
This table sets out the regression results where the dependent variable is the amount of debt maturing 
after 3 years expressed as a proportion of total debt against the variables in the left-hand column 
(hypothesis 1) 
Variables Fixed effects System GMM 
Dependent variable (1-year lag) 0.325*** 0.460*** 
 (46.8) (36.85) 
Dependent variable (2-year lag)  -0.0655*** 
  (-6.085) 
Market to book value ratio -0.00652*** -0.00807*** 
 (-11.70) (-12.80) 
Regulation dummy  - 0.174*** 
  (4.312) 
Size 0.0331*** 0.0373*** 
 (15.88) (14.81) 
Commercial paper dummy -0.0230*** -0.0147 
 (-3.082) (-1.207) 
Abnormal earnings -0.00883*** -0.00624*** 
 (-6.641) (-4.046) 
Average asset life 0.00433*** 0.00488*** 
 (9.983) (7.646) 
Fixed asset ratio 0.00827 0.0292 
 (0.536) (1.446) 
Yield curve -1.462*** -1.364*** 
 (-7.952) (-6.853) 
Bond spread 1.043*** 1.073*** 
 (6.397) (6.736) 
Inflation -0.856*** -0.883*** 
 (-5.400) (-4.880) 
Short-term interest rate -0.128 -0.198 
 (-0.918) (-1.362) 
Constant 0.108*** 0.0111 
 (7.50) (0.725) 
   
F test 297.9***  
Adjusted R squared 0.131  
Hausman p value 0.00***  
Wald test p value  0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  0.26 
Sargan statistic  0.00 
Observations 50,521 42,254 
Number of firms 9,792 8,473 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable 
here - as pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The 
Hansen test statistic is not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 
2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, the variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  
The definitions of the variables are set out in Table 2.5. 
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The results of the test of hypothesis 2 where gearing (based on market values) is 
regressed against the market to book value and the other control variables are set out 
in Table 2.10.  These results support the hypothesis and established results such as 
those in Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003). 
 
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically significant 
in both fixed effects and system GMM.  The coefficient of the market to book value 
ratio is negative and statistically significant in both columns as predicted supporting 
the hypothesis.  Using the fixed effects coefficient value of 0.006 and applying it to the 
difference in the values of the market to book value ratio at the 10th and 90th percentile 
levels, the associated change in debt maturity would amount to approximately 4.2%.  
In terms of a movement in the market to book value ratio of one standard deviation, 
gearing (based on market values) would adjust by 11.5% of one standard deviation of 
gearing (based on market values). 
 
The fixed effects coefficients are supported in sign and significance by the system 
GMM results except for the commercial paper dummy (significant in system GMM but 
not in fixed effects); abnormal earnings (significant in fixed effects but not in system 
GMM); and the short-term interest rate (significant in system GMM but not in fixed 
effects). 
 
The coefficient of size is negative and statistically significant which was expected given 
the explanations implied by both the on-off model and the structural model suggesting 
that larger companies have less gearing.  Also, the coefficient of abnormal earnings is 
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positive and statistically significant suggesting that total gearing is not affected by 
information asymmetry.  As with debt maturity, bond spread has a positive coefficient. 
 
Both the above results are in line with previous results confirming the negative 
relationship between debt maturity and gearing and the market to book value ratio.   
 
The economically significant variables are size and regulation.  The coefficient of size 
is negative as predicted by the on-off model and the structural model as discussed 
above.  The coefficient of regulation is positive and large suggesting that such 
companies are significant borrowers: given their predictable cash flows they are 
desirable targets for lenders.  The commercial paper dummy has a statistically 
significant coefficient in system GMM (but not under fixed effects) confirming that such 
a financing method is associated with more gearing. 
 
The fixed asset ratio and average asset life both have positive and statistically 
significant coefficients as predicted but their economic significance is small. 
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Table 2.10 Determinants of gearing (based on market values) 
This table sets out the regression results where the dependent variable is the amount of debt expressed 
as a proportion of the enterprise value measured using market values against the variables in the left-
hand column (hypothesis 2)  
Variables Fixed effects System GMM 
Dependent variable (1-year lag) 0.425*** 0.461*** 
 (60.56) (33.5) 
Dependent variable (2-year lag)  0.00462 
  -0.453 
Market to book value ratio -0.00582*** -0.00617*** 
 (-18.04) (-12.26) 
Regulation dummy - 0.558*** 
  (8.676) 
Size -0.0273*** -0.0397*** 
 (-21.45) (-20.04) 
Commercial paper dummy 0.0031 0.0279*** 
 (0.679) (2.604) 
Abnormal earnings 0.00597*** -2.98E-05 
 (7.467) (-0.0273) 
Average asset life 0.000712*** 0.00172*** 
 (3.096) (4.117) 
Fixed asset ratio 0.0940*** 0.108*** 
 (10.17) (7.342) 
Yield curve -0.525*** -0.499*** 
 (-6.679) (-5.293) 
Bond spread 1.204*** 0.954*** 
 (20.59) (13.06) 
Inflation -0.574*** -0.650*** 
 (-7.877) (-7.586) 
Short-term interest rate -0.0612 0.149* 
 (-0.943) (1.888) 
Constant 0.261*** 0.246*** 
 (31.19) (21.38) 
F test 732.4***  
Adjusted R squared 0.268  
Hausman p value 0.00***  
Wald test p value  0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  0.62 
Sargan statistic  0.00 
Observations 73,948 64,001 
Number of firms 11,224 9,817 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable 
here - as pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The 
Hansen test statistic is not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 
2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, the variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  
The definitions of the variables are set out in Table 2.5. 
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Hypothesis 3 is a refinement of hypothesis 1 in that debt maturity is measured as the 
amount of debt with maturity greater than 3 years expressed as a proportion of total 
market value.  This measures the amount of debt with the longer maturity and which 
should be negatively related to the market to book value ratio in line with hypothesis 
1.  This is not a replication of past results since a different dependent variable is being 
used but the results should be similar to those in Table 2.9.   
 
The results of the test of hypothesis 3 are set out in Table 2.11.  In this case, system 
GMM using two lags does not produce a satisfactory AR(2) statistic so a three-lag 
version of system GMM is included in the Table and produces very similar results to 
the two lags case.  The results support the hypothesis. 
 
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically significant 
in both fixed effects and system GMM as in the previous results.  The coefficient of the 
market to book value ratio is negative and statistically significant in both columns as 
predicted supporting the hypothesis.  Using the fixed effects coefficient value of 0.0034 
and applying it to the difference in the values of the market to book value ratio at the 
10th and 90th percentile levels, the associated change in debt maturing after 3 years 
would amount to approximately 2.3% of the total market value – a very modest and 
marginal difference.  Equivalently, a one standard deviation movement in the market 
to book value ratio would trigger a change in debt maturity (debt with maturity longer 
than 3 years expressed as a proportion of total enterprise value) that would represent 
9% of the standard deviation of that variable. 
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The fixed effects coefficients are supported in sign and significance by the system 
GMM results except for the commercial paper dummy; fixed asset ratio (not significant 
in system GMM); and short-term interest rate (different signs but no significance). 
 
The coefficients of size (negative) and regulation (positive) are both statistically and 
economically significant which is consistent with the results in Table 2.11.  This 
suggests that larger companies have less gearing with longer maturities.  This result 
is consistent with the idea that debt maturity and gearing are correlated.  Nevertheless, 
this contrasts with the positive coefficient in Table 2.9.  
 
Also, the coefficient of abnormal earnings is positive and statistically significant 
suggesting that total gearing is not affected by information asymmetry.  As with the 
previous results, bond spread has a positive coefficient.  The other results are 
consistent with those in Table 2.9 and need no further elucidation here. 
 
These results support hypothesis 3 and are consistent with results of previous studies 
of debt maturity such as Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003). 
 
 
 
  
 Chapter 2 Managing the under-investment problem 
130 
 
Table 2.11 Determinants of debt maturity as a proportion of market value 
This table sets out the regression results where the dependent variable is the amount of debt maturing 
after 3 years expressed as a proportion of total enterprise value based on market values against the 
variables in the left-hand column (hypothesis 3) 
Variables 
 
Fixed effects 
 
System GMM 
2 lags 
System GMM  
3 lags 
Dependent variable (1-year lag) 0.363*** 0.449*** 0.449*** 
 (35.98) (27.81) (25.20) 
Dependent variable (2-year lag)  -0.0422*** -0.0581*** 
  (-3.403) (-3.921) 
Dependent variable (3-year lag)   0.0922*** 
   (6.413) 
Market to book value ratio -0.00340*** -0.00337*** -0.00415*** 
 (-12.86) (-9.485) (-9.005) 
Regulation dummy - 0.210*** 0.163*** 
  (6.994) (5.214) 
Size -0.00773*** -0.00676*** -0.00950*** 
 (-6.501) (-5.195) (-6.127) 
Commercial paper dummy -0.00614 0.00587 0.0118 
 (-1.342) (0.757) (1.231) 
Abnormal earnings -0.00292*** -0.00343*** -0.00375*** 
 (-3.599) (-3.875) (-3.417) 
Average asset life 0.00188*** 0.00277*** 0.00273*** 
 (7.030) (6.895) (6.050) 
Fixed asset ratio 0.0205** 0.00536 0.00515 
 (2.258) (0.476) (0.366) 
Yield curve -0.521*** -0.589*** -0.699*** 
 (-5.892) (-6.926) (-7.256) 
Bond spread 1.085*** 0.890*** 0.937*** 
 (15.51) (12.97) (12.42) 
Inflation -0.485*** -0.640*** -0.724*** 
 (-6.029) (-8.765) (-8.635) 
Short-term interest rate 0.108 -0.0304 -0.134* 
 (1.530) (-0.448) (-1.797) 
Constant 0.121*** 0.0757*** 0.0956*** 
 (14.68) (9.480) (9.894) 
F test 203.5***   
Adjusted R squared 0.151   
Hausman p value 0.00***   
Wald test p value  0.00*** 0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  0.00 0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  0.04 0.75 
Sargan statistic  0.00 0.00 
Observations 44,581 35,210 28,122 
Number of firms 8,799 7,061 5,684 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - as 
pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test statistic is 
not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, the 
variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the variables are set out in 
Table 2.5.  In this case, system GMM using two lags does not produce a satisfactory AR(2) statistic so a three-lag 
version of system GMM is included although this reduces the available sample size. 
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The above results confirm existing results in the literature that both debt maturity and 
gearing are negatively related to the market to book value ratio as reported in Barclay, 
Marx and Smith (2003).  To overcome the problems identified earlier in respect of 
gearing measured using market values, hypotheses were formulated to test gearing 
and debt maturity based on book values rather than market values. 
 
These hypotheses are tested using the same regression equation as before but using 
gearing ratios based on book values rather than market values with a corresponding 
lagged dependent variable included.  Hypothesis 4 proposes that gearing based on 
book values will not be negatively related to the market to book value ratio.  The results 
are reported in Table 2.12 and support the hypothesis. 
 
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically significant 
in both fixed effects and system GMM.  The coefficient of the market to book value 
ratio is positive and statistically significant in both columns as predicted supporting the 
hypothesis and contradicting the solution to the under-investment problem in Myers 
(1977).  The coefficient is also much larger in size (0.021) than the corresponding 
coefficient reported in Table 2.10 and can be applied to the range of values for the 
market to book value ratio of 6.91 (between the 10th and 90th percentiles) implying a 
change in gearing of approximately 14.3% which is substantial and much greater than 
the relatively small negative adjustments (approximately 4%) implied by a similar 
change in the market to book value ratio when the gearing ratio is computed using 
market values.  Equivalently, a one standard deviation movement in the market to 
book value ratio would trigger a change in gearing (based on book values) that would 
represent 25% of the standard deviation of that variable. 
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The other economically significant variables are abnormal earnings, average asset 
life, fixed asset ratio, regulation, short-term interest rate and yield curve. 
 
These results can be compared to the results in Table 2.10 (where gearing was 
measured using market values).  The coefficient of size is negative in both 
regressions.  The coefficient of abnormal earnings is positive in both regressions.  The 
coefficient of average asset life has changed sign although the coefficient is small in 
both cases. 
 
The coefficient of the fixed asset ratio is much larger here than when gearing based 
on market values is used as in Table 2.10.  The system GMM coefficient for the fixed 
asset ratio in Table 2.12 is 0.373 and is 0.288 in the fixed effects model.  Using a 
coefficient value of 0.3 and applying this to the difference in fixed asset ratio between 
the 10th and 90th percentile (a difference of 0.74) would produce a difference in gearing 
of 22%.  Equivalently, a one standard deviation movement in the fixed asset ratio 
would trigger a change in gearing (based on book values) that would represent 20% 
of the standard deviation of that variable.  This result supports the analysis behind the 
on-off model that gearing is linked directly to the book value of assets. 
 
There are no other significant differences in the results between Tables 2.10 and 2.12. 
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Table 2.12 Determinants of gearing (based on book values) 
This table sets out the regression results where the dependent variable is the amount of debt expressed 
as a proportion of the enterprise value measured using book values against the variables in the left-hand 
column (hypothesis 4)  
Variables Fixed effects System GMM 
Dependent variable (1-year lag) 0.495*** 0.571*** 
 (44.18) (32.35) 
Dependent variable (2-year lag)  -0.0343*** 
  (-2.694) 
Market to book value ratio 0.0207*** 0.0157*** 
 (21.17) (14.93) 
Regulation dummy - 0.330*** 
  (4.764) 
Size -0.0128*** -0.00816*** 
 (-6.424) (-3.795) 
Commercial paper dummy 0.0148*** 0.00217 
 (3.381) (0.295) 
Abnormal earnings 0.0127*** 0.00576*** 
 (7.578) (3.708) 
Average asset life -0.00389*** -0.00218*** 
 (-10.12) (-4.569) 
Fixed asset ratio 0.288*** 0.373*** 
 (15.38) (15.20) 
Yield curve -1.449*** -0.634*** 
 (-11.86) (-7.238) 
Bond spread -0.126 -0.149** 
 (-1.151) (-2.143) 
Short-term interest rate -1.370*** -0.512*** 
 (-13.21) (-7.042) 
Inflation -1.405*** -0.665*** 
 (-13.62) (-8.324) 
Constant 0.179*** 0.0434*** 
 (13.94) (3.329) 
   
F test 364.9***  
Adjusted R squared 0.325  
Hausman p value 0.00***  
Wald test p value  0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  0.21 
Sargan statistic  0.00 
Observations 83,943 77,789 
Number of firms 12,447 11,808 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - as 
pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test statistic is 
not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, the 
variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the variables are set out in 
Table 2.5. 
 
Hypothesis 5 postulates that the amount of debt with a maturity greater than 3 years 
(expressed as a proportion of the book value of the enterprise) is not negatively related 
 Chapter 2 Managing the under-investment problem 
134 
 
to the market to book value ratio unless the size effect dominates.   Results are set 
out in Table 2.13 which support the hypothesis, although somewhat weakly. 
 
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically significant 
in both fixed effects and system GMM.  The market to book value ratio has a negative 
coefficient although it is small (approximately 0.0021).  If this were applied to the 
difference in the market to book value ratio between the 10th and 90th percentiles (a 
difference of approximately 6.91) then a change in debt maturity of 1.45% is implied – 
quite small.  Equivalently, a one standard deviation movement in the market to book 
value ratio would trigger a change in maturity (based on the amount of debt maturing 
after 3 years expressed as a proportion of book values) that would represent 5% of 
the standard deviation of that variable. 
 
The only other economically significant variables are size (where the sign is positive 
as before) and regulation.  There are no other useful results from Table 2.13 that 
support or contradict the hypothesis.  
 
These results demonstrate that even when book values are used, there is still a small 
indication that the market to book value ratio and debt maturity are negatively related.  
However, there may be an alternative explanation.  Since the market to book value 
ratio is strongly negatively related to company size and since debt maturity (as 
measured by the proportion of debt maturing after 3 years) is positively related to size 
(see the correlations in Table 2.7, which are positive and significant and the positive 
coefficient of size in Table 2.13) then it is to be expected that even when maturity is 
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measured using book values that a negative relationship between debt maturity and 
the market to book value ratio will be seen.   
 
Hypothesis 6 addresses this effect by using a scaled measure of the market to book 
value ratio instead of the market to book value ratio.  The scaled version is simply the 
market to book value ratio divided by the size variable and attempts to address the 
interaction between size and maturity. 
 
The regression can then be repeated using the scaled version of the market to book 
value ratio in place of the market to book value ratio.  The results are set out in Table 
2.14.   
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Table 2.13 Determinants of debt maturity as a proportion of book value 
This table sets out the regression results where the dependent variable is the amount of debt maturing after 
3 years expressed as a proportion of total enterprise value at book values against the variables in the left-
hand column (hypothesis 5) 
Variables Fixed effects System GMM 
Dependent variable (1-year lag) 0.402*** 0.521*** 
 (37.29) (31.98) 
Dependent variable (2-year lag)  -0.0427*** 
 
 (-3.448) 
Market to book value ratio -0.00214*** -0.00193*** 
 (-6.163) (-7.196) 
Regulation dummy - 0.0512** 
 
 (2.541) 
Size 0.0150*** 0.0144*** 
 (14.55) (14.90) 
Commercial paper dummy -0.00728** -0.0165*** 
 (-2.039) (-3.049) 
Abnormal earnings -0.000323 0.000138 
 (-0.378) (0.174) 
Average asset life 0.00116*** 0.00173*** 
 (4.845) (5.274) 
Fixed asset ratio 0.0456*** 0.0495*** 
 (4.995) (4.655) 
Yield curve -0.440*** -0.259*** 
 (-5.279) (-3.416) 
Bond spread 0.302*** 0.280*** 
 (4.144) (4.639) 
Inflation -0.516*** -0.367*** 
 (-6.789) (-5.287) 
Short-term interest rate 0.0654 0.119** 
 (0.960) (2.110) 
Constant -0.000212 -0.0354*** 
 (-0.0297) (-6.107) 
F test 194.8***  
Adjusted R squared 0.181  
Hausman p value 0.00***  
Wald test p value  0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  0.37 
Sargan statistic  0.00 
Observations 50,501 42,214 
Number of firms 9,789 8,463 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - as pointed 
out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test statistic is not 
reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, the variance 
inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the variables are set out in Table 2.5. 
 
 
 
Table 2.14 reports the result of a regression test of hypothesis 6 which examines the 
relationship between gearing based on book values and the scaled market to book 
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value ratio together with the other control variables.  The results support the 
hypothesis. 
 
These results broadly replicate the results in Table 2.13 except that the coefficient of 
the scaled market to book value ratio is not significant although it is still negative but 
much smaller.  There is no significant negative relationship between debt maturing 
after 3 years (expressed as a proportion of the book value of assets) and the scaled 
market to book value ratio as predicted in the hypothesis. 
 
The other independent variables have similar size coefficients and statistical 
significance in both Tables 2.13 and 2.14. The results in Table 2.14, other than in 
respect of the scaled market to book value ratio, add little to the results in Table 2.13.
        
 
  
 Chapter 2 Managing the under-investment problem 
138 
 
Table 2.14 Relationship between book debt maturity and the scaled MTBV ratio 
This table sets out the regression results where the dependent variable is the amount of debt maturing 
after 3 years expressed as a proportion of total enterprise value at book values against the variables in 
the left-hand column (hypothesis 6) including the scaled market to book value ratio 
Variables Fixed effects System GMM 
Dependent variable (1-year lag) 0.403*** 0.532*** 
 (37.48) (32.81) 
Dependent variable (2-year lag)  -0.0345*** 
 
 (-2.733) 
Scaled MTBV ratio -0.000727 -0.00121 
 (-0.852) (-1.400) 
Regulation dummy - 0.0562*** 
  (2.802) 
Size 0.0122*** 0.0124*** 
 (13.69) (13.78) 
Commercial paper dummy -0.00630* -0.0123** 
 (-1.764) (-2.358) 
Abnormal earnings -0.000535 -3.06e-05 
 (-0.624) (-0.0383) 
Average asset life 0.00131*** 0.00202*** 
 (5.467) (5.947) 
Fixed asset ratio 0.0411*** 0.0435*** 
 (4.486) (3.890) 
Yield curve -0.499*** -0.307*** 
 (-6.015) (-4.040) 
Bond spread 0.306*** 0.283*** 
 (4.205) (4.620) 
Inflation -0.544*** -0.378*** 
 (-7.161) (-5.492) 
Short-term interest rate 0.0153 0.0785 
 (0.226) (1.382) 
Constant 0.0129* -0.0309*** 
 (1.943) (-5.208) 
F test 190.4***  
Adjusted R squared 0.179  
Hausman p value 0.00***  
Wald test p value  0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  0.25 
Sargan statistic  0.00 
Observations 50,501 42,214 
Number of firms 9,789 8,463 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - as 
pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test statistic is 
not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, the 
variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the variables are set out in 
Table 2.5. 
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Hypothesis 7 suggests that changes in gearing (based on market values) will be 
negatively related to changes in the market to book value ratio.  This is a consequence 
of the analysis that the structure of these variables contributes to the reported negative 
relationship between gearing and the market to book value ratio.   
 
The results are set out in Table 2.15.  The results support the hypothesis. 
 
In this case, the system GMM approach produces an Arellano-Bond AR(2) statistic 
just less than 10% so the three-lag version of system GMM is included and produces 
coefficients similar to the two-lag version with similar levels of significance and which 
produces a satisfactory Arellano-Bond (AR2) statistic. 
 
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is negative and statistically significant 
in both fixed effects and system GMM consistent with earlier results and confirming 
that there is reversion to a target level of gearing.  The coefficient of changes in the 
market to book value ratio is negative and statistically significant in all columns as 
predicted supporting the hypothesis. 
 
The size of the change in gearing implied by the product of the coefficient and the 
change in the market to book value ratio between the 10th and 90th percentiles is 2.3%.  
Equivalently, a one standard deviation movement in changes in the market to book 
value ratio would trigger a change in gearing (based on market values) that would 
represent 18% of the standard deviation of that variable. 
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The system GMM results are supportive of the fixed effects results except for abnormal 
earnings.  The coefficient of size is negative consistent with earlier results and is 
economically significant as is regulation.  The bond market conditions are all positively 
related to changes in gearing (except for the short-term interest rate) which is not 
predicted although it has been argued that modifying gearing in response to changes 
in market conditions (or other factors) is not something that can be easily or quickly 
undertaken. The other results are unexceptional. 
 
. 
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Table 2.15 Determinants of changes in gearing (based on market values) 
This table sets out the regression results where the dependent variable is changes in the amount of debt 
expressed as a proportion of the enterprise value measured using market values against the variables in the 
left-hand column (hypothesis 7) 
Variables Fixed effects System GMM System GMM 
  2 lags 3 lags 
Dependent variable (1-year lag) -0.272*** -0.294*** -0.374*** 
 (-43.72) (-27.88) (-28.55) 
Dependent variable (2-year lag)  -0.159*** -0.271*** 
 
 (-17.42) (-21.61) 
Dependent variable (3-year lag)   -0.162*** 
   (-15.89) 
Change in the market to book value ratio -0.00793*** -0.00529*** -0.00522*** 
 (-25.11) (-13.48) (-12.10) 
Regulation dummy - 0.159*** 0.211*** 
  (3.888) (4.406) 
Size -0.0176*** -0.0359*** -0.0352*** 
 (-15.45) (-17.76) (-15.95) 
Commercial paper dummy 0.00984** 0.0315** 0.0320** 
 (2.127) (2.481) (2.340) 
Abnormal earnings 0.00434*** -0.00106 -0.00197 
 (4.672) (-0.858) (-1.491) 
Average asset life 0.00144*** 0.00208*** 0.00186*** 
 (5.528) (4.476) (3.571) 
Fixed asset ratio 0.0601*** 0.0459*** 0.0469*** 
 (6.367) (2.902) (2.667) 
Yield curve 0.269*** -0.557*** -0.264** 
 (3.307) (-5.662) (-2.259) 
Bond spread 0.781*** 0.751*** 0.807*** 
 (12.57) (10.18) (9.546) 
Inflation -0.310*** -0.867*** -0.528*** 
 (-4.530) (-9.984) (-5.283) 
Short-term interest rate 0.540*** -0.0812 0.190** 
 (9.178) (-1.060) (2.023) 
Constant 0.0588*** 0.173*** 0.155*** 
 (7.998) (15.33) (12.39) 
F test 341.5***   
Adjusted R squared 0.139   
Hausman p value 0.00***   
Wald test p value  0.00*** 0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  0.00 1.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  0.09 0.51 
Sargan statistic  0.00 0.00 
Observations 63,952 55,256 47,759 
Number of firms 9,811 8,589 7,571 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - as 
pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test statistic is 
not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, the 
variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the variables are set out in 
Table 2.5.  In this case, system GMM using two lags does not produce a satisfactory AR(2) statistic so a three-lag 
version of system GMM is included although this reduces the available sample size. 
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Hypothesis 8 is similar to hypothesis 7 but changes in debt maturing after 3 years 
(expressed as a proportion of market value) is hypothesised to be negatively related 
to changes in the market to book value ratio.  The results are set out in Table 2.16 
which provide support for the hypothesis. 
 
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is negative and statistically significant 
in both fixed effects and system GMM consistent with earlier results and confirming 
that there is reversion to a target level of debt maturity.  The coefficient of changes in 
the market to book value ratio is negative and statistically significant in both columns 
as predicted supporting the hypothesis. 
 
As predicted in the hypothesis, Table 2.16 demonstrates that there is a clear negative 
relationship between changes in the proportion of debt maturing after three years 
(based on market values) and changes in the market to book value ratio.  The size of 
the change in gearing implied by the product of the coefficient and the change in the 
market to book value ratio between the 10th and 90th percentiles is approximately 
2.2%.  Equivalently, a one standard deviation movement in changes in the market to 
book value ratio would trigger a change in debt maturity (based on market values) that 
would represent 22% of the standard deviation of that variable (i.e. changes in debt 
maturity) indicating a significant relationship, both statistically and economically. 
 
The only other economically significant independent variable is size with a negative 
sign consistent with the results in Table 2.15.  The results in respect of the other 
variables are unexceptional. 
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Table 2.16 Determinants of changes in maturity (based on market values) 
This table sets out the regression results where the dependent variable is changes in the amount of debt 
with maturity in excess of 3 years expressed as a proportion of the enterprise value measured using 
market values against the variables in the left-hand column (hypothesis 8) 
Variables Fixed effects System GMM 
Dependent variable (1-year lag) -0.282*** -0.326*** 
 (-29.85) (-21.57) 
Dependent variable (2-year lag)  -0.247*** 
 
 (-18.87) 
Change in the market to book value ratio -0.00321*** -0.00200*** 
 (-11.53) (-6.269) 
Regulation dummy - 0.0332 
  (1.211) 
Size -0.0118*** -0.0166*** 
 (-10.28) (-10.74) 
Commercial paper dummy 0.00383 0.0148 
 (0.862) (1.353) 
Abnormal earnings -0.00317*** -0.00305*** 
 (-2.754) (-2.607) 
Average asset life 0.00243*** 0.00343*** 
 (8.080) (7.028) 
Fixed asset ratio -0.0144 -0.0489*** 
 (-1.560) (-3.277) 
Yield curve 0.154 -0.632*** 
 (1.575) (-6.070) 
Bond spread 0.886*** 0.764*** 
 (10.85) (9.897) 
Inflation -0.189** -0.775*** 
 (-2.300) (-8.825) 
Short-term interest rate 0.460*** -0.296*** 
 (6.150) (-3.868) 
Constant 0.0349*** 0.0913*** 
 (4.354) (9.261) 
   
F test 132.7***  
Adjusted R squared 0.101  
Hausman p value 0.00***  
Wald test p value  0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  0.61 
Sargan statistic  0.00 
Observations 35,199 28,115 
Number of firms 7,058 5,683 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - as 
pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test statistic is 
not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, the 
variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the variables are set out in 
Table 2.5. 
 
Hypothesis 9 is tested by regressing changes in gearing (based on book values) 
against changes in the market to book value ratio (a positive relationship is predicted 
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by the hypothesis) and the other independent variables.  The results are set out in 
Table 2.17 and support the hypothesis. 
 
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is negative and statistically significant 
in both fixed effects and system GMM consistent with earlier results and confirming 
that there is reversion to a target level of debt maturity.  The coefficient of changes in 
the market to book value ratio is positive and statistically significant in both columns 
as predicted supporting the hypothesis.  The size of the change in gearing implied by 
the product of the coefficient and the change in the market to book value ratio between 
the 10th and 90th percentiles is approximately 10.0% which is substantial.  Equivalently, 
a one standard deviation movement in changes in the market to book value ratio would 
trigger a change in debt maturity (based on market values) that would represent 22% 
of the standard deviation of that variable (ie changes in debt maturity) indicating a 
significant relationship, both statistically and economically. 
 
The other economically significant independent variables are average asset life (which 
is negative here but positive in all other Tables) the fixed asset ratio, regulation and 
size.  Here the coefficient of size is positive suggesting that changes in gearing are 
positively related to company size consistent with the on-off model and the structural 
model.  The results in respect of the other variables are unexceptional. 
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Table 2.17 Determinants of changes in maturity (based on book values) 
This table sets out the regression results where the dependent variable is changes in the amount of debt 
with maturity in excess of 3 years expressed as a proportion of the enterprise value measured using 
book values against the variables in the left-hand column (hypothesis 9)  
Variables Fixed effects System GMM 
Dependent variable (1-year lag) -0.223*** -0.169*** 
 (-19.43) (-9.758) 
Dependent variable (2-year lag)  -0.0958*** 
 
 (-6.655) 
Change in the market to book value ratio 0.0145*** 0.00911*** 
 (16.30) (11.59) 
Regulation dummy - -0.118*** 
 
 (-2.804) 
Size 0.0117*** 0.000970 
 (6.569) (0.495) 
Commercial paper dummy 0.00744** -0.0164* 
 (2.021) (-1.924) 
Abnormal earnings 0.00805*** 0.00708*** 
 (4.060) (4.073) 
Average asset life -0.00380*** -0.00228*** 
 (-7.910) (-3.941) 
Fixed asset ratio 0.284*** 0.286*** 
 (12.42) (10.67) 
Yield curve -0.595*** -0.525*** 
 (-4.603) (-6.083) 
Bond spread -0.106 -0.198*** 
 (-0.884) (-2.800) 
Inflation -0.880*** -0.752*** 
 (-7.596) (-9.562) 
Short-term interest rate -0.446*** -0.308*** 
 (-5.058) (-4.433) 
Constant -0.0682*** -0.0107 
 (-5.504) (-0.860) 
   
F test 88.10***  
Adjusted R squared 0.111    
Hausman p value 0.00***  
Wald test p value  0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  0.48 
Sargan statistic  0.00 
Observations 72,774 67,203 
Number of firms 11,033 10,345 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - as 
pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test statistic is 
not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, the 
variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the variables are set out in 
Table 2.5. 
 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
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The contributions identified in this Chapter are listed at the beginning of this Chapter 
and in Chapter 1.  Here, the main findings are presented more briefly with more 
emphasis on the empirical tests conducted. 
 
The key contribution is to show that the under-investment problem arises when there 
are transfers in value between debt-holders and shareholders caused by the financing 
mix of the external financing for the investment rather than the investment itself and 
that such transfers can be reversed by a post-investment adjustment in capital 
structure that restores the gearing ratio prior to the investment.  This solution is simple 
with low costs and is preferable to the solutions proposed in Myers (1977) of 
shortening debt maturity of reducing gearing – both of which have significant 
associated costs and reductions in flexibility. 
 
To avoid problems of under-investment, a company should aim to maintain constant 
gearing or at least avoid improving the position of the debt-holders by reducing gearing 
or volatility.  By publishing statements about the company’s policy to maintain a 
constant gearing ratio should encourage the market to assume that any improvement 
in gearing that benefitted debt-holders would be temporary and would be reversed.  In 
this way, there would be no transfer in value to debt-holders.  This approach coupled 
with the option to reverse adverse transfers by post-investment capital structure 
adjustments are much simpler and cheaper than the solution in Myers (1977) of either 
shortening debt maturity or reducing gearing – both of which are clumsy, difficult and 
costly to implement. 
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The motivation for reducing debt maturity in Myers (1977) is to create a need to meet 
with lenders.  However, management need not adjust debt maturity to be able to enter 
into negotiations with lenders: the option to negotiate exists regardless of debt maturity 
and reducing debt maturity carries other disadvantages such as accelerating 
refinancing and liquidity risk. 
 
In summary: there will be no under-investment problem if gearing remains constant; 
gearing can be kept constant if the financing mix of the new investment matches 
existing gearing; if the financing mix cannot match existing gearing and if, as a result, 
of such a mis-match, gearing falls, then the under-investment problem will be avoided 
if there is a post-investment adjustment to capital structure that restores gearing to the 
pre-investment level.  It should also be noted that in some cases, even if gearing falls, 
there is no under-investment problem (depending on there being a positive net present 
value investment of sufficient size). 
 
Empirical results summarised in the Appendix to Chapter 2 (the negative relationship 
between both debt maturity and gearing (based on market value) and the market to 
book value ratio) are considered to support the solution in Myers (1977) and similar 
results are obtained here.  However, two explanations for these relationships are 
identified: the on-off model and the structural link between gearing (based on market 
value) and the market to book value ratio.  Both these explanations imply a similar 
negative relationship between gearing (based on market values) and size and suggest 
that the established results may not provide support for the solution to the under-
investment problem in Myers (1977). 
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Hypotheses are developed to test these alternative explanations empirically.  In view 
of these explanations, an alternative gearing measure is used (based on book values 
rather than market values) that is not affected by the above structural link or by the 
implications of the on-off model.  When gearing (based on book values) is regressed 
against several independent variables, the coefficient of the market to book value ratio 
is positive rather than negative (when gearing based on market values is used).  
However, when gearing is restricted to debt with a maturity longer than 3 years (can 
based on book values) a negative coefficient is obtained but it is small and is reversed 
when the market to book value ratio is scaled by size.  This tends to confirm that 
existing empirical results are due to the explanations provided and do not represent 
any evidence about the management of the under-investment problem.   
 
Similar results are obtained for size (also predicted by the on-off model and the 
structural links between the variables): gearing based on market values is negatively 
related to size.  Gearing (based on book values) is also negatively related to size: 
however, changes in gearing (based on book values) is positively related to size and 
debt with a maturity greater than 3 years as a proportion of book value is positively 
related to size.                                                                   
 
Some simple conclusions can be drawn for the management of capital structure. 
Under-investment need not be a problem: the only problem that might arise in the 
context of an investment is that a transfer of value from shareholders to debt-holders 
can arise because the mix of financing for the investment improves the position of 
existing debt-holders: this transfer can be reversed by a subsequent adjustment to 
capital structure that cancels the improvement.  Companies need not reduce debt 
 Chapter 2 Managing the under-investment problem 
149 
 
maturity or reduce the amount of debt issued (both of which carry significant 
disadvantages for the company) to manage the under-investment problem. 
 
 
The policy of adjusting capital structure is consistent with the idea of measuring speed 
of adjustment as in Graham and Leary (2011). 
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Appendix to Chapter 2: Summary empirical results in relation to the market to book value ratio         
Dependent variable is debt maturity Definition of debt maturity Coefficient and 
significance of 
the market to 
book value ratio 
Country Time Observations Methodology 
 
        
Barclay and Smith (1995) Proportion > 3 years -2.33*** US 1974-1991 37,155 fixed effects 
 
  
-4.78*** US 1974-1992 37,969 pooled 
 
  
-4.37*** US 1974-1993 5545 cross-
section 
 
        
Dennis, Nandy and Sharpe (2000) Debt term -0.192* US 1987-1995 2,634 Two stage least 
squares         
Kleczyk (2012) Proportion > 3 years -0.0095*** US 1991-2000 N/A pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.1306* US 1991-2000 
 
cross-
section 
 
  
-0.0047 US 1991-2000 
 
fixed effects 
 
  
-0.0080** US 1991-2000 
 
random 
effects 
 
  
-0.0067** US 1991-2000 
 
GLS 
corrected  
 
      
for 
heteroskedasticity 
and AR(1)         
Harrison and Widjaja (2014) Long-term gearing -0.0575*** US 2004-2011 2,648 random 
effects 
 
Similar results were obtained for shorter time periods 
      
        
Stohs and Mauer (1996) weighted average maturity 0.223 US 1980-1989 3,279 fixed effects 
 
(includes leverage in the equation which reduces the significance 
of the coefficient of the market to book value ratio) 
0.159 US 1980-1989 3,279 pooled 
 
  
-0.220 US 1980-1989 328 cross-
section 
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Appendix to Chapter 2: Summary empirical results in relation to the market to book value ratio, continued 
Dependent variable is debt maturity Definition of debt maturity Coefficient and 
significance of 
the market to 
book value ratio 
Country Time Observations Methodology 
 
Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal 
(2006) 
Proportion > 1 year -0.0026 France 1985-2000 2,430 fixed effects 
 
  
-0.0054 France 1986-2001 2,133 system 
GMM 
 
  
-0.0033 Germany 1989-2000 3,936 fixed effects 
 
  
0.0025 Germany 1990-2000 3,467 system 
GMM 
 
  
0.0011 UK 1971-2000 26,779 fixed effects 
 
  
-0.0014 UK 1972-2000 24,703 system 
GMM 
 
        
Johnson (2003) Proportion < 3 years -0.074*** US 1986-1995 20,565 pooled 
 
  
-0.0815*** US 1986-1995 4,945 cross-
section 
 
  
-0.0209*** US 1986-1995 17,714 fixed effects 
 
Cai, Fairchild and Guney (2008) Proportion > 1 year 0.001 China 1999-2004 1,544 
 
Fixed 
effects, 
system 
GMM 
 
Cai, Cheunga and Goyal (1999) Bond maturity 0.034 Japan 1980-1993 173 OLS  
Kim, Mauer and Stohs Weighted average -0.05 US 1980-1989 3,280 Fixed 
effects 
 
        
Dependent variable is gearing (measured using market values) -0.0175*** France 1989-2000 2,145 system 
GMM 
 
Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal 
(2008) 
 
-0.0015* Germany 1989-2000 4,952 As above 
 
  
-0.0875*** Japan 1989-2000 16,664 As above 
 
  
-0.0045* UK 1989-2000 14,495 As above 
 
  
-0.0013 USA 1989-2000 11,584 As above 
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Appendix to Chapter 2: Summary empirical results in relation to the market to book value ratio, continued 
Dependent variable is gearing 
(measured using book values) 
Definition of gearing Coefficient and 
significance of 
the market to 
book value ratio 
Country Time Observations Methodology 
 
        
Rajan and Zingales (1995) based on book values -0.17*** US 1987-1991 2,207 maximum likelihood 
and a   
-0.04 Japan 1987-1991 303 censored Tobit 
model.   
-0.20*** Germany 1987-1991 176 as above 
 
  
-0.17** France 1987-1991 126 as above 
 
  
-0.19 Italy 1987-1991 98 as above 
 
  
-0.13*** UK 1987-1991 544 as above 
 
  
-0.11*** Canada 1987-1991 275 as above 
 
        
Rajan and Zingales (1995) based on market values -0.08*** US 1987-1991 2,207 maximum likelihood 
and a   
-0.07*** Japan 1987-1991 303 censored Tobit 
model.   
-0.21*** Germany 1987-1991 176 as above 
 
  
-0.15** France 1987-1991 126 as above 
 
  
-0.18* Italy 1987-1991 98 as above 
 
  
-0.6** UK 1987-1991 544 as above 
 
  
-0.13*** Canada 1987-1991 275 as above 
 
        
de Jong, Nguyen and van Dijk 
(2007) 
Cournot firms 
      
(use lagged value of the market to 
book value ratio) 
Long-term debt > 1 
year/market value of assets 
-0.006*** US 1985-2004 2,504 fixed effects, 2-stage 
LS  
Long-term debt > 1 
year/book value of assets 
-0.002 US 1985-2004 2,504 lagged  dependent 
variables  
Total debt > 1 year/market 
value of assets 
-0.008*** US 1985-2004 2,504 as above 
 
 
Total debt > 1 year/book 
value of assets 
-0.002 US 1985-2004 2,504 as above 
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Appendix to Chapter 2: Summary empirical results in relation to the market to book value ratio, continued 
Dependent variable is gearing 
(measured using book values) 
Definition of gearing Coefficient and 
significance of 
the market to 
book value ratio 
Country Time Observations Methodology  
 
Bertrand firms 
      
 
Long-term debt > 1 
year/market value of assets 
-0.002* US 1985-2004 3,513 as above 
 
 
Long-term debt > 1 
year/book value of assets 
-0.002** US 1985-2004 3,513 as above 
 
 
Total debt > 1 year/market 
value of assets 
-0.003*** US 1985-2004 3,513 as above 
 
 
Total debt > 1 year/book 
value of assets 
-0.004*** US 1985-2004 3,513 as above 
 
        
Akdal (2010) 
In this specification, year dummies 
are included. 
When year dummies are excluded, 
significance reduces  
for the market value ratios and 
disappears for the book value 
measures of gearing 
Long-term debt > 1 
year/market value of assets 
-0.10*** UK 2002-2009 1,616 pooled OLS 
 
Long-term debt > 1 
year/book value of assets 
-0.09*** UK 2002-2009 1,616 pooled OLS 
 
Total debt > 1 year/market 
value of assets 
-0.10*** UK 2002-2009 1,616 pooled OLS 
 
Total debt > 1 year/book 
value of assets 
-0.07*** UK 2002-2009 1,616 pooled OLS 
 
       
                
Hovakimian (2006) Gearing (book values) -0.024** US 1983 - 2002 51,251 pooled OLS 
 
        
        
de Jong, Kabir and Nguyan (2008) Gearing (market value) 
averages 
-0.007** Australia 1997-2001 254 pooled OLS 
 
(Only the statistically significant results are presented here) -0.015*** Belgium 1997-2001 82 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.014*** Canada 1997-2001 413 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.145*** Chile 1997-2001 81 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.017*** Denmark 1997-2001 99 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.009*** France 1997-2001 503 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.001*** Germany 1997-2001 571 pooled OLS 
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Appendix to Chapter 2: Summary empirical results in relation to the market to book value ratio, continued 
Dependent variable is gearing 
(measured using book values) 
Definition of gearing Coefficient and 
significance of 
the market to 
book value ratio 
Country Time Observations Methodology  
de Jong, Kabir and Nguyan (2008) Gearing (market value) 
averages 
-0.005* India 1997-2001 226 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.035* Indonesia 1997-2001 177 pooled OLS 
 
(Only the statistically significant results are presented here) -0.024*** Ireland 1997-2001 37 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.011** Italy 1997-2001 164 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.015* Korea 1997-2001 142 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.011* Malaysia 1997-2001 496 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.110*** Mexico 1997-2001 54 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.063** New 
Zealand 
1997-2001 47 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.077*** Peru 1997-2001 19 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.001*** Philippines 1997-2001 77 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.015** Portugal 1997-2001 31 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.030*** Singapore 1997-2001 310 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.015*** Sweden 1997-2001 206 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.013** Switzerland 1997-2001 164 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.032*** Taiwan 1997-2001 153 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.004*** UK 1997-2001 795 pooled OLS 
 
  
-0.012*** US 1997-2001 2533 pooled OLS 
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CHAPTER 3 MANAGING INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of this Chapter is to assess the classical models on over-investment 
(developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976)) and pecking order (developed by Myers 
and Majluf (1984)) in a critical fashion and to develop further the notions and 
implications underpinning the model reflecting realistic market characteristics and 
managerial objectives.  These analyses lead to the generation of new methods of 
managing the under-investment problem and the problem of information asymmetry 
in the pecking order theory.  This leads to the development of testable hypotheses.  
Both experimental and empirical analyses are presented to test the analytic and 
narrative arguments advanced via this set of hypotheses. 
 
The over-investment problem can arise when the company can obtain a transfer of 
value from debt-holders to shareholders.  This transfer of value can be used to 
subsidise an investment opportunity that has a negative net present value.  If the value 
transferred is sufficiently large, the investment opportunity can become viable which 
is why it is called the over-investment problem – companies might be tempted to invest 
sub-optimally. 
 
The technique posed in the model developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is to 
transfer value from debt-holders to shareholders by misrepresenting the nature of the 
investment opportunity: a riskier investment is substituted in place of the opportunity 
disclosed (hence the name asset substitution).  Once the true nature of the investment 
is known and the information asymmetry resolved, there will be a reduction in value of 
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the debt which will precipitate a transfer of value to the shareholders.  Asset 
substitution is an example of information asymmetry. 
 
The motivation for the pecking order theory is information asymmetry.  Companies do 
not wish to issue new shares when the issue price of those new shares does not reflect 
the company’s perception of their true value.  Such an issue of shares would have the 
effect of transferring value from the old or existing shareholders to the new 
shareholders.  Faced with such a problem, companies will prefer to use debt to fund 
the investment or otherwise pass up the investment opportunity thus creating the 
circumstances of the under-investment problem. 
 
The pecking order theory is closely related to the under-investment and over-
investment problems.  In each case, there is a transfer of value between stakeholders 
that can benefit or disadvantage existing shareholders and, for each case, possible 
solutions for the problems arising require changes to capital structure. 
 
The incremental contributions achieved in this Chapter show that: 
• the over-investment problem is the converse of the under-investment problem in 
that a transfer of value from debt-holders at the expense of shareholders is the 
underlying problem generating over-investment whereas in the under-investment 
scenario, it is a transfer of value from shareholder to debt-holders that can lead 
to the under-investment problem;  
• the tools proposed in Chapter 2 to manage the under-investment problem can 
be used to achieve a transfer of value from debt-holders to shareholders as in 
the over-investment problem: this mechanism involves reducing the value of 
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existing debt by reducing the credit quality: this can be achieved quite simply by 
increasing overall company gearing by using a suitably large amount of debt in 
the financing mix of the new investment: if sufficient debt is used to finance the 
investment then overall gearing will rise and this will reduce the credit quality of 
the pre-investment debt and thus reduce its value for the benefit of shareholders 
(see Table 2.1).  At face value, this could be a source of value creation for 
shareholders (if debt-holders accepted such transfers of value);  
• providers of debt finance will not be content to suffer transfers of value from their 
investments to shareholders (as postulated in the solution to the under-
investment problem): this will make it difficult for a company to promote such a 
transfer and pursue sub-optimal investments; 
• debt investors, aware of the behaviour of a company seeking to transfer value 
from debt-holders to shareholders, will seek a premium in the cost of debt that 
will compensate for the risk of a value transfer occurring; 
• a good strategy for the company to avoid this increased debt cost is to maintain 
a constant capital structure and so avoid debt investors seeking a premium (to 
compensate for the risk of a transfer in value) and thereby optimise the 
company’s cost of capital; 
• there is a stark contrast between Myers’ (1977) solution to the under-investment 
problem (shortening debt maturity and/or reducing the debt amount) and the 
solution to the pecking order problem (increasing debt): both problems involve 
the risk of under-investment and yet the solutions proposed about debt are 
exactly opposite;  
• in the case of the pecking order theory, there are several solutions that can be 
used to manage potential transfers of value between old and new shareholders 
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in the presence of asymmetric information that enable sensible investment 
opportunities to be pursued without value being lost by shareholders: one 
technique that is proposed is the use of short-term bridging finance.  This is pure 
debt financing and so in a certain narrow sense is consistent with the solution in 
the pecking order theory.  However, the idea of the short-term finance is that it 
will be replaced with long-term finance which could include equity which can be 
issued at a time when the problem of information asymmetry has been resolved.  
In this way, a company can pursue a long-term capital structure strategy (for 
example, constant gearing) with temporary deviations (using bridge financing) 
when information asymmetry precludes an equity issue; 
• the bridge financing technique is tested using the dataset described in Chapter 
2 and shows that while there is support for the pecking order theory in common 
with tests reported in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), that the data also 
support the idea that increases in gearing at the time of investment are 
subsequently reversed and that such temporary increases in gearing are 
suggestive of the use of short-term bridge financing which is one of the solutions 
proposed for problems of information asymmetry; 
• these results suggest that problems of asymmetric information can be managed 
in a way that makes no predictions about capital structure and thus that there is 
no basis for arguing that there is a natural preference for debt over equity (as 
proposed in the pecking order theory);   
• if there is no motivation for the pecking order theory (since there are alternative 
solutions to problems of information asymmetry) then the implication for capital 
structure theory is that companies should maintain reserve borrowing capacity to 
be able to use bridge financing should the need arise.  This suggests a 
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preference for a conservative capital structure – a gearing ratio that is below the 
maximum level that it could be. 
 
In section 3.2, the connection between the under-investment problem and the over-
investment problem is developed to highlight the origins of the transfers in value.  In 
section 3.3, the over-investment problem is reviewed, and the results of an experiment 
are reported to demonstrate how investors might react when faced with a company 
that seeks to switch value between debt-holders and equity holders by deception.  In 
section 3.4, several solutions for the management of capital structure are proposed 
that can manage the problems of asymmetric information that avoid the consequences 
predicted by the pecking order theory.  In section 3.5, the results of a test of the 
pecking order theory are reported (essentially a modification of the test in Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999)) that provide no support for the pecking order theory.   
 
The proposed solutions suggest a number of hypotheses which are tested, and 
evidence is presented that companies use short-term financing for investment so that 
gearing increases (at the time of investment) but that this is followed by a reduction in 
gearing in subsequent periods.  This is support for one of the solutions proposed to 
manage the problem of asymmetric information.  Conclusions are in section 6. 
 
3.2 The connection between under-investment and over-investment  
The over-investment problem (as described in Jensen and Meckling (1976)) is the dual 
or converse of the under-investment problem in Myers (1977).  In the case of the 
under-investment problem, the company may have a profitable investment opportunity 
but, as debt-holders will capture some of this value, the company may decide against 
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the project as the reduced equity returns could render the investment opportunity 
uneconomic. 
 
The converse case, the over-investment problem, arises where the company may 
decide to go ahead with an unattractive investment opportunity as it can achieve a 
subsidy (by means of a transfer of value from the debt-holders to the equity holders) 
that covers the shortfall in the returns of the investment opportunity.  This is the reverse 
transfer in value to that arising in the under-investment scenario. 
 
The connection between these two problems allows the analysis in Chapter 2 to be 
extrapolated to the over-investment problem.  In the extended Myers’ (1977) model in 
Chapter 2, two main scenarios were considered: first, scenario 1, where volatility was 
kept constant and enterprise value allowed to vary (and both internal and external 
financing were considered); and secondly, scenario 2, where enterprise value was 
kept constant and volatility allowed to vary (where only internal financing needed to be 
considered). 
 
In the case of scenario 1, it was shown that the under-investment problem derived 
from changes in capital structure caused by the method of financing the investment 
rather than the investment itself.  This method of transferring value from debt-holders 
to shareholders to support over-investment is considered in section 3.2.1.  Scenario 2 
(where volatility varies) corresponds to the asset substitution scenario which is 
considered in section 3.2.2. 
 
3.2.1 Changing capital structure to support over-investment  
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In Jensen and Meckling (1976), only asset substitution was considered (see section 
3.2.2 below).  However, the analysis of scenario 1 (in Chapter 2) can be extended 
directly to the over-investment problem.  The argument would be to consider a 
company faced with a negative net present value investment opportunity looking to 
achieve a subsidy from the debt-holders by financing the investment in a way that 
reduced the value of existing debt (for example by using a large proportion of debt that 
increased overall gearing and thereby reduced the value of existing debt).  This would 
create the circumstances of the over-investment problem.  The analysis in Chapter 2 
indicates that the transfer in value is due to the mix of financing (as between debt and 
equity) rather than the investment itself: the analysis also indicates that where there is 
a positive net present value project that in some circumstances (depending on the new 
gearing level) the debt-holders do not capture all the benefit (of a positive net present 
value project) but that the shareholders do get some proportion of the surplus.   
 
By analogy, faced with an investment opportunity with a negative net present value, 
not all the loss in value associated with the investment opportunity would be suffered 
by the debt-holders in every circumstance.  Section 2.2.4 of Chapter 2 demonstrates 
the argument for a positive net present value project financed using a mix of debt and 
equity that is equal to the capital structure prior to the investment.  The same argument 
applies to a negative net present value project.  In case 1, scenario i) gearing rises but 
the loss of value associated with the negative net present value investment opportunity 
is shared between both debt-holders and shareholders.  In case 1, scenario ii) where 
gearing is unchanged after investment, there is still a sharing of the loss associated 
with the negative net present value project.   In these cases, the transfer in value from 
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debt-holders to shareholders is not sufficient to convert an unprofitable project into a 
profitable one. 
 
To achieve a transfer in value that is sufficiently large, there needs to be a more 
significant change in gearing that causes a large reduction in value of the existing debt.  
As with under-investment, this analysis shows that it is the financing method that 
causes the transfer in value.  
 
The under-investment problem can be managed by using short maturity debt and/or 
less debt as this certainly minimises any value transfer, but these are extreme 
solutions and would be difficult and costly to implement.  Better solutions are proposed 
in Chapter 2 such as recapturing value transferred by subsequent adjustments to 
capital structure that avoid making significant changes in capital structure such as 
reducing debt or reducing maturity.   
 
This approach can be extended to the over-investment problem.  By using longer debt 
maturity and/or by using more debt, there would be more scope to achieve a transfer 
in value from debt-holders to shareholders to support a negative net present value 
investment opportunity.  The juxtaposition of two quite different capital structure 
policies confirms that they are unrealistic solutions.  A company could not adopt both 
such extreme capital structures unless it was sure that the next investment opportunity 
represented under-investment or over-investment.  The company might need to make 
significant changes in capital structure between strategies to overcome both over-
investment and under-investment problems.   
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The empirical inverse relationship between the market to book value ratio and both 
debt maturity and gearing was confirmed in Chapter 2 and is widely confirmed in the 
literature (see the Appendix to Chapter 2).  It could be argued that this empirical 
relationship supports the solution to the over-investment problem.  
 
If companies do prefer longer maturity or greater leverage to be able to obtain 
subsidies from debt-holders, then such a policy will be associated with low market to 
book value ratios (implying their investment opportunities are unprofitable).  This 
implies the same inverse relationship between the market to book value ratio and i) 
maturity and ii) gearing as summarised in the Appendix to Chapter 2. 
 
However, those relationships were explained in Chapter 2 in ways that did not validate 
the support for Myers’ (1977) solution of the under-investment problem and equally 
provide no support the converse solution for over-investment. 
 
There are plenty of examples where such changes in debt values have been observed.  
Myers (2001) describes how the bond issues of RJR Nabisco fell in price by more than 
10% on the announcement of the leveraged buy-out which had the effect of reducing 
the credit quality of the existing debt issues.  This is a directly comparable situation 
where an event occurred which reduced the value of the debt issues (and transferred 
a benefit to the shareholders).  Leveraged buy-outs can lead to transfers of value.  
Asquith and Wizman (1990) estimated that the announcement of a leveraged buy-out 
led to a loss in value for bonds without covenant protection (that is mechanisms to 
protect debt investors in the loan agreement) of approximately 5.2%.  Alexander, 
Edwards and Ferri (2000) examined the returns of traded high yield bonds and found 
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evidence of a negative correlation between bond returns and share returns around the 
announcement of events such as leveraged buy-outs (of which RJR Nabisco is an 
example). 
 
Switching value from debt-holders to shareholders is such an obvious strategy that 
some companies could be tempted to adopt it without the cover of an investment 
opportunity.  As such a switch can increase shareholder value, then a company is 
almost compelled to adopt it. 
 
The ability of a company to switch value between stakeholders is something that will 
have an impact on the debt investors and they will react and learn.  It may not be easy 
for a management team to achieve this without alerting debt investors to their true 
intentions.  The perspective of debt investors has a major impact on the ability of a 
company to change its capital structure and this is explored in section 3.3. 
 
3.2.2 Asset substitution 
One way in which the over-investment problem does not mirror the under-investment 
problem is the assumption that the company can raise capital by deceiving investors.  
This is a step further than simply damaging the value of existing debt as it involves 
misleading new investors in debt. 
 
To achieve this, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that management will issue debt 
claiming that project 1 is the investment objective but then substitute project 2 (with 
greater risk but the same expected return as for project 1).  This switch will produce 
lower expected returns (given the higher risk, the returns will not be sufficient 
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compensation) and hence a reduction in enterprise value.  However, the intended 
reduction in value of the debt is designed to be greater than the overall reduction in 
enterprise value so that shareholders will enjoy an overall increase in their value.  It is 
therefore possible to argue that management could pursue projects with negative net 
present values and still benefit equity holders: this is the essence of the risk-shifting 
version of the over-investment problem.  The debt-holders are in effect, subsidising 
shareholders. 
 
If the switch in project involved investing in an activity that is different to the company's 
existing underlying business, then it is likely that there would be a reduction in the 
overall variance of the enlarged business.  The difference in activity would give rise to 
a correlation between the new and existing activities that is less than 1.  Thus, overall 
variance for the enterprise would be reduced: a reduction in variance would be 
beneficial for the existing debt investors as credit quality would improve (because 
variance had reduced) and so existing debt values would rise to reflect the reduced 
risk.  This is the advantage of a conglomerate where the spread of activity reduces 
overall variance and hence credit risk.  In this case, the effect of a switch would be 
counterproductive and would damage the interests of shareholders.  There would be 
a shift in value from shareholders to debt-holders. 
 
The shift in value would need to work in the other direction.  The management would 
need to represent to potential debt investors that it intended to diversify with the 
expectation that variance would reduce.  Then once the debt issue was completed, 
the management could then make the switch.  This would then produce the desired 
reduction in debt values and the holders would certainly feel cheated.  It might not be 
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easy to represent to debt investors exactly what the effects of the diversification would 
be until a precise acquisition had been identified so that this factor would be 
considered in the pricing of the debt. 
 
Although the model in Jensen and Meckling (1976) assumes that the management 
switch project, switching from one project to another especially after making 
representations in a debt prospectus would not be easy especially if it led to a 
significant shift in value.  Such a blatant disregard for representations made to raise 
debt could lead to law suits and a seriously damaged reputation.  There are also 
regulatory restrictions that prevent such behaviour.  Also, some lenders use secured 
debt to improve their position and the process of taking security on real assets would 
make it hard for asset substitution to occur.  Hart and Moore (1995) argue that secured 
or hard claims and long-term debt constrain management incentives to pursue 
investments with negative net present values.  
 
A subtler approach is for management to indicate a lower variance by understating the 
risk characteristics of the investment being financed.  This would avoid the 
confrontational aspects of contradicting statements made to lenders.  But this would 
not be easy since debt buyers would be able to form a reasonable assessment of 
variance independently by looking at the market and examining comparable 
companies.  Only in the rare situation of a new activity where the market was short of 
comparable companies might this strategy work but then this would imply that the new 
activity had a low correlation to the existing business and this would lead to a benefit 
for debt-holders. 
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The over-investment problem is the converse of the under-investment problem as the 
value-recapture solution to the under-investment problem can be used to create the 
circumstances of the over-investment problem.  However, an important relevant 
consideration is the likely reaction of debt investors to a company employing value 
recapture to obtain benefits for shareholders at the expense of debt-holders or 
pursuing asset substation strategies that damage debt values.   
 
The response of debt investors is modelled in the next section.  The hypothesis is that 
investors are likely to observe when they are being exploited and take appropriate 
action so that the strategy of transferring value between stakeholders will not be 
tolerated by investors without consequences. 
 
3.3 Investors and transfers of value 
This section describes an experiment that has been designed to test the hypothesis 
that debt investors will not continue to buy bonds from companies that seek to mislead 
them in a way that transfers value from debt-holders to shareholders.  This experiment 
has been designed to test investor behaviour and follows the broad structure of the 
experiment in Cadsby, Frank and Maksimovic (1990). 
 
It is likely that debt investors will become aware of companies seeking to transfer value 
to shareholders at the expense of debt-holders – investors will identify such behaviour 
with companies and its management team.  Such investors, if they behave rationally, 
will take the risk of such behaviour into account when considering acquiring debt 
instruments in companies where the risk value transferring events is high.  The 
experiment is designed in the context of the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) work on 
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behavioural finance (decision making under risk) and loss aversion in Tversky and 
Kahneman (1991). 
 
The above analysis shows that value can be transferred from debt-holders to 
shareholders.  However, it may not be so easy to repeat this process as the debt 
investors are likely to react to the first transfer of value by re-evaluating the risks of 
their investments and are likely to consider the possibility of a recurrence of such a 
transfer with further debt issues.   
 
Investors will learn, and the possibility of a recurrence will be factored into the value 
of the debt.  If investors consider there is a high risk of a repeat transfer of value away 
from debt-holders, then the value of the debt is likely to fall below the level that would 
be suggested by a simple consideration of gearing.  The value of the debt would need 
to incorporate the risk of a further transfer of value.  This perception will increase the 
cost of debt finance for the company.  This increase in cost could outweigh the benefit 
of the initial transfer. 
 
The experiment aims to test the ability of participants to forecast the behaviour of 
management when issuing debt securities.  The experiment is designed to see how 
potential investors behave when a company’s actions lead to a transfer value from 
debt investors to shareholders.  The objective of the experiment is to identify whether 
potential investors i) can identify value transferring activities; and ii) whether the 
potential investors modify their behaviour in a way that affects the company's ability to 
issue debt or the cost at which it issues debt.  If potential investors can identify this 
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type of behaviour and respond appropriately, then the strategy of transferring value 
from bond-holders to equity holders will be constrained. 
 
The hypothesis is that value transferring activities are not easy to perpetrate as lenders 
have memories.  While a company may be able to achieve a transfer of value once, 
doing so repeatedly ought to be harder as the market will remember the past behaviour 
of the borrower and either seek tighter protections or higher returns or both. 
 
3.3.1 Experiment design 
The experiment design broadly follows the framework in Cadsby, Frank and 
Maksimovic (1990). 
 
The potential investors are students studying for a one-year Masters degree in 
Investment Management at Cranfield Business School (in 2012/2013): most have little 
real-world experience and so they are suitable candidates to test whether there is any 
evidence of learning.  The experiment is conducted early in their course before issues 
such as capital structure and information asymmetry are covered.  The experiment is 
organised as a bond trading game.  The objective is to make money by buying bonds.  
Money can be made in two ways: first, by holding the bond for a period, the holder 
receives a unit of interest; and secondly, there is an opportunity for a capital gain if the 
rating of the bond improves – or a loss if the rating of the bond falls. 
 
The experiment is organised over several discrete time intervals, each described as 
coinciding with a period of 6 months.  Some 10 periods are considered but the 
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experiment is conducted over the last 8 periods, the first two periods being used to 
demonstrate to participants how to make investment decisions. 
 
There are 4 companies, 50 students and 8 trading events.  This provides a sample of 
reasonable size.  Each company publishes a statement on its capital structure or debt 
policy.  These statements are the key information resource used by the subjects to 
evaluate the debt investment opportunity.  These are either a specific policy or a 
statement of no policy.  This provides some guidance to participants.  However, more 
detailed information is provided at the end of each trading period.  Each company 
provides the following information: 
 
1 a comment on the trading period; 
 
2 the revised rating for its bonds (revised to reflect the information in item 1); and 
 
3 a forecast, made by the company, of the rating of its bonds at the end of the next 
period. 
 
Using this information, participants are then invited to bid for the company's bonds.  
Bids are recorded on an answer sheet.  Once bids are made, the bids are published 
via a show of hands.  This introduces transparency into the process and reflects more 
closely to the operation of a market.  This design is to ensure that participants cannot 
simply bid a low price.  There needs to be an element of competition. 
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Each of the major rating bands are split into upper and lower sub-bands.  Bond prices 
are allocated depending on the rating of bonds with the higher prices reflecting better 
ratings. 
 
Participants then bid a price for the bonds based on the information they have.  Once 
the bids are made there is a clearing mechanism whereby the bids are published via 
raised hands – visible to all participants – and then a price is set by the experimenter 
which is a price which reflects the bids of the majority of participants.   
 
Book building is the most common method of equity and debt issue process (see Ritter 
(2003)).  This process is designed to elicit information and opinions on the value of the 
securities on offer.  However, some investors choose to provide no opinions on value 
but simply register interest in an amount or quantity, relying on the investment bank to 
price the securities on a basis that leaves some profit for the investors.  Such investors 
avoid the cost of valuation and are free-loading on others doing such work. 
 
In the experiment, free-loading was avoided to ensure that participants were required 
to perform the investment appraisal and make a judgement.  So, participants pay the 
price they bid and not the clearing price.  The clearing price determined only those 
who got bonds – a bid price that was lower than the clearing price meant no bonds 
were allocated to that participant.  Participants were not required to bid – but only on 
2 occasions did a participant choose not to make a bid for a company's bonds.  After 
all, a low-price bid represented low risk – a doubtful investor could be protected by a 
low price.  However, this reflects real world decisions when investors sometimes prefer 
higher quality to lower quality at any price.  This is like the traditional flight to quality 
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and corresponding loss of liquidity in lower quality instruments that is usually seen at 
times of economic turmoil. 
 
One issue is whether participants accurately displayed their written bid.  Participants 
might perceive a benefit if they were to display a bid price lower than their written bid.  
This would have the effect of encouraging the experimenter to set too low a clearing 
price – participants would be able to buy bonds at lower prices than if they had 
correctly displayed their bid.  This would need to be undertaken on a significant scale 
to have an effect.  However, it is possible to restate the results using different clearing 
prices – based more closely on the written bids.   
 
The different types of rating forecast included short statements such as: "rating outlook 
stable"; "rating expected to fall to the next band"; "acquisition expected to lower rating".  
The forecast usually gives either a clear indication or a slightly fuzzy indication.  Of the 
4 companies, one company is deliberately setting out to mislead bond investors by 
optimistic forecasts: that company forecasts an upturn in rating and yet achieves a 
downturn.  This behaviour becomes clearer as the game is played and more 
disappointments are observed by participants. 
 
In the real world, some forecasts are not achieved for reasons beyond the control of 
management.  So, included in the track record of the company with the most reliable 
forecasting history is an unexpected event (litigation) which causes a loss of value to 
bond holders. 
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Finally, to test the ability of participants to make judgements about individual 
forecasting ability, there is a change of management.  The CEO of the company 
seeking to transfer value moves to another company.  Also, a new chairman is 
appointed to the board of one company which then announces a change in debt policy.  
To some extent, these events crystallise or confirm what the participants (or some of 
them) may have identified.  So, forecasting ability is tested before and after these 
events.  The key measure is how accurately the investors learn or identify optimism in 
management's statements and whether they reflect this knowledge in their bid prices.  
This process is not unlike book building (see Ritter (2003)). 
 
3.3.2 Results of the experiment 
The establishment of the clearing price by observation of the experimenter was tested 
in the following way.  First, the number of bids that became eligible because of this 
process was measured and compared against total bids.  This was then compared 
with the result that would be achieved if the average of bid prices was used – rounded 
down to the nearest whole price or rounded up.  A comparison was also made with a 
clearing price that was a unit higher than that determined by the experimenter.  These 
comparisons are summarised in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Comparison of success rates for bids  
This table sets out the results of successful bids analysed according to different 
pricing approaches 
Row Acceptance or cut-off price Proportion of 
bids accepted  
1 Clearing price determined by experimenter as a result of observation 
of bids 
83.2% 
2 Clearing price determined as the average of all bids 54.0% 
3 Clearing price determined as the next whole number less than the 
average of all bids 
96.0% 
4 Clearing price determined as the average price + 1  3.7% 
5 Clearing price determined as 1 + the clearing price determined by the 
experimenter 
14.6% 
 
 
Row 1 indicates that the price determined by the experimenter had the effect of 
including most bids but not all.  Thus, the concern about under-pricing the displayed 
bids described above might have been misplaced.  This is confirmed in the other rows 
of data. 
 
Row 2 indicates that if the average bid price was used as the cut-off point that just 
over half of bids would have succeeded – as would have been expected.  Row 3 sets 
the cut-off price as the next whole number less than the average bid price.  This 
increases the success rate to 96% which demonstrates that bids at prices below the 
average bid price were very closely clustered around the average bid price. 
 
Similarly, row 4 demonstrates that bids at prices above the average bid price are 
closely clustered around the average bid price.  Only 3.7% of bids are more than a 
unit above the average bid prices. 
 
Finally, row 5 confirms that if a price of a unit above the experimenter's price was used 
the success rate would have fallen to 14% demonstrating that the bids at prices above 
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the experimenter’s price were closely clustered around the experimenter's determined 
prices. 
 
So, the conclusion is that the establishment of a clearing price at the time of the auction 
is unlikely to have introduced any bias into the process by which participants 
determined the level of their bids.   
 
The key test is how accurately the participants could determine the likely level of bond 
prices.  The task for participants was to determine the price that would ensure that 
they obtained a bond and that the price reflected the likely future value of the bond.   
The test is designed to seek evidence that participants can learn from the results and 
to reflect that acquired knowledge in their bids.  This process is not very different to 
that of book building (see Ritter (2003)) which involves feeding back pricing 
information to participants and thereby enable them to reconsider the pricing of their 
bids. 
 
The average results of the participants can be correlated against the actual results: 
the correlation coefficient is 0.77 – a high degree of correlation.  However, this is to be 
expected as for most of the experiment, the companies behaved broadly in line with 
their forecasts.  One company (company C) behaved in a contrary fashion – its 
forecast was not achieved, in fact the opposite occurred.  For this company, 
forecasting was more difficult.  Correlations of actual results against individual 
company forecasts made by the participants were as follows. 
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Table 3.2 Correlation of actual results  
This table sets out the correlation statistics for the actual prices set by the 
experimenter compared to the prices bid by the participants for each individual 
company 
 Company A Company B Company C Company D 
Correlation coefficient 0.30 0.87 0.20 0.75 
 
 
These results confirm that participants had difficulty in forecasting company C's bond 
ratings compared to company B or D.  Company A also posed difficulties as that 
company suffered an unexpected reduction in rating (ahead of period 6) because of 
litigation.  Had this not occurred, the correlation coefficient would have been 
significantly higher.  This demonstrates one of the difficulties of this process – can any 
evidence of learning be discerned when other effects that are unconnected (i.e. 
random) are present?  In any event, there are only a small number of data items when 
averages for the data set are used.  In this case, there are only 8 items of data being 
used to compute the correlation coefficient on an individual company basis. 
 
The performance of participants can be measured in terms of errors (the difference 
between the prices participants bid and the actual prices determined by the 
experimenter): these errors are set out in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Average errors of participants’ prices  
This table sets out the average errors of participants’ prices compared to 
actual prices (a positive number indicates that the average participants' 
forecasts were lower than the outcome) 
 Company A Company B Company C Company D 
Period 1 1.55 1.73 -0.16 0.64 
Period 2 1.23 1.45  0.59 1.02 
Period 3 0.98 0.91  0.25 0.93 
Period 4 1.45 2.23 -0.80 1.70 
Period 5 0.16 1.18  0.20 2.02 
Period 6 1.68 1.25 -0.16 0.98 
Period 7 1.23 0.84  1.98 0.30 
Period 8 1.09 1.09  1.21 0.07 
Average error 1.17 1.34  0.39 0.96 
 
By inspection, the errors in the company C prices broadly reduce over time although 
there is an increase at the time when there is a change in management (ahead of 
period 7).  Clearly, some participants were troubled by the implications of this change.   
 
The average error figures included in the Table 3.3 above suggest that the participants 
were closest to the outcome for company C.  This is not quite what might have been 
expected.  Company C presented a more challenging task for participants and yet the 
average error is lowest.  Company D included a change in management which might 
have affected the results, so consider only companies A and B.  Here, there is a larger 
average error than with company C.  One possible explanation is that the participants 
were seeking to bid the lowest possible price consistent with obtaining bonds.  So, in 
the case of companies A and B, they were successful in obtaining bonds at a lower 
price.  If this process were followed for the other two companies, then participants 
were seeking to minimise the price paid.  So, the low average error term for company 
C might simply imply that the pricing process demonstrated in the results for company 
A and company B was applied but that as the outcome was always less favourable 
than the company forecast, that the profit made by the participants was lower. 
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It is possible that the objective of maximising profit might make it difficult to identify 
any evidence of learning.  It was apparent in comments made that some participants 
considered that the forecasting record of company C was poor (one student 
commented that the management are "liars") – so it was at least clear to some 
participants.  This is evidence of an ability to learn and others would learn indirectly 
from those able to learn directly.  This supports the hypothesis that investors would 
learn about management’s plans to transfer value from debt-holders to shareholders 
and take appropriate evasive action. 
 
Accordingly, a redesigned experiment was conducted.  In the second experiment, the 
objective of participants was restricted to forecasting the bond rating.  This meant that 
the element of price and the auction process was excluded.  Participants merely had 
to provide their own estimate of the future bond rating based on the same information 
as provided in the previous experiment (the individual company forecasts and the track 
record).  This meant that the forecasting ability could be tested more directly.   
 
Although pricing was not included per se, the cost of debt is directly linked to the bond 
rating, so price and cost of debt is very much part of this redesigned experiment.  
Where subjects are forecasting lower ratings, they are implicitly signalling higher debt 
funding costs for the company.  The process of book building still applies (see Ritter 
(2003)) but instead of price, a bond rating is used as a proxy for price. 
 
One fewer company was used but otherwise a similar series of rating forecasts were 
made by the individual companies as with the previous experiment.  With this revised 
experiment, the distance between the participant’s forecast and the outcome could be 
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measured.  This permitted an average difference to be calculated for the group of 50 
Masters students.  The results are set out in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4 Average errors of forecasts  
This table sets out the average errors between the forecasts of bond ratings by all 
participants for each company and the actual rating announced by the experimenter 
Time period Company A Company B Company C 
1 0.04 1.36 0.40 
2 0.28 1.10 0.38 
3 0.12 1.88 0.10 
4 0.86 1.44 0.04 
5 0.50 1.20 0.10 
6 0.52 1.18 1.46 
7 0.18 0.20 0.70 
8 0.32 0.68 1.34 
Overall average 0.35 1.13 0.57 
 
 
Table 3.4 shows the average errors made by participants in their estimates of each 
company’s credit rating.  Broadly, there is a steady reduction in the average error rate 
over time.  However, a more sophisticated test is to examine how the range of the 
participants’ forecasts vary over time and whether accuracy increases – this is 
described below. 
 
The middle column of Table 3.4 contains the results for the company which 
consistently misled the market until a change of management in period 8 occurred.  
What can be seen is that the difference declines steadily over time.  The blip in period 
3 coincides with an adverse rating movement over 2 bands.  The size of this movement 
was not anticipated only the direction.  If 1.0 was deducted from this difference, the 
downward trend in the difference would be re-established.  Possibly because of this 
unexpectedly large adverse movement, subsequent estimates were slightly inflated, 
but the downward trend was then evident again until after the change of management 
when there was a slight increase. 
 
These results indicate that relatively naïve investors with very little information can 
interpret and assess the quality of information provided by companies.  Several 
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additional tests on the data were performed to assess the ability of participants to 
learn.  The distribution and standard deviation of the participants’ results were 
examined.  The distribution of the scores of the participants is set out in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5 Distribution of forecasts  
This table sets out the distribution of forecasts ranked according to overall score 
Scores 11 13 15 18 20 30 
Cumulative 6 14 24 38 43 50 
Non-cumulative 6 8 10 14 5 7 
 
 
Here, the low scores represent the smallest difference between the participants’ 
forecasts and the actual results.  Broadly, the results are distributed with some central 
weighting and smaller tails on either side.  As the sample size is small, it is not possible 
to be very precise as to the nature of the distribution.  A key test is whether the results 
are due to chance. 
 
One measure of learning is the actual range of participants’ forecasts.  If there was a 
narrowing in the range of the forecasts over time this might indicate that participants 
learned to improve their forecasts.  A test was also made to see if there was any 
difference in terms of the distribution according to results.  In other words, did high 
scoring participants show a much narrower range of possible results (compared with 
lower scoring participants)?  The sample was divided into two groups according to the 
scores and the standard deviation of the range of results computed for each forecast.  
These results together with the results for the whole group are set out in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6 Standard deviation analysis  
This table sets out the standard deviations of results analysed according to the 
scores achieved by the top and bottom scorers (respectively those closest and 
furthest from the actual outcomes) shown together with the results for the whole 
group 
Time Top group Bottom group Whole group 
period Company Company Company Company Company Company Company Company Company 
 A B C A B C A B C 
1 0.20 0.83 0.56 0.19 1.20 0.66 0.20 1.04 0.61 
2 0.56 0.76 0.61 0.52 1.15 0.58 0.54 0.98 0.60 
3 0.33 0.91 0.00 0.32 1.19 0.42 0.32 1.07 0.30 
4 0.28 0.76 0.00 0.40 0.97 0.27 0.35 0.88 0.20 
5 0.63 0.61 0.20 0.58 1.00 0.39 0.61 0.83 0.31 
6 0.57 0.87 0.78 0.75 1.08 1.07 0.67 0.98 0.94 
7 0.28 0.28 0.76 0.71 0.77 1.10 0.55 0.59 0.95 
8 0.33 0.37 0.53 1.23 1.46 1.09 0.92 1.09 0.87 
 
 
In terms of the company B attempting to mislead investors, the standard deviation 
appeared to reduce slowly over time rising only slightly at the time of the change in 
management.  This pattern was repeated for both the top scoring group and the bottom 
scoring group. 
 
It is to be expected that the top scoring group would demonstrate a narrower range of 
forecasts – obviously being closer to the actual outcome so the standard deviation 
would be expected to be smaller in value.  However, the results do demonstrate 
evidence of learning – to avoid or reduce losses (see Tversky and Kahneman (1991)). 
 
A significance test can be performed to check that there is evidence of learning.  The 
ability of the subjects to improve their forecasting ability can be tested by comparing 
their performance in the second half of the experiment with their performance in the 
first half.  This is a crude approach since learning occurs throughout the experiment 
as students can compare company forecasts with actual outcomes.  
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A simple measure of forecasting ability can be used that compares the subjects’ 
forecasts with the actual outcome: the difference between the subject’s forecast and 
the actual bond rating can be defined as the “error”.  Where the forecasts were more 
than one rating band away from the actual rating they are recorded as an error of one 
whereas forecasts that are within one rating band are counted as zero 
 
Company A behaved very much in line with the indications provided to the subjects so 
most of the time, the subjects could forecast the rating with accuracy within one rating 
band.  
 
This classification approach can be applied to company B and the errors measured.  
In the first half of the experiment (the first four periods), the subjects made 101 errors 
out of a total of 200 forecasts.  This is just more than 50%.  This compares with 
company A where the error rate was less than 2%. 
 
In the second half, the errors for company B reduced to a total of 46, an error rate of 
23%.  This demonstrates a good deal of learning by the subjects between the two 
periods.  The significance of this result can be tested using the binomial distribution.  
If the average error rate achieved in the first half of the experiment were to apply in 
the second half of the experiment (the null hypothesis) then the probability of obtaining 
an error rate in the second half of 23% (based on the average error rate in the first 
half) is less than 0.1%.  This result is therefore statistically significant evidence of 
learning. 
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These results confirm support for the hypothesis that investors would be able to 
identify managerial behaviour likely to lead to a loss of value for debt investors (by 
means of a transfer to shareholders) and that they would be able to take appropriate 
action to alleviate this situation. 
 
Larger samples or repeats of the tests would usefully improve confidence in identifying 
learning.  A further experiment (in the style of Cadsby, Frank and Maksimovic (1990)) 
could be introduced to see if investors punished such companies.  The time period in 
the above experiment was quite short.  Faced with a persistently misleading 
management team, the investors might begin forecasting ratings that were below the 
actual outcome.  The experiment was not designed to show whether the behaviour of 
investors might include not bidding for the company’s bonds.  Clearly, if a poor 
reputation was generated, rational investors might decide that it was either too difficult 
to make a forecast and so not bid for any new bonds, or, that the only compensation 
for the risk of poor company information was a low price.  This might increase the risks 
of default – which it is argued is not the intention of management rather opposite.  
 
It can also be argued that rational investors faced with a company that consistently 
misrepresented its prospects would learn to interpret such forecasts appropriately.  
Similarly, companies that had a track record that implied that forecasts were made 
randomly would also teach investors how to interpret their forecasts.  Analysts, acting 
rationally would be able to measure accuracy in forecasts or other financial information 
and so companies would not be able to mislead the market.  Faced with rational 
investors, companies could not easily misrepresent the risk characteristics of the 
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companies’ bonds consistently.  It might be possible for the company to succeed once 
or twice but the market would learn and respond appropriately. 
 
A further option for investors faced with a company that consistently misleads 
investors, would be to seek protective covenants such as downgrade provisions.  
These are covenant provisions which trigger an increase in interest rate in the event 
of a downgrade in the rating of the bond.  This might be the only mechanism available 
to a company when faced with investors unwilling to purchase bonds. 
 
3.3.3 Implications 
The option to mislead investors such as investors in bonds exists.  However, the ability 
of a company to do this consistently is in doubt.  Investors are not blind to this type of 
behaviour.  The experiment demonstrated that rational investors can learn from the 
behaviour of management and can respond in a way that protects their own interests.  
This ability to learn should prevent a company from being able to mislead investors 
repeatedly.  Indeed, the possibility of such misleading behaviour might lead to the 
following problems. 
 
1 Investors stage a strike and refuse to buy bonds. 
 
2 Investors demand a premium price to compensate them for the risk of a 
downgrade. 
 
3 Investors demand protective covenants in the event of a downgrade such as an 
uplift in coupon. 
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Obviously, a combination of 2 and 3 is also possible. 
 
It is therefore quite possible that a company that is perceived as a candidate to transfer 
value from the debt-holders to the shareholders will be obliged to pay a higher cost of 
debt than otherwise might be the case for a company that was not so perceived.  So, 
the advantage of this transfer of value might not be positive overall.  The market price 
for the debt will be already discounting a further transfer of value.   
 
A better strategy for a company might be to maintain a constant ratio of debt to equity.  
This avoids the risk of suggesting to the market that a transfer of value is a possibility.  
If the market is confident that there won’t be any erosion of value by that transfer 
mechanism, then the company won’t be penalised by a cost of debt that discounts 
further value erosion. 
 
A track record of a stable capital structure (as reported in Lemmon, Roberts and 
Zender (2008)) should encourage bond investors to believe that “event risk” is small 
and so they would be less likely to penalise the company with a higher cost of debt.  A 
track record would help convince bond investors and the company might signal its 
intentions by publishing its capital structure policy as some companies do 
 
If indeed companies do maintain steady or constant capital structures, then if gearing 
changes, (i.e. gets out of line with the long run target) then such a change should be 
followed by a change in the reverse direction.  So, there ought to be a negative 
correlation between successive such changes (although the reversion may not happen 
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immediately).  Similarly, if the market to book value ratio changes, because this 
quantity is also stable over time, a positive change should be followed by a negative 
change.  Both these effects were identified and recorded in Chapter 2. 
 
Such a policy is suggestive of a company that continually manages its capital structure 
towards a target.  The literature on partial adjustment models is relevant here where 
such studies have sought to identify evidence that companies have target capital 
structures and seek to maintain such targets.  Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008) 
confirmed that firms in France, Germany, Japan, U.K. and U.S. have target capital 
structures as reflected in the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable (gearing) 
being highly statistically significant but that firms do not fully adjust to the target every 
year – consistent with the coefficient values being less than unity.  See Tables 2.10 
and 2.12 in Chapter 2 where the coefficient of the lagged value of gearing was 
statistically significant. 
 
The conclusions of Flannery and Rangan (2006) are that firms do have target capital 
structures and that firms close the gap on target by about one third each year.  
However, Hovakimian and Li (2012) challenge the soundness of the partial adjustment 
approach by reporting that firms do not always fully adjust even when they can. 
 
While the analysis above suggests that companies should maintain a policy of stable 
capital structures to avoid persuading debt investors to take punitive action against the 
company to protect themselves against possible transfers of value, this does not 
necessarily imply that companies need to be very rigid.  Capital structure policies often 
target a range rather than a precise or specific target (see Graham and Harvey (2001)).  
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The purpose of a range is to allow the company a degree of flexibility as to the gearing 
level and as to timing of adjustments.  Debt investors are likely to tolerate slow 
adjustment speeds providing they are confident that adjustments will eventually occur. 
 
DeAngelo and Roll (2015) comment that capital structure stability is the exception 
rather than the rule, that it is usually temporary and that there is substantial instability 
in gearing. 
 
If the market to book value ratio increases following the acquisition of a significantly 
positive net present value project, then the argument in Myers (1977) implies that debt 
and/or debt maturity would be reduced.  However, if the policy of the company is either: 
i) to recapture value transferred to the debt-holders; or (equivalently) ii) to maintain a 
constant debt equity ratio; then an increase in the market to book value ratio would 
cause a reduction in gearing which should then be followed by an increase in gearing 
to recapture the value transferred – this is the opposite to that suggested in Myers 
(1977) and reported in empirical studies.  Therefore, changes in gearing and debt 
maturity should be positively associated with positive change in the market to book 
value residual.  This was also observed in Chapter 2 where a negative relationship 
was identified between changes in gearing (measured using market values) and 
changes in the market to book value residual in the same year.  This relationship 
became positive when gearing (measured using book values) was used. 
 
 
3.3.4 Risk mitigation by investors: contracting issues 
The experiment described above shows that investors learn and take appropriate 
action.  This knowledge or learning is already reflected in the structure of debt 
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instruments which contain mechanisms such as loan covenants to protect the position 
of debt-holders.  These mechanisms are examined in this section in the specific 
context of the problems of asymmetric information. 
 
Investors in debt instruments are aware that circumstances can arise leading to a 
switch in value between debt-holders and equity holders and precautions to prevent 
such changes in value usually exist in the form of restrictive covenants in the loan 
documentation.  Investors in debt instruments are concerned about corporate events 
which can adversely affect debt values.  Investors describe the risk of such adverse 
movements in value as "event risk" – for example the reduction in debt values in the 
RJR Nabisco leveraged buy-out reported in Myers (2001).  That is an extreme 
example but there are many examples of bonds reducing in value for example by 
moving out of one credit rating class to the next lowest class.  This is usually called 
transition or migration risk and may be triggered by an event such as those described 
above.  Risks or probabilities of such migration in ratings can be measured using 
historical data and are published by the rating agencies. 
 
Debt-holders are aware of the potential for adverse changes in debt value caused by 
changes in the variance of the underlying business or other corporate events.  In some 
cases, appropriate structural protections are sought in the contractual terms of loan 
instruments.  These include (but are not restricted to) the following: 
 
• Negative pledge: which restricts the borrower from giving priority to another 
lender ahead of or pari passu to the existing debt (or restricting the amount of 
such security); 
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• Security/priority: which prevents another lender getting an equal position with 
existing lenders; 
 
• Financial covenants: these are intended to signal problems early (in terms of a 
credit ratio such as interest cover or the gearing ratio) so that the lenders can 
step in and take control before a major loss of value occurs; 
 
• Debt maturity limitations: lenders extend maturity but only if the credit quality is 
acceptable; 
 
• Change of control clause: this is standard in bank lending agreements and 
triggers early repayment if the borrower is subject to a takeover – an event that 
could damage the credit quality of the existing debt. 
 
The presence of suitable covenants and other contractual obligations tends to be 
linked to the overall credit risk.  High gearing tends to be associated with highly 
restrictive loan covenants whereas low gearing tends to be associated with less 
restrictive covenant structures.  The imposition of restrictive covenants is negotiated 
between borrower and lender.  Where a company is highly geared, lenders will seek 
to impose greater restrictions to obtain better protection.  Where the borrower has low 
gearing, the lenders are likely to be content with a loose set of protections but will 
nevertheless seek to prevent major shifts in credit quality occurring usually by means 
of a negative pledge. 
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A further factor which affects the overall credit quality of debt providers is the absolute 
level of gearing.  A lowly geared company without any restrictive covenants in place 
would probably be regarded as a reasonably good credit risk as the probability of 
default could be low.   Credit quality will involve a judgement of several factors 
including: 
 
• The structural protections available (restrictive covenants, priority, security); 
• The absolute level of gearing; 
• Industry and company specific features (such operational gearing, competition 
etc.);  
• Maturity; and 
• Quality of management – is the management team likely to seek to transfer value 
from the debt-holders to the equity holders? 
 
But even with low gearing, event risk could still be a problem for debt investors.  In 
such a case, the market will take a view on the likelihood of an event damaging the 
interests of the debt-holders.  The market price will factor in the probability of an 
adverse credit event (which is clearly more probable in the absence of protective 
covenants) into the pricing of the debt. 
 
From the perspective of the company, restrictive covenants can reassure debt 
investors and the advantage is that the price of the debt would be lower than in the 
absence of the covenants.  However, the disadvantage is that the restrictions can also 
limit the company's flexibility.  This is something regarded as very important from a 
strategic aspect.  In Graham and Harvey (2001), the survey identified financial 
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flexibility (the ability to raise capital quickly in a way that does not involve burdensome 
restrictions imposed by lenders) as a very important factor affecting capital structure 
decisions. 
 
Management obviously prefer that there are no or few covenants as this will always 
maximise the flexibility of the company , but the price could be a higher cost of 
borrowing.  Lenders may be prepared to lend only if either there is a suitable covenant 
structure in place or, in the absence of such protections, are compensated by a higher 
return to the investors.  Very tight restrictions would limit the company’s flexibility and 
would be resisted by the borrower.  There is a clear trade-off between costs and 
flexibility. 
 
Nash, Netter and Poulsen (2003) examined the relationship between the presence of 
covenants in bond contracts and investment opportunities.  They find that there is no 
difference in covenants between firms with high or low investment opportunities except 
that high-growth firms tend not to have restrictions on dividends or the issuance of 
further debt.  However, restrictions such as negative pledges, merger restrictions or 
asset sales are included.  This suggests that covenants are designed with company 
features in mind and to provide flexibility to the company.  Goyal (2005) confirms that 
lenders discipline bank risk-taking by writing restrictive covenants into subordinated 
bank debt contracts. 
 
Billett, King and Mauer (2007) find that covenant protection increases with growth 
opportunities, debt maturity and gearing.  This suggests that debt providers view 
companies with high growth opportunities (or companies with longer maturity debt) as 
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riskier than companies with low growth opportunities (or shorter maturity debt): it is 
obviously the case that more gearing is associated with more risk for lenders.  They 
conclude that firms use covenants to control conflicts between shareholders and debt-
holders.  This is like the argument in Myers (1977) that short maturity debt manages 
under-investment risk.  The covenants in the debt agreement are sought by the debt 
providers and are not proposed by borrowers.  It is the debt providers that are seeking 
to obtain protections as the experiment above demonstrates. 
 
Reisel (2014) documents a reduction in the cost of debt of between 35 and 75 basis 
points where there are covenant restrictions on investment activities or the issuance 
of higher priority claims (this is what the negative pledge is designed to restrict).  This 
is confirmation that the type of behaviour that debt investors might resort to when faced 
with risk includes higher debt costs.  Bradley and Roberts (2015) confirm the negative 
relationship between cost of debt and the presence of covenants.  They also conclude 
that protective covenants are more likely when the borrower is small, has high growth 
opportunities or is highly geared.  This suggests that lenders view companies with 
growth opportunities as risky and hence this would create a negative relationship 
between gearing and the market to book value ratio as documented in the Appendix 
to Chapter 2. 
 
These studies confirm that the contractual arrangements embedded in the loan 
documentation are an important component of the nature of the debt and the ability of 
the company to take advantage of debt providers.  Characterising debt in terms only 
of maturity and amount is unlikely to present the whole picture. 
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Despite these arrangements to protect debt-holders, there is evidence of companies 
over-investing although this does not necessarily involve obtaining a subsidy by 
means of a transfer from debt-holders.  Richardson (2006) identifies evidence of over-
investment in the sense that companies invest more than would be suggested by a 
model that predicts future investment based on past behaviour and that such 
investment is concentrated in firms with the highest levels of cash flow.  Harford (1999) 
also documents cash-rich firms as being more likely to attempt acquisitions and that 
such acquisitions are followed by abnormal declines in operating performance – a 
clear example of sub-optimal investing.  Franzoni (2009) analyses share price 
reactions to the announcement of mandatory pension contributions which suggests 
over-investment in large firms compared with under-investment for the sample as a 
whole: for more financially constrained firms, mandatory pension contributions lead to 
a greater negative reaction than is the case for larger better financed firms and that 
this greater price reduction represents loss of investment opportunities – which is not 
an unreasonable conclusion but such projects could still be financed on a joint venture 
basis, or could be sold or could be financed if additional capital could be raised as 
discussed above under solutions to the under-investment problem. 
 
Pan, Wang and Weisbach (2013) document a cycle of investment according to the 
tenure of the chief executive officer (CEO) reporting that disinvestment is high early in 
the period of office of the CEO but thereafter declines as investment increases.  This 
result contrasts with the results in Jiang (2016) which reports higher over-investment 
in the early years (using the technique in Richardson (2006)).  The results in Jiang 
(2016) also suggest that over-investment increases with internally generated cash 
flow.  There are also examples of over-investment in relation to acquisitions where the 
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benefits accrue to the target company shareholders rather than shareholders in the 
acquiring company – see Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003).  
 
The next section examines how information asymmetry can be managed by suitable 
contractual arrangements and short-term debt financing. 
 
3.4 Pecking order theory of capital structure 
The pecking order theory as set out in Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) 
provides a hierarchy of preferences for financing corporate investment and addresses 
an under-investment problem that arises from asymmetric information.  This theory 
suggests that companies will use finance in the following order: internal funds; the 
issue of debt; and only after exhausting the first two options, the issue of equity. 
 
The simple hierarchy in financing choices is motivated by the problem of asymmetric 
information where the company is reluctant to issues shares where the management 
consider that due to differences in perception of value, investors are unwilling to pay 
a price for shares that reflects the management’s view of value.  If the company were 
to issue shares at an under-valuation, then value would be transferred from the 
existing shareholders to the new shareholders.  Such a transfer in value could be so 
significant as to render the investment opportunity unattractive and lead to the 
company foregoing the investment creating the possibility of under-investment: in that 
situation, the company may be able to use debt to finance the investment thus avoiding 
the problem of asymmetric information (although the debt issue may also be affected 
by the asymmetric information although to a much lesser extent than an equity issue). 
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The preference for debt over equity is easily established in the circumstances of 
asymmetric information.  This is the reverse of the situation of under-investment 
described in Chapter 2 where the presence of existing debt creates the circumstances 
of the under-investment problem. 
 
In this section solutions are developed to manage the problem of information 
asymmetry that enable the company to avoid the disadvantage of being unable to 
issue shares at times of information asymmetry (at least, for some companies) and 
thereby reduce the risk of under-investment. 
 
3.4.1 The model in Cadsby, Frank and Maksimovic (1990) 
In this section, the model in Cadsby, Frank and Maksimovic (1990) is modified by 
substituting alternative financing methods in place of the use of debt as in the pecking 
order theory.  These alternative financing methods solve the problem of information 
asymmetry without any preference in favour of debt (although short-term or temporary 
debt is one of the alternative methods). 
 
The basic model can be simplified.  Suppose a company is one of two possible types.  
Either it is type H (high post-investment value) or type L (low post-investment value).  
Investors don’t know the type of each company, so they assume that each company 
type is equally likely and so value each company on an average basis.  The company 
type is not revealed until after the investment is made.  So, the problem for company 
H is how to raise equity when the market does not reflect the company’s true value.  
The advantage for company L is that investors are unaware of the company’s true 
type. 
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Investors assume each company is of only two possible types with value H or L with 
equal probability.  One solution is for investors to take a simple average and invest on 
that basis.  This would benefit company L at the expense of company H whose 
shareholders would suffer a transfer of value from themselves to the new 
shareholders.  Such a transfer would occur in the reverse direction for company L 
where value would be transferred to the old shareholders of company L from the new 
shareholders in company L.   
 
The use of an average price may not prevent company type H going ahead since the 
average price could still represent an improvement in existing shareholder wealth (if 
the investment opportunity had a sufficiently large net present value).  Cadsby, Frank 
and Maksimovic (1990) suggest that there is another situation in which company H 
might go ahead which is where company H uses the issue price that would apply if it 
were company type L (and the issue price reflected that knowledge) provided that the 
investment opportunity had such a large net present value that the existing investors 
suffered no disadvantage from such an issue price.  However, these two solutions are 
not the optimum outcome since there is a loss of value for the existing shareholders. 
 
If company H is not able or willing to issue shares at a price that represents some loss 
of value for its existing shareholders, then either it must pass up the investment 
opportunity (an example of under-investment); or it must use the alternative of debt 
finance by invoking the pecking order theory. 
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The model suggests that under-investment could arise for type H companies and over-
investment could arise for type L companies. 
 
For type H companies, some of the solutions to the under-investment problem 
described in Chapter 2 are relevant and can be considered here.  These include selling 
the investment opportunity (if that is possible) or finding a partner with whom to joint 
venture (with the partner providing capital) and to whom information could be disclosed 
without disadvantage so that the problem of information asymmetry can be 
surmounted. 
 
A further solution is suggested by the experiment described above which is for the 
management to provide a low-cost signal by simply stating publicly its views of the 
company’s value including its investment opportunity.  This would amount to an 
opinion without any verification.  If investors believed the management then company 
type H can issue shares at the right price.  If company type L were to make a similar 
claim (that it was of type H – which would amount to a breach of regulatory 
requirements to avoid a false market in the company’s shares i.e. market abuse) then 
it would ultimately be discovered that the management had been dissembling.  The 
reactions of investors as described in the above experiment in relation to debt would 
apply here making it difficult for the company type L to be believed again with the 
consequences of a higher cost of equity capital.   
 
In the next section, alternative financing methods involving additional contractual 
arrangements are described which avoid both i) the problem of asymmetric 
information; and ii) the problem of misleading investors, in each case in ways that do 
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not support the pecking order theory.  Each of these solutions are proposed as 
alternative solutions to the preference for debt (as in the pecking order theory). 
 
3.4.2 Resolving the problem of information asymmetry using appropriately 
designed contracts 
The disclosure of information to the market is regulated closely by rules of the 
exchange on which the shares are listed and by rules of the regulator, via market 
abuse regulations.  In broad terms listed companies have obligations under the 
exchange listing agreement to ensure that a false market in their shares is not created.  
Essentially this means that price-sensitive information needs to be disclosed in order 
that the market can properly assess share values.  However, in some situations, it may 
not be in the company's interest (or the shareholders' interest) for certain price-
sensitive information to be disclosed.  This type of information could include details of 
litigation where disclosure might harm the company's legal position; or details of an 
investment opportunity such as that envisaged in the above model; or details of a 
potential acquisition where disclosure of the purchaser's interest might encourage a 
competitor to bid or might drive the price up or damage the target or produce another 
disadvantageous outcome. 
 
In these situations, the rules affecting disclosure of price-sensitive information may 
permit the company to withhold such information provided of course the company or 
its directors do not deal in the company's securities. 
 
Promoting fair and efficient capital markets is an important policy objective for 
government so ensuring that capital flows to companies at fair values is important both 
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for the individual companies and for the economy as a whole.  Hence the need for 
extensive regulation.  For instance, in the case of a company issuing shares by means 
of a prospectus, there are significant penalties for errors and omissions from such 
documents that bite on the directors, the issuing company and in the US on the 
underwriters.  The process of due diligence that is conducted ahead of the issue of 
shares is designed to check the accuracy and completeness of statements in 
prospectuses.   
 
In Myers and Majluf (1984), the possibility of the company signalling its type was 
considered.  However, in that model variation, the company can purchase a signal, 
but it is assumed that the cost of the signal is significant when compared with the 
company value.  The model can be modified to include the cost of the signal which 
can be set against the value of the investment opportunity and its impact will obviously 
be negative.   
 
Even if there are situations involving asymmetric information where the prices of 
securities can be affected, there are several ways in which the problems of asymmetric 
information can be managed.  The following sections describe several possible 
solutions that can be adopted in the circumstances set out in the model described 
above that enable the company to manage the problems of asymmetric information in 
ways that avoid the risk of under-investment and do not involve a costly signal. 
 
These solutions have been used in the capital markets in related situations where 
there are regulatory barriers to the issue of shares as opposed to information 
asymmetry.  For example, if a non-US company wishes to acquire a US company but 
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lacks a US listing for its shares, then it will not be able to issue its shares as 
consideration for the acquisition.  This is not just a question of share values being 
affected by asymmetric information, the company does not have the option to issue 
shares at any price to the shareholders of the target company because of regulatory 
barriers.  To manage this problem, several techniques have been developed and these 
can be adapted to manage the problem of information asymmetry as described below. 
 
3.4.2.1 Managing the problem by adjusting the share price after issue 
A contract can be designed to accommodate the uncertainty associated with 
information asymmetry.  The type H company can execute an appropriately-designed 
contract for an issue of shares that specifies an issue price based on the company 
type being H subject to an adjustment in price once the company type is revealed.  
This adjustment mechanism would provide that if the company was revealed as type 
H then no further shares would be issued.  This would amount to the optimum issue 
price for company type H.  However, if the company type was revealed as type L, then 
additional shares would be issued by the company to the new investors to provide 
those investor with an issue price that reflected company type L.  This would reflect 
the correct issue price for company type L.  This method is potentially a two-stage 
equity issue and it involves an additional stage not envisaged in the original model in 
Myers and Majluf (1984) as modified in Cadsby, Frank and Maksimovic (1990). 
 
In this way, the investor would be paying the price for the shares which related directly 
to the actual company type.  The investor would avoid the problem of attempting to 
value the company with uncertain outcomes.  The existing investors in the company 
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would suffer no loss of value.  The under-investment and over-investment problems 
would both be avoided. 
 
The legal mechanism to give effect to this type of arrangement is relatively simple.  
The company can commit to issue a minimum number of shares subject to issuing a 
further tranche of shares if the company type is revealed as type L.  The purchasers 
of the new shares would have rights to receive more shares if the company type was 
revealed as type L.  Alternatively, the company can issue a single security such as a 
convertible bond or preference share instrument that would be convertible at a price 
that would be determined once the firm type is revealed.  The conversion mechanism 
would be triggered once the company type was known – this conversion would be 
mandatory unlike a conventional convertible where the option to convert is with the 
investor. 
 
Kahan and Yermack (1998) find that there is a “near-total absence” of restrictive 
covenants in publicly traded convertible bonds.  They conclude that firms that wish to 
maximise flexibility (by avoiding restrictive covenants although there are likely to be 
such covenants in other non-convertible debt instruments issued by the firm) prefer 
convertibility as a method to reduce the agency costs of debt (although it is difficult to 
see how it would be effective).  The advantage of a convertible bond for the investor 
is that some downside protection is provided (compared to an investment in equity) as 
there is a liability to repay the debt if it is not converted: at the same time, there is 
some upside potential if and when the share price rises to make the conversion option 
attractive.   
 
Chapter 3 Managing information symmetry 
204 
 
A convertible bond could be used to implement the solution proposed above where 
there is a variable issue price.  The company (type H or type L) would issue the 
convertible bond.  This convertible bond would convert at a share price reflecting 
company type H (if it were subsequently revealed as such) or company type L.  This 
would achieve precisely the correct issue terms thus overcoming the problem of 
information asymmetry.   
 
This variable conversion price arrangement would also work for a convertible 
preference share. 
 
This mechanism reduces uncertainty for both the company and the investors and 
provides no support for the pecking order theory. 
 
A variation on the above mechanism is already in use in the context of acquisitions.  A 
security known as a contingent value right (“CVR”) is sometimes issued to selling 
shareholders in the target company.  This instrument then carries a future payment 
obligation that is contingent on the share price of the acquirer being less than a 
stipulated level at that future time.  This mechanism supports the value of the CVR 
and overcomes the problem of information asymmetry since the value of the CVR is 
determined after a suitable time when the information asymmetry can be resolved.  
Chatterjee and Yan (2008) show that CVRs can help a type H firm to reveal its type 
when faced with information asymmetry and that firms with such a problem are more 
likely to offer CVRs.  Once again, this provides no support for the pecking order theory 
of an automatic preference for debt when faced with information asymmetry. 
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3.4.2.2 Managing the problem by contracting with an investment bank 
A common example where asymmetric information can be a problem relates to 
acquisition.  Suppose a company wishes to make an acquisition but that it needs to 
raise external finance to complete the acquisition.  Suppose further that it is unable to 
disclose details of its potential acquisition as such disclosure might jeopardise the 
success of the acquisition.  For example, such disclosure could stimulate a competitor 
to make a bid for the target company possibly increasing the cost to the acquirer or 
risking losing the acquisition completely.  In this way, a situation of information 
asymmetry could be created exactly comparable to that envisaged in the model. 
 
The intervention of an intermediary – an investment bank – can help resolve the 
difficulty of information asymmetry.  The investment bank contracts with the company 
along the following lines: 
 
• the investment bank commits to keep information provided by the company 
confidential (this enables the company to share information about the potential 
acquisition with a potential source of finance without making a public disclosure 
and risking the possible adverse consequences): there is no information 
asymmetry between the company and the intermediary; 
 
• the investment bank researches the feasibility of either providing the finance or 
underwriting the provision of the necessary finance, whether debt or equity or 
both; 
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• once the feasibility research has been completed, the investment bank, if it 
wishes to proceed, will enter into a financing or underwriting contract with the 
company and the company will simultaneously enter into a contract to make the 
acquisition: the acquisition and financing can then be announced. 
 
The company reveals its type to the investment bank without risking public revelation 
and the adverse consequences.  These arrangements will allow the company to obtain 
the terms of financing which take into account the actual company type but without the 
risk of disclosing information that could be disadvantageous to the company's 
interests.  
 
Such an arrangement would avoid the risk of transaction failure.  A condition can be 
included in the contract with the investment bank that is linked to the overall success 
of the transaction to avoid the unnecessary issue of securities when the transaction 
aborts.  Shares would not be issued if the transaction did not proceed – an important 
objective to avoid unnecessary dilution of shareholders. 
 
This solution amounts to using the investment bank to give a signal of the company 
type that can be believed by investors.  It would be known by investors that the contract 
between company and investment bank included clauses protecting the bank if the 
management was misleading the bank.  This would create confidence that the signal 
provided by the involvement of the investment bank was reliable. 
 
One problem that can arise with the issues of shares as in the above mechanisms, is 
that it is usually difficult for a company to issue shares at a price more than the current 
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market price.  In the Cadsby, Frank and Maksimovic (1990) model, investors price the 
shares based on their expectation of the outcome which is an average price.  It is 
certainly rare for a company to issue shares at a price higher than the current market 
price as this mechanism implies.   
 
The company would prefer to issue shares at a price which reflects the additional value 
associated with the investment opportunity.  This extra value will only be reflected in 
share prices once it is revealed to the market. 
 
This problem could be accommodated in both the two-stage equity method (as 
envisaged in the solution in section 3.4.2.1) and with the involvement of an investment 
bank.  In the latter case, the investment bank would reveal the company type once it 
was known and the terms of the issue would be adjusted to reflect that information 
and then announced to the market. 
 
3.4.2.3 Managing the problem by using bridge financing  
One method that takes into account the difficulty of arranging simultaneously the 
negotiation of an acquisition and the issue of a range of financial instruments in 
different markets (e.g. different types of bonds in different markets coupled with an 
equity issue) is bridge financing.   
 
Combining a range of different transactions adds considerable complexity.  For 
example, the company may wish to issue equity or long-term bonds to finance the 
acquisition but as the acquisition is not certain, it does not wish to commit to issue 
those securities if the transaction does not go ahead.  Here the issue of securities 
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would need to be conditional upon the successful completion of the acquisition.  This 
example has obvious similarities to the type H and type L company in the Cadsby, 
Frank and Maksimovic (1990) model.  In the acquisition example, the information 
asymmetry is the completion of the acquisition which is an uncertain event and occurs 
only after the financing is in place. 
 
Short-term bridge financing is debt of an amount that is sufficient to enable the 
company to complete the acquisition and announce it to the market.  The term of the 
financing is usually 12 months (but can be longer) and it is designed to give the 
company time to refinance the debt with the company’s long-term desired financing 
arrangements such as equity and/or bonds and for problems of information asymmetry 
to be resolved. 
 
This arrangement addresses the problem of information asymmetry and the difficulty 
identified by Myers and Majluf (1984) that, so they argued, leads to a preference for 
debt over equity.  Here, bridge financing is exactly that but with one important 
difference.  The bridge financing is a stopgap debt financing until permanent financing 
is put in place.  The use of bridge finance does not indicate a preference for debt over 
equity in the long-term but only until it is refinanced.   
 
The bridge financing arrangement has one further important advantage in the context 
of acquisitions namely speed.  A bridge financing can be put in place quickly and 
certainly much more quickly than an equity issue.  This speed can be particularly 
important in acquisitions where the timetable may be set by another party. 
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So, the bridge financing would be followed by further issues of securities e.g. long-
term bond issues and/or equity issues after the asymmetry of information was 
corrected.  The company would be able to benefit from any positive market reaction 
to the announcement of the acquisition.  For instance, if the acquisition created 
positive value then this might be reflected in better issue terms for the securities 
issued, both debt and equity.  This mechanism addresses precisely the concerns 
about information asymmetry. 
 
Alternatively, if the acquisition was not received in a positive way, there could be a 
reduction in the value of the company's securities and the terms of subsequent issues 
of securities would reflect this.  The investment bank by underwriting a bridge financing 
would be protected against any adverse share price reaction to the acquisition and so 
might prefer this two-stage process particularly when it is difficult to assess exactly 
how the market might react.  A bridge financing avoids the valuation problems arising 
from the information asymmetry. 
 
One important requirement for a bridge financing to work is that the investment bank 
or lender must feel very comfortable that the company will be able to refinance the 
bridge financing within the 12-month timetable.  The ability of a company to refinance 
will depend on its capital structure and it may also depend on its company type.  If the 
company type cannot be known at the time of the bridge, then the lenders will assume 
company type L, so the overall capital structure of the company could be a very 
important determinant in the availability of bridge finance.  Obviously, a strong 
company balance sheet will facilitate the provision of bridge finance and vice versa.  
So, to manage information asymmetry, a company should manage its capital structure 
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so that it is always able to access bridge finance.  This dictates a conservative capital 
structure. 
 
The problem of asymmetric information can also affect issues of debt.  If the market is 
unaware of the true position of the company, then the terms of a debt issue will not 
reflect the management’s own private knowledge of its prospects.  A long-term debt 
issue on terms based on information asymmetry will lead to a loss of value – 
shareholders will suffer a transfer of value to the holders of the new debt issue once 
the information asymmetry is corrected.  Halov and Heider (2011) present evidence 
that firms avoid issuing debt when the outside market is likely to know little about the 
risk.  Goyal and Wang (2013) present evidence that the maturity of debt issues is 
connected to their private information about company prospects.  Berger, Espinosa-
Vega, Frame and Miller (2005) identify a link between debt maturity and information 
asymmetry noting that companies prefer shorter maturities when there is a situation 
of information asymmetry. 
 
To manage a problem of information asymmetry ahead of a debt issue, the company 
can resort to bridging or short-term financing so that the cost of issuing debt on terms 
that could become unfavourable are minimised by the shorter maturity.  Once the 
information asymmetry is corrected, it will be possible to refinance with longer maturity 
debt on terms that reflect the management’s knowledge that is no longer private. 
 
3.4.2.4 Issuing equity to existing shareholders 
In many jurisdictions, there are legal restrictions on the issue of new shares for cash.  
Such shares must first be offered by a company to the existing shareholders.  This is 
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known as the right of pre-emption.  The existing shareholders are legally entitled to 
subscribe pro rata for any new shares issued for cash.  The rationale for the pre-
emption arrangement is simply to ensure that existing shareholders have the right to 
maintain their proportionate shareholding – although they must subscribe for the new 
shares to avoid being diluted. 
 
So, a typical equity cash raising mechanism is to issue shares, usually at a discount, 
to existing shareholders in proportion to their holdings (a rights issue).  This approach 
can avoid the problems motivating the pecking order as discussed in Myers and Majluf 
(1984). 
 
Faced with a situation of information asymmetry, the company could offer shares to 
its shareholders at a price equivalent to that implied by company type L or even at a 
lower price.  The offering document would provide the information on the two possible 
company types.  By offering the shares at a low value to existing shareholders, the 
possible adverse loss of value arising from issuing at an average price is not avoided 
but the value that is transferred to the new investors is transferred to those existing 
shareholders subscribing for the new shares.  Once the company type is revealed, the 
shares will reflect that information and the shareholders will benefit if the company 
type is H but will suffer no loss if the company type is L. 
 
Obviously, for those existing shareholders unable or unwilling to subscribe for new 
shares, there will be a transfer of value to those subscribing.  But the company will 
have done its best to protect its existing shareholders.  The shareholders unable to 
subscribe would not be any worse off than if they had simply sold their shares at the 
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market price that reflected the uncertainty – this is why regulators seek to promote fair 
markets where information is disclosed to avoid share prices being inaccurate. 
 
The rights issue mechanism could be used by any company regardless of jurisdiction 
to solve the asymmetric information problem.  If the timetable for the revelation of 
company type is known then, if feasible, the rights issue could be organised so that 
the company type is revealed prior to the end of the offering period.  Such a timing will 
allow those shareholders unable to subscribe to sell their rights at a price which reflects 
the company type. 
 
If the timing of revelation of company type is not expected to occur within the usual 
timetable for a rights issue, then a bridge financing should be organised followed by a 
rights issue at the appropriate time.   
 
3.4.2.5 Selling the investment opportunity 
As mentioned above, another method of avoiding the difficulties of issuing equity in a 
situation of information asymmetry is for the company to seek to sell the investment 
opportunity to a third party.  It might be possible to approach possible buyers on a 
confidential basis in a way that did not jeopardise the value of the opportunity.   
 
Alternatively, the company could seek a joint venture partner who could be invited to 
invest allowing the company to retain an interest.   
 
Both these options could be pursued on a confidential basis to limit the risk of 
information disclosure which might jeopardise the value of the investment opportunity.  
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Also, if the company type could not be known within a reasonable timeframe, one of 
the contractual provisions described above (such as the terms and price of the share 
issue being adjusted depending on the company type, once revealed) could be 
incorporated into the joint venture agreement to protect the joint venture partner. 
 
3.4.3 Implications for the pecking order theory 
The discussion above demonstrates that the problem posed in the Myers and Majluf 
(1984) paper can be managed in several ways that do not support the pecking order 
theory.  In summary, these are as follows. 
 
1. The company makes a two-stage equity issue.  The first issue assumes a price 
based on company type H but, if the company type is subsequently revealed as 
type L, then a further issue of shares to the new investors is made to give an 
effective price based on the correct company type.  Otherwise no further shares 
are issued.  The mechanism used can be a convertible bond, convertible 
preference share or a CVR (contingent value right). 
 
2. The company uses an intermediary to underwrite a securities issue until the 
company type can be revealed to the market. Here, the intermediary’s reputation 
is a further signal to convince investors of its true type. 
 
 
3. The company arranges a bridging finance or other short-term finance until the 
company type is revealed when more permanent capital raising arrangements 
can be put in place including equity. 
 
Chapter 3 Managing information symmetry 
214 
 
4. Shares can be issued to existing shareholders at a discount.  This avoids the 
problem of issuing shares at an undervaluation at least for those existing 
shareholders able to subscribe to the issue. 
 
5. The company seeks a sale or partial sale of the investment opportunity to a third 
party to whom confidential details are disclosed; or uses a costless signal such 
as a statement by management. 
 
All the above techniques provide ways of addressing the asymmetric information 
problem.  The only solution that has a link to the pecking order theory is technique 3.  
This involves using short-term bridging finance from an intermediary until other 
arrangements can be put in place at a time when the information asymmetry problem 
has reduced.  Such other arrangements may or may not include debt – there is no 
preference implied by the bridge financing.  The choice of financing method may be 
determined in advance but is only executed after the asymmetric information problem 
has passed i.e. once the company type is revealed.   
 
Once the company type is revealed, the company has the option to restructure its 
debt/equity mix.  Problems of asymmetric information can at most affect capital 
structure decisions over the time until the information asymmetry is resolved. 
 
The conclusion is that if the problem of asymmetric information can be managed by 
one or more of the solutions describe above then there is no support for the pecking 
order theory.  The only connection between the idea of pecking order theory and 
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information asymmetry is that one of the solutions, bridge financing, involves short-
term debt that is subsequently refinanced (a type of short-term pecking order theory). 
 
Subject to one important qualification, the analysis above of the problem of information 
asymmetry provides no insight into what the company’s capital structure might be or 
should be.  The company could pursue any capital structure objective with occasional 
temporary use of bridge financing without supporting any preference for debt over 
equity.  However, there is one important qualification which is that for the company to 
overcome the problem of information asymmetry by using bridge financing or other 
short-term debt financing, the company must have a balance sheet that is sufficiently 
conservative to be able to support bridge financing which could represent a temporary 
but substantial increase in gearing.  The bridge financing solution requires a 
conservative balance sheet.  So, there is an implication for capital structure choice. 
 
3.5 Empirical evidence 
In this section, the empirical literature on pecking order theory is reviewed and some 
alternative hypotheses are developed and tested which do not provide support for the 
pecking order theory but instead suggest support for the temporary or short-term 
bridge financing approach described above. 
 
3.5.1 Empirical literature 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) examined in a comparative way the pecking order 
theory and the static trade-off model.  They concluded that the pecking order is an 
“excellent descriptor” of corporate financing behaviour for their sample of mature 
companies. 
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The analysis below follows in part the approach in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999).  
That study employed Compustat data that were complete for the entire period (1971 
– 1989) and where there was no takeover activity – as such activity can lead to 
significant changes in gearing.  Because of this constraint, their data set was restricted 
to a sample of 157 firms which were mainly mature companies.  This bias in their data 
set may affect the results. 
 
The main result of the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) study is a regression test on 
the following equation. 
 
ΔTotdebti,t =  + β1 x Totfindefi,t + εi,t           (3.1) 
 
where ΔTotdebti,t is the change in total debt over the year and Totfindefi,t is the total 
financing deficit arising during the year.  The idea of this test is to examine whether 
there is a relation between the company's need for external financing (the total 
financing deficit) and the issue of debt securities.  Clearly, the deficit must be financed 
by either debt and/or equity, so the equation has an element of circularity.  While 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) argue that the equation is not an accounting identity, 
the circularity can be articulated.  Obviously, the financing deficit must balance with 
changes in the external sources of finance – debt and equity.  So, their equation is as 
follows. 
ΔTotdebti,t =  + β1 x (ΔTotdebti,t + ΔTotequityi,t) + εi,t        (3.2) 
 
where ΔTotdebti,t is the change in total equity over the year. 
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This regression equation effectively examines the split between debt and equity in 
terms of their use to finance the deficit.  A coefficient of unity would imply that firms 
finance their deficits entirely with debt finance – which is the explanation put forward 
in the pecking order theory.  This would imply that changes in equity were zero. 
 
The coefficient value identified by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) in their study 
based on changes in net debt was 0.75.  So, the coefficient value while not very close 
to unity, does indicate that more debt is used than equity. 
 
The equation in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) can be reorganised as follows. 
 
ΔTotdebti,t x (1 – β1) =  + β1 x ΔTotequityi,t + εi,t         (3.3) 
 
and equivalently,  
ΔTotdebti,t = /(1 – β1) + (β1/(1 – β1)) x ΔTotequityi,t  + εi,t        (3.4) 
 
Hence, if the value of β1 is 0.75, then this implies a value for β1/(1 – β1) of 0.75/0.25 
which is 3.  This implies that deficits are financed as to one quarter with equity and 
three quarters with debt.  However, it is difficult to argue that this supports the pecking 
order theory.  The evidence implies only that changes in debt issued appear to be 
more common than raising capital by equity issues.   
 
For large mature slower growing companies (which may include those in the dataset 
in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) study), debt issues that match the growing 
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equity base are to be expected.  The incidence of such companies in the dataset will 
tend to produce a high value for β1.  But this may not provide evidence to support the 
pecking order theory. 
 
Such companies clearly prefer debt in the sense that they prefer not to issue equity 
which would have the effect of reducing gearing.  Such companies could be said to 
have a target gearing ratio.  As they have only modest investment requirements (that 
can be accommodated by increasing debt slowly as the equity base grows) there will 
be no real need for equity issues.  The Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) results may 
therefore provide support for a theory of capital structure that involves a target gearing 
ratio for slower growing companies and not necessarily for the pecking order theory in 
general.  This could be an example of the narrow sample effect described in Graham 
and Leary (2011). 
 
It is not obvious that the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) results can be interpreted 
as providing support for the pecking order theory in a very meaningful way.  In fact, a 
similar analysis can be performed for changes in equity in the same way as performed 
in respect of changes in debt. 
 
The analogous equation for changes in equity financing is as follows. 
ΔTotequityi,t =  + 1 x (ΔTotdebti,t + ΔTotequityi,t) + εi,t        (3.5) 
 
This equation can be derived from the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) equation by 
subtracting each side of the above equation from "Total financing deficit". 
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This second equation could be tested in the same way as in Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) and is likely to produce a coefficient as indicated above.  Using the argument 
in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) but applying it in reverse, such a coefficient could 
suggest a preference for equity over debt – the exact converse of the pecking order 
theory. 
 
Chirinko and Singha (2000) questioned the testing methodology in Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) and pointed out that the regression coefficient could be significantly less 
than one even if the companies pursued the pecking order theory and that incorrect 
inferences about financing being consistent with the pecking order theory could be 
drawn even if companies pursued financing in fixed proportions of debt and equity.  
The criticism in Chirinko and Singha (2000) is essentially that the test lacks sufficient 
power and so cannot provide evidence of companies demonstrating a preference for 
debt over equity since the data include both debt and equity financing without any way 
of determining preference.  While there could be a preference for debt (over equity) 
up to a point after which equity is preferred or vice versa, the regression coefficient 
cannot distinguish between these two alternative preferences. 
 
Other studies have provided less supportive evidence for the pecking order theory.  
Frank and Goyal (2003) concluded that the pecking order better describes the 
behaviour of large companies rather than small.  Fama and French (2005) observed 
that during the period 1973-2002, more than half of the companies within their sample 
issued or retired equity in a way that violated the pecking order theory: they identified 
“pervasive contradictions” in the model.  Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu (2009) argued 
that firms with low levels of information asymmetry account for the bulk of the failings 
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of the pecking order theory while Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) concluded the opposite.  
Hennessy, Livdan and Miranda (2010) develop models that show that asymmetric 
information can lead to financing policies other than the pecking order theory. 
 
The wide range of results has prompted some to modify the original pecking order 
theory – Leary and Roberts (2010) equate a simplistic version of the pecking order 
theory (first internal funds; and secondly debt, but no equity) as a “practical 
irrelevance” so modifications to the pecking order theory have been developed.  In 
their study, Leary and Roberts (2010) show that by including factors associated with 
alternative theories, the predictive accuracy of their model increases classifying over 
80% of the observed debt and equity issues.   
 
Some companies can expand by relying only on debt and retained earnings without 
recourse to equity (although that might be needed to finance acquisitions).  These can 
be described as self-sustainers since the new sources of capital exclude equity but 
instead are generated internally or by increasing the amount of debt in a way that does 
not increase gearing.  For some mature companies, modest growth can be financed 
by a combination of retained earnings and increases in debt without increasing overall 
gearing.  For such companies, there would be no need to make new issues of shares 
since there would be no requirement for further capital (except for acquisitions which 
were excluded in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) study).   
 
Mature companies could be growing relatively slowly while maintaining constant 
gearing and so would not necessarily be providing evidence of a preference for debt 
over equity.  Their capital structure is self-sustaining with growth being financed by 
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retained profits and increases in debt supported by the retained earnings without the 
need for an issue of new shares. 
 
For a company that pays out a constant proportion of earnings and has constant 
gearing, then it is easy to show that the growth rate that is achievable on a self-
sustaining basis is given by the following formula: 
 
Self-sustaining growth rate = (1-Po).(WACC – Kd(1 – t).G)/(1-G)  (3.6) 
 
where Po is the pay-out ratio; WACC is the weighted average cost of capital; Kd is the 
cost of debt; t is the corporate tax rate; and G is the gearing ratio (based on market 
values).  The derivation of this deterministic model is set out in the Appendix to this 
Chapter). 
 
Using some simple assumptions such as a pay-out ratio of 35%, cost of debt of 4% 
and a corporation tax rate of 35%, it is possible to compute some growth rates.  Table 
3.7 sets out growth rates implied by this combination of assumptions for a range of 
values for weighted average cost of capital and gearing. 
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Table 3.7 Rates of growth for self-sustainers 
This table sets out the rates of growth implied by a self-sustaining strategy, based 
on a pay-out ratio of 35%, cost of debt of 4% and a corporation tax rate of 35% 
  WACC WACC WACC 
  8.00% 10.00% 12.00% 
Gearing 10.00% 6.02% 7.58% 9.13% 
Gearing 20.00% 6.55% 8.30% 10.05% 
Gearing 30.00% 7.22% 9.22% 11.22% 
  
 
It is apparent from the Table that relatively substantial growth rates can be achieved 
using only internally generated equity and a constant gearing ratio.  This self-
sustaining strategy will be appropriate for some large mature companies where 
acquisitions are not contemplated and where growth is sufficiently modest to permit 
growth based on a self-sustaining capital structure.  If the sample comprised only self-
sustaining companies, then the coefficient of the financing deficit in the regression 
equation would be unity. 
 
However, this strategy does not provide evidence of a preference for debt over equity 
(or equally a preference for equity over debt) but there will be such self-sustaining 
companies included within the full sample.  Those companies not pursuing a self-
sustaining strategy (or those that are but wish to make acquisitions that can’t be 
financed by the self-sustaining approach) are a more suitable dataset for the analysis 
of financing preferences. 
 
Lemmon and Zender (2010) test a modified version of the pecking order theory that 
takes account of credit or default risk.  They split their sample into 3 groups reflecting 
the probability or actuality of having a bond rating.  Companies in these groups differ 
by their ability to issue debt.  The companies that are predicted not to face debt 
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capacity constraints finance more of their deficits with debt than equity, but this is less 
the case with those companies where the ability to issue more debt is constrained.  
Lemmon and Zender (2010) include the squared financing deficit as an independent 
variable as the relationship between the amount of debt used and the financing deficit, 
so they argue, is not necessarily linear.  They obtained a positive coefficient for the 
financing deficit and a negative coefficient for the squared financing deficit indicating 
that as the financing deficit increases the amount of debt financing used reduces at a 
faster rate.  Lemmon and Zender (2010) conclude that the use of debt and equity 
conforms well with the pecking order theory after accounting for the effect of debt 
capacity.  In other words, debt is used depending on its availability.  This is support for 
a modified pecking order theory that takes account of existing capital structure. 
 
Helwege and Liang (1996) study the financing of recent initial public offerings and find 
no relationship with the pecking order theory for such companies.  Fama and French 
(2002) highlight the preference for equity financing on the part of high growth 
companies as a serious failing of the pecking order theory.  Chang and Song (2013) 
address both smaller companies and high growth companies which do not appear to 
follow the pecking order theory suggesting that information asymmetry and supply 
constraints explain this anomaly – a possible narrow sample effect.  Fulghieri, Garcia 
and Hackbarth (2013) construct a model in which companies with investment 
opportunities prefer equity until they are large enough to prefer debt. 
 
3.5.2 Developing appropriate hypotheses 
The analysis above suggests that the pecking order theory should be tested in a way 
that recognises capital structure or the determinants of capital structure.  The 
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hypothesis to be tested is that the proportion of the financing deficit that is financed 
using debt should also be affected by the company’s capital structure. 
 
A modified test along the lines of both Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Lemmon 
and Zender (2010) can be attempted where the sample is restricted to those 
companies with positive financing deficits (where companies need to raise external 
financing).  The proportion of the deficit that is financed by debt is the dependent 
variable (as in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Lemmon and Zender (2010)) but 
the independent variables can be extended to include not just the financing deficit but 
also the square of the financing deficit (as in Lemmon and Zender (2010) to take into 
account the non-linear nature of the relationship between the proportion of the 
financing deficit covered by debt and the amount of the financing deficit) and the 
lagged value of gearing (i.e. the gearing at the start of the year in which the financing 
deficit is generated – this takes direct account of the company’s existing capital 
structure).   
 
• Hypothesis 1: It is argued above that the pecking order theory need not apply as 
there are alternative financing solutions available to manage information 
asymmetry.  So, there will not be an automatic preference for debt over equity.  
This in turn implies that the financing of the deficit would take account of other 
factors such as the amount of existing debt on the company’s balance sheet.  A 
high (low) pre-investment level of gearing is likely to suggest using low (high) levels 
of debt to finance the deficit.  This implies, firstly, that the proportion of debt used 
to finance the deficit will be negatively related to the gearing at the beginning of the 
year in which the deficit is generated; and secondly, the option to use bridge 
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financing suggests that the proportion of debt used to finance the deficit will be 
positively related to the size of the financing deficit.   
 
So, if a company has high gearing at the beginning of the year in which the financing 
deficit is generated, the company will tend to use less debt to finance that deficit than 
a company that starts the year with less gearing.  In other words, the company’s 
preference for debt over equity (if there is such a preference) is constrained or affected 
by its existing capital structure. 
 
If the alternative solution of short-term financing technique described above is used to 
manage information asymmetry, then it suggests that a temporary increase in debt 
could be followed by a refinancing that returns the company to its long run target 
capital structure.  This arrangement creates time for the asymmetry of information to 
be corrected so that the company can issue shares at a share price that reflects more 
closely the company’s view of its valuation and thus avoids issuing shares at an 
undervaluation which could damage shareholder value. 
 
So, it is likely that where a company employs bridge financing or other short-term 
financing, it will increase its gearing and then, following the resolution of the 
information asymmetry there will be a refinancing to enable the company to reduce its 
gearing.  Where gearing increases to finance the deficit, the company will move away 
from its target capital structure but that such an increase in gearing will be temporary 
and so will be followed by an adjusting decrease in gearing.   
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Of course, the bridge and its refinancing may occur within the same financial year, so 
such transactions will not be observable simply by examining changes from year to 
year.  Equally, there may be delays in the refinancing and there may be a further 
reduction in gearing in the succeeding year.  This is unlikely to be caused by bridging 
because there the timetable is usually just 12 months so unless the terms of the facility 
are breached, the bridge financing will be refinanced within that period and certainly 
at the latest by the next balance sheet date.  However, it may be that part of the 
company’s plan to reduce debt includes a disposal and that such disposal may take 
longer to complete than the timetable for the bridge so there might be some further 
debt reduction during the second year after the year of the financing deficit when 
gearing increased.  Alternatively, the bridge might have been repaid but there was still 
some further debt reduction that was planned during the second year after the year of 
the financing deficit by way of a further equity issue or other transaction. 
 
This can also be tested.  The hypothesis is that there will be evidence of companies 
returning to their long run capital structure by means of a further reduction in gearing 
in the second year after the year in which the deficit was financed by an increase in 
gearing. 
 
Various further hypotheses are suggested by this approach to information asymmetry.  
As before, the base year is defined as a year in which i) there is a positive financing 
deficit; and ii) such deficit is financed by an increase in gearing.  If hypothesis 1 is 
correct and supported by the results, then this will suggest the use of bridge financing.  
If that is the case, then following the use of bridge financing there will be a reduction 
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in gearing as the bridge is refinanced with equity (perhaps in part) in the period 
following the investment year.   
 
The additional hypotheses are as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  that after the base year (when the positive financing deficit is financed 
by an increase in gearing), there will be a reduction in gearing observable in the 
following year as the bridge debt is refinanced (at least in part) with equity: so, the 
change in gearing during the year following the base year will be negatively related to 
the gearing at the end of the base year. 
 
As the bridge financing may not be repaid in the year following the base year, there 
will be a reduction in gearing in the second year following the base year, so a further 
hypothesis can be formulated. 
 
Hypothesis 3: that in the second year after the base year, there will be a further 
reduction in gearing so that the change in gearing in that year will also be negatively 
related to the gearing at the end of the base year thus supporting the use of short term 
debt finance to cover the financing deficit that is subsequently refinanced with equity 
to reduce the temporarily increased gearing. 
 
For robustness, instead of using gearing at the end of the base year, the change in 
gearing in the base year can be used as an independent variable.  Hence two further 
hypotheses can be formulated: 
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Hypothesis 4: that the change in gearing during the year following the base year will 
be negatively related to the change in gearing during the base year: this replicates the 
idea in hypothesis 2 except that a different independent variable is used – the change 
in gearing rather than the absolute level of gearing; and 
 
Hypothesis 5: that the change in gearing in the second year following the base year 
will be negatively related to the change in gearing during the base year: this replicates 
the idea in hypothesis 4 except that a different independent variable is used – the 
change in gearing rather than the absolute level of gearing. 
 
These hypotheses are tested by restricting the sample to those companies with both 
a positive financing deficit and an increase in gearing during the year in which the 
deficit is generated.  Since, the tests require three consecutive company-year 
observations for hypotheses 2 and 3 and four consecutive company-year observations 
for hypotheses 4 and 5, there is a commensurate reduction in sample size compared 
to the analysis for hypothesis 1. 
 
This approach extends that described in Lemmon and Zender (2010). 
 
Not all companies will be using bridge financing since not all will face problems of 
asymmetric information.  Some companies may be in the nature of self-sustainers 
where the company has increased gearing slightly during the financing year and so 
become included within the sample (companies with both a positive financing deficit 
and an increase in gearing in the year).  Clearly there are several different capital 
structure strategies that could be being pursued. 
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3.5.3 Data and Methodology  
This section describes the data, the variables, the regression equations and the 
estimation methods. 
 
The data are taken from Compustat for North American companies for the period 1995 
– 2014 restricted to non-financial company data. The sample includes data where the 
company is not present for the full period thereby avoiding survivorship bias.    Yield 
curve data are taken from the US Treasury website; US consumer price index data 
are downloaded from US Department of Labour website; and yields on corporate 
bonds by maturity are from Bank of America Merrill Lynch/Federal Reserve Bank of St 
Louis, Economic Data.  A more extensive description of the data is contained in section 
2.3.3 of Chapter 2 which employs the same data.  
 
A total of 195,600 company-year observations in respect of 23,600 companies are 
included.  However, not all company-year observations are complete and so the 
usable data are smaller in number: the sample size available varies between each 
regression depending on the variables employed.  A further constraint is the 
requirement to use lagged values of the variables: this requires that each company-
year observation has a corresponding value for the previous year.  This requirement 
leads to a further reduction in sample size where there is no previous company-year 
value.  For instance, using system GMM with two lags requires 3 consecutive 
company-year observations and so the sample size for this approach is smaller than 
for fixed effects modelling where only two consecutive company-year observations are 
required.  For these reasons, the sample size varies between regression analyses. 
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The choice of data follows that in Lemmon and Zender (2010) (which covered an 
earlier period than in this case although with some small degree of overlap).  The 
sample is more comprehensive than that employed in Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) which was restricted to 159 firms only.  This sample includes some companies 
present for the whole sample period and others for shorter time frames thus avoiding 
survivorship bias. 
 
The variables are defined in Table 3.8.  Summary statistics of the data are set out in 
Table 3.9 except for those variables defined in Table 2.5 of Chapter 2 and that are 
summarised in Table 2.6.  Table 3.10 contains the respective correlation statistics 
except for cross-correlations for those variables defined in Table 2.5 of Chapter 2 
which are reported in Table 2.7. 
 
3.5.3.1 Variables 
The definitions of the independent variables are set out in Table 3.8 except for those 
variables already defined in Table 2.5 of Chapter 2.  
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Table 3.8 Definitions of the variables and expected signs of coefficients 
This table sets out the definitions of all the variables used in the regression analyses and their expected 
signs 
Debt proportion  The proportion of the financing deficit that is financed with debt and is the 
dependent variable as in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). 
 
Financing deficit The annual increase in the total amount of debt and equity (restricted to positive 
values – negative values are omitted) expressed as a proportion of share capital 
and debt as in Lemmon and Zender (2010).  The restriction to positive values for 
the financing deficit reduces the available sample size but is nevertheless large.  
This restriction is necessary to focus the analysis on companies needing to obtain 
external finance 
 
Expected sign “+” since the assumption is that more debt is used when financing a larger deficit.  
 
Squared 
financing deficit 
The square of the financing deficit (as the relationship is not linear) as described 
in Lemmon and Zender (2010). 
 
Expected sign “–” based on the results in Lemmon and Zender (2010). 
 
Gearing (net 
book value) 
The total amount of debt net of cash (since it is necessary to adjust for cash to get 
the correct relationship with the financing deficit which is also net of cash following 
Cooper and Lambertides (2016)) expressed as a proportion of the book value of 
total assets.  
 
Expected sign “–” since the amount of debt financing of the financing deficit must be constrained 
by existing gearing as hypothesised. 
 
In addition to the above variables and to avoid under-specification biases, those explanatory variables 
included in the regression equations in Chapter 2 are included: the definitions of these variables are 
set out in Table 2.5 and are listed below together with the expected signs . 
 
The market to 
book value ratio 
 
Expected sign: “+” to reflect the results of Chapter 2. 
Regulation 
dummy 
 
Expected sign: “+” to reflect the results of Chapter 2. 
Size Expected sign: “–” to reflect the results of Chapter 2. 
 
Commercial 
paper dummy 
 
Expected sign: “+” to reflect the results of Chapter 2. 
Abnormal 
earnings 
 
Expected sign: “+” to reflect the results of Chapter 2. 
Average asset life Expected sign: “–” to reflect the results of Chapter 2. 
 
Fixed asset ratio Expected sign: “+” to reflect the results of Chapter 2. 
 
In addition to the company specific variables and to reflect  debt market conditions, the following 
variables are included as in Chapter 2 and the definitions of these variables are set out in Table 2.5.   
 
Yield curve, Bond spread, Inflation and Short-term real interest rate are included and the expected sign 
of each of these variables is “–“. 
 
As in Chapter 2, to take account of a policy of adjusting capital structure to a target, lagged values of 
the dependent variables are included as explanatory variables. 
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3.5.3.2 Model equations 
The regression equation used to test each hypothesis is set out below under each of 
the hypotheses. 
 
Static models do not provide for delays in adjusting capital structure as is argued 
above in relation to the uses of bridge financing.  Accordingly, a lagged value of the 
dependent variable is included as an explanatory variable.  The subscripts indicate 
firm (i) and time (t). 
 
• Hypothesis 1: The proportion of debt used to finance the deficit will be negatively 
related to the capital structure at the beginning of the year in which the deficit is 
generated and positively related to the financing deficit.   
 
Propdebti,t =  + β1Propdebti,(t-1) + β2Findefi,t + β3Findef2i,t + β4Gearingi,t-1 + β5MTBVi,t 
+ β6Regi,t + β7Sizei,t + β8CPDi,t + β9Abegsi,t + β10AALi,t + β11FARi,t + β12Ycurvet + 
β13Bondspreadt + β14Inflationt + β15Shortintt + εi,t        (3.7) 
 
Dependent variable: Propdebti,t = proportion of debt used to finance the financing 
deficit. 
Independent variables: 1) Propdebti,(t-1) = lagged value of Propdebti,t; 2) Findefi,t = the 
financing deficit; 3) Findef2i,t = financing deficit squared as in Lemmon and Zender 
(2010); 4) Gearingi,t-1 = lagged gearing (ie the gearing at the beginning of the year of 
the financing deficit, which is similar to the approach in Lemmon and Zender (2010) 
which recognises that factors that affect gearing will influence the method of financing 
the deficit and hence why the following additional control variables are included; 5) 
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MTBVi,t = market to book value ratio; 6) Regi,t = regulation dummy; 7) Sizei,t = natural 
logarithm of the enterprise value; 8) CPDi,t = commercial paper dummy; 9) Abegsi,t = 
abnormal earnings; 10) AALi,t = average asset life; 11) FARi,t = fixed asset ratio; 12) 
Ycurvet = yield curve; 13) Bondspreadt = bond spread; 14) Inflationt = inflation; and 
15) Shortintt = short-term interest rate.  The error term is εi,t. 
 
• Hypothesis 2:  After an increase in debt in the base year (when the deficit is 
financed by an increase in gearing), there will be a reduction in gearing observable 
in the following year: so, the change in gearing during the year following the base 
year will be negatively related to the gearing as the end of the base year; 
 
ΔGearingi,t+1 =  + β1ΔGearingi,t + β2Gearingi,t + β3MTBVi,t + β4Regi,t + β5Sizei,t + 
β6CPDi,t + β7Abegsi,t + β8AALi,t + β9FARi,t + β10Ycurvet + β11Bondspreadt + β12Inflationt 
+ β13Shortintt + εi,t           (3.8) 
 
Dependent variable, ΔGearingi,t+1  = change in gearing in the year following the year 
of the financing deficit. 
Independent variables: 1) ΔGearingi,t = lagged value of the dependent variable (ie the 
value in the year of the financing deficit); 2) gearing; and the other independent 
variables as per the equation for hypothesis 1.  The error term is εi,t. 
 
• Hypothesis 3: In the second year after the base year, there will be a further 
reduction in gearing so that the change in gearing in that year will also be negatively 
related to the gearing at the end of the base year. 
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ΔGearingi,t+2 =  + β1ΔGearingi,t+1 + β2Gearingi,t + β3MTBVi,t + β4Regi,t + β5Sizei,t + 
β6CPDi,t + β7Abegsi,t + β8AALi,t + β9FARi,t + β10Ycurvet + β11Bondspreadt + β12Inflationt 
+ β13Shortintt + εi,t           (3.9) 
 
Dependent variable, ΔGearingi,t+2  = change in gearing in the second year following 
the year of the financing deficit. 
Independent variables: 1) ΔGearingi,t+1 = lagged value of the dependent variable (ie 
the value in the year following the year of the financing deficit); 2) Gearingi,t and the 
other independent variables as per the equation for hypothesis 1.  The error term is 
εi,t. 
 
• Hypothesis 4: The change in gearing during the year following the base year will 
be negatively related to the change in gearing during the base year; and 
 
ΔGearingi,t+1 =  + β1ΔGearingi,t + β2MTBVi,t + β3Regi,t + β4Sizei,t + β5CPDi,t + β6Abegsi,t 
+ β7AALi,t + β8FARi,t + β9Ycurvet + β10Bondspreadt + β11Inflationt + β12Shortintt + εi,t    
         (3.10) 
 
Dependent variable, ΔGearingi,t+1  = change in gearing in the first year following the 
year of the financing deficit. 
Independent variables: 1) ΔGearingi,t = lagged value of the dependent variable (ie the 
change in gearing in the year of the financing deficit.); and the other independent 
variables as per the equation for hypothesis 1.  The error term is εi,t. 
 
 
Chapter 3 Managing information symmetry 
235 
 
• Hypothesis 5: The change in gearing in the second year following the base year 
will be negatively related to the change in gearing during the base year. 
 
ΔGearingi,t+2 =  + β1ΔGearingi,t+1 + β2ΔGearingi,t + β3MTBVi,t + β4Regi,t + β5Sizei,t + 
β6CPDi,t + β7Abegsi,t + β8AALi,t + β9FARi,t + β10Ycurvet + β11Bondspreadt + β12Inflationt 
+ β13Shortintt + εi,t           (3.11) 
 
Dependent variable, ΔGearingi,t+2  = change in gearing in the second year following 
the year of the financing deficit. 
Independent variables: 1) ΔGearingi,t+1 = lagged value of the dependent variable (ie 
the change in gearing in the first year following the year of the financing deficit); 2) 
ΔGearingi,t = the change in gearing in the year of the financing deficit; and the other 
independent variables as per the equation for hypothesis 1.  The error term is εi,t. 
 
These hypotheses are tested by restricting the sample to those companies with both 
a positive financing deficit and an increase in gearing during the year in which the 
deficit is generated.  So, while the same sample is used as in Chapter 2, this restriction 
reduces the available company-year observations. 
 
 
3.5.3.3 Methods of estimation    
A more detailed description of the selection of estimation procedures is set out in 
section 2.3.3.3 of Chapter 2. 
 
The two methods highlighted in Flannery and Hankins (2013) as the most efficient, 
namely fixed effects and system GMM, are used here and the procedure in relation 
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to system GMM used in that paper (using Stata's “xtdpdsys” command, two steps, 
with all the independent variables specified as "predetermined" and the maximum 
number of lags restricted to two or, in some cases, more where it is necessary to 
increase the number of lags to generate satisfactory AR(2) statistics) is followed.   
 
 
3.5.3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Summary statistics are set out in Table 3.9 and correlation statistics in Table 3.10. 
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Table 3.9 Summary statistics 1995-2014 
 
Obser-
vations 
Med- 
ian Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Var- 
iance 
Skew-
ness 
Kur- 
tosis 
Min- 
imum 
Max-
imum 
Debt pro-
portion 95,284 0.052 0.054 0.456 0.208 -2.080 16.181 -2.508 1.636 
Financing 
deficit 94,493 0.150 0.246 0.341 0.116 1.274 8.397 -0.922 1.765 
Squared 
financing 
deficit 94,493 0.052 0.176 0.421 0.177 4.709 29.556 0.000 3.114 
Lagged 
net 
gearing 
(book 
value) 149,989 0.098 0.141 0.772 0.596 4.420 31.901 -0.964 5.839 
Change in 
gearing 149,068 0.002 0.015 0.315 0.099 0.486 12.793 -1.335 1.544 
The definitions of the variables are set out in Table 3.8.  Those variables not included in the above table are defined 
in Table 2.5 and summary statistics and correlation statistics are set out in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 respectively. 
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Table 3.10: Correlation statistics 1995-2014 
 
Debt 
proportion 
Financing 
deficit 
Financing 
deficit2 
Net 
gearing 
Difference 
in gearing 
Financing deficit 0.320***     
Financing deficit2 0.136*** 0.749***    
Net gearing     -0.003   -0.094*** -0.128***   
Difference in gearing 0.302*** 0.055*** 0.059*** -0.225***  
Market to book value ratio -0.055*** -0.027*** -0.049*** 0.243*** 0.218*** 
Regulation 0.032*** -0.044*** -0.053*** 0.084*** -0.005** 
Abnormal earnings -0.025*** -0.055*** -0.060*** 0.136*** 0.058*** 
Fixed asset ratio 0.097*** -0.062*** -0.103*** 0.119*** 0.066*** 
Natural log of size 0.087*** 0.071*** 0.077*** -0.060*** -0.021*** 
Term spread 0.017*** -0.090*** -0.051*** 0.021***   -0.003 
Bond spread     0.000 -0.083*** -0.046*** 0.024*** -0.013*** 
Inflation -0.044*** 0.038*** 0.022***    0.002 -0.037*** 
Short-term real rate      0.006* 0.107*** 0.055*** -0.016***   -0.001 
The definitions of the variables are set out in Table 3.8.  Additional cross correlations are set out in 
Table 2.7.   
 
3.5.4 Results 
Table 3.11 reports the results of the test of hypothesis 1 that the proportion of debt 
used to finance the deficit is negatively related to the gearing at the beginning of the 
year of the financing deficit.  The results support the hypothesis. 
 
Both fixed effects and system GMM results are reported: however, in this case, the 
dependent variable may not have the characteristics of either gearing or debt maturity 
in displaying reversion towards a target.  It may be that such an assumption is 
inappropriate.  To address this, the fixed effects regression has been performed in two 
ways, in column 1 of Table 3.11 without the lagged value of the dependent variable 
being included as a dependent variable and in the middle column where the lagged 
value of the dependent variable is included.  In system GMM, lagged values (both one 
and two lags) of the dependent variable are included.  Interestingly, the coefficient of 
the once-lagged value of the dependent variable is negative and statistically significant 
although small. 
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The coefficients are all highly significant except for the regulation dummy (in system 
GMM); the yield curve (in system GMM – it is significant under fixed effects); and the 
constants (under both estimators). 
 
The coefficient of the financing deficit is 0.88 (fixed effects, including the lagged value 
of the dependent variable) which is not so far from the results of Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) which reported a coefficient of 0.76 for a narrower sample although they 
did not include the square of the financing deficit in their regression.  This coefficient 
is also similar to the results in Lemmon and Zender (2010) for those companies in their 
sample with the best access to debt where the coefficient reported was 0.79.   
 
Also, in common with Lemmon and Zender (2010), there is a negative coefficient for 
the square of the financing deficit indicating that as the size of the financing deficit 
rises, less debt is used as hypothesised indicating that the debt proportion of the 
financing deficit is directly affected by the company’s existing capital structure – more 
existing gearing is associated with a lower proportion of debt financing of the deficit.  
The relationship between gearing and the financing deficit is not linear but quadratic 
or parabolic which is confirmed by the sign of the coefficient of the square of the 
financing deficit. 
 
The other coefficients are as predicted.  These results support the idea that the debt 
proportion of the financing deficit is linked to the independent variables that explain 
gearing as well as the financing deficit (and its square) and to existing gearing.  At the 
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very least, the pecking order theory needs to be modified to explain these wider 
factors.   
 
The coefficient of the market to book value ratio is positive as hypothesised and 
consistent with the analysis in Chapter 2 contradicting the idea that less debt is used 
to manage under-investment problems linked to higher market to book value ratios. 
 
The coefficient of the abnormal earnings variable is positive indicating that the larger 
the value (and hence the greater the information asymmetry) then the larger will be 
the debt financing proportion.  This supports the idea that motivates the pecking order 
theory that when faced with problems of asymmetric information that could render an 
equity issue unattractive for existing shareholders that the company will resort to debt.  
However, this result is also consistent with the idea that the company can manage the 
problem of information asymmetry by using short-term debt that can be put in place 
until the asymmetric information problem has reduced, and an equity issue can be 
made as proposed in the bridge financing solutions for asymmetric information 
described above. 
 
Interestingly, the coefficients of the variables representing debt market conditions are 
negative (as expected), large and statistically significant.  The dependent variable may 
represent a movement away from target gearing to finance a deficit on a short-term 
basis as proposed in the bridge finance solution and that this deviation is sensitive to 
debt market conditions. 
 
  
Chapter 3 Managing information symmetry 
241 
 
Table 3.11 Determinants of the debt proportion of the financing deficit  
This table sets out the regression results of the debt proportion of the financing deficit (dependent 
variable) against the variables in the left-hand column (hypothesis 1). 
 Fixed effects (1) Fixed effects (2) System GMM 
Lagged dependent variable (one lag) -0.0492*** -0.0451**  
 (-5.031) (-2.447) 
Lagged dependent variable (two lags) 
 
-0.0200*** 
  
 
(-2.895) 
Financing deficit 1.030*** 0.884*** 0.778*** 
 (44.49) (22.28) (14.51) 
Squared financing deficit -0.244*** -0.220*** -0.172*** 
 (-13.38) (-5.535) (-2.598) 
Lagged gearing  -0.0195*** -0.0182*** -0.0314*** 
 (-7.976) (-8.594) (-9.456) 
Market to book value ratio 0.00595*** 0.00627*** 0.00784*** 
 (12.37) (13.44) (14.27) 
Regulation dummy - - -0.0671 
  
 
(-1.255) 
Abnormal earnings 0.00465*** 0.00306*** 0.00320*** 
 (4.998) (3.340) (3.102) 
Fixed asset ratio 0.241*** 0.228*** 0.368*** 
 (16.27) (15.78) (15.75) 
Average asset life -0.000182*** -0.000145*** -0.000234*** 
 (-6.430) (-4.458) (-4.826) 
Natural logarithm of size -0.00769*** -0.0126*** -0.0246*** 
 (-3.677) (-5.761) (-9.145) 
Commercial paper dummy 0.0252* 0.0223 0.130*** 
 (1.856) (1.464) (4.924) 
Yield curve -2.393*** -1.701*** -0.394* 
 (-10.45) (-7.103) (-1.720) 
Bond spread -0.0716 -0.359** -0.377** 
 (-0.421) (-2.172) (-2.228) 
Inflation -3.329*** -2.634*** -1.452*** 
 (-15.93) (-11.88) (-6.357) 
Short-term interest rate -3.298*** -2.997*** -0.908*** 
 (-18.25) (-15.16) (-5.158) 
Constant 0.00518 0.0269* 0.0144 
 (0.337) (1.765) (0.927) 
F test 350.6*** 153.8*** 
 
Adjusted R squared 0.425 0.332  
Hausman p value 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
Wald test p value   0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)   0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)   0.81 
Sargan statistic   0.0 
Observations 51,043 33,334 22,544 
Number of firms 11,514 9,699 7,386 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - as 
pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test statistic 
is not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, 
the variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the variables are set 
out in Table 3.8.  Fixed effects (1) excludes the lagged value of the dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable but is included in Fixed effects (2). 
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Table 3.12 sets out the regression results for the test of hypothesis 2 that following an 
increase in gearing in the year of the financing deficit, there will be a reduction in 
gearing.  The dependent variable is the change in gearing in the year following the 
year of the financing deficit and the independent variables include the gearing at the 
end of the year of the financing deficit.  The result provides some degree of support 
for the hypothesis. 
 
Here, for system GMM to produce acceptable AR(2) statistics, it has been necessary 
to specify 6 lags rather than 2 (as in Flannery and Hankins (2013)).  The coefficients 
have been omitted from the Table for those lags which were not statistically significant.  
In the case of fixed effects, the procedure described in respect of Table 3.11 has been 
followed although the impact of the additional analysis is marginal.   
 
The coefficient of gearing in the year of the financing deficit is negative and statistically 
significant suggesting the negative relationship hypothesised.  However, the constant 
is positive (and significant) suggesting that for some small values of gearing, there 
could still be a positive increase in gearing in the year following the financing deficit. 
small changes in gearing in the year of the financing deficit, there could be an increase 
in gearing in the subsequent year.  For large increases in gearing during the year of 
the financing deficit, the results above suggest that the increase is reversed in part in 
the subsequent year supporting the idea that bridge financing or other short-term 
financing has been used.   
 
The coefficient of the change in gearing in the deficit year is positive in contradiction 
to the hypothesis suggesting that in increase in gearing is followed by a further 
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increase.  However, this result is reversed when gearing is omitted from the regression 
equation as reported in Table 3.13 below. 
 
The coefficient for the market to book value ratio is positive, as before, supporting the 
results in chapter 2.  The signs of the other coefficients are largely as expected except 
for the following variable coefficients.  The abnormal earnings coefficient is negative 
suggesting that gearing reduces in the year after the period when management 
becomes aware of an increase in earnings which is consistent with management 
seeking to avoid transfers of value to debt-holders.  The coefficient of the fixed assets 
ratio is negative which is somewhat counter-intuitive, but this coefficient is not 
statistically significant under the fixed effects estimator.  Of the debt market conditions, 
only the bond spread variable has a coefficient with a positive sign contradicting the 
idea that, faced with a high bond spread, borrowers should reduce maturity to minimise 
borrowing costs.  However, changes in gearing do not necessarily reflect changes in 
maturity. 
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Table 3.12 Determinants of changes in gearing in the year after the year of the 
financing deficit 
This table sets out the regression results of the change in gearing after the year in which the financing 
deficit is generated (dependent variable) against the variables in the left-hand column (hypothesis 2). 
Variables Fixed effects (1) Fixed effects (2) System GMM 
(6 lags) 
Change in net gearing in the deficit year  0.169*** 0.433*** 
  (4.669) (4.136) 
Gearing at end of deficit year -0.262*** -0.292*** -0.385*** 
 (-19.10) (-18.13) (-8.218) 
Market to book value ratio 0.00568* 0.00362 0.0224*** 
 (1.840) (1.114) (4.800) 
Regulation dummy - - 0.359** 
  
 
(2.477) 
Abnormal earnings -0.00619 -0.00650 -0.0204** 
 (-1.098) (-1.133) (-2.369) 
Fixed asset ratio -0.0803 -0.0693 -0.179* 
 (-1.522) (-1.274) (-1.774) 
Net average asset life -7.43e-05 -0.000107 -0.000127 
 (-0.987) (-1.536) (-1.002) 
Natural logarithm of size 0.00489 0.00434 -0.0336*** 
 (0.886) (0.796) (-2.593) 
Commercial paper dummy -0.00688 -0.00542 0.0689 
 (-1.122) (-0.847) (1.621) 
Yield curve -1.955*** -1.947*** -3.837*** 
 (-4.375) (-4.483) (-4.693) 
Bond spread 0.663* 0.687** 1.468*** 
 (1.900) (2.004) (3.258) 
Inflation -0.495 -0.621 -2.140*** 
 (-1.237) (-1.602) (-2.731) 
Short-term interest rate -0.931*** -0.945*** -1.982*** 
 (-2.733) (-2.861) (-3.062) 
Constant 0.156*** 0.142*** 0.347*** 
 (3.275) (2.947) (3.142) 
    
F test 44.2*** 37.7***  
Adjusted R squared 0.170 0.167  
Hausman p value 0.00*** 0.00***  
Wald test p value   0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)   0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  
 
0.127 
Sargan statistic  
 
0.00 
Observations 21,421 20,825 10,115 
Number of firms 7,654 7,420 4,157 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - as 
pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test statistic 
is not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, 
the variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the variables are set 
out in Table 3.8.  6 lags are used here to generate a satisfactory AR(2) statistic but the coefficients after lag 2 
are not shown – they were not statistically significant.  Fixed effects (1) excludes the lagged value of the 
dependent variable as an explanatory variable but is included in Fixed effects (2). 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 Managing information symmetry 
245 
 
Table 3.13 sets out the regression results of the test of hypothesis 3.  This suggests 
that there is a further reduction in gearing in the second year following the year of the 
financing deficit.  Here, the dependent variable is the change in gearing in the second 
year following the year of the financing deficit and the independent variables include 
the gearing at the end of the year of the year of the financing deficit as before.  The 
results support the hypothesis. 
 
Table 3.13 documents negative coefficients for the relationship between changes in 
gearing in the second year following the financing deficit year and gearing at the end 
of the year of the deficit and which is statistically significant in both fixed effects and 
system GMM.  The constant term is positive but not significant (although it is much 
smaller than the constant in Table 3.12). 
 
The coefficient of the market to book value ratio is positive and statistically significant 
(in system GMM) again contradicting the solution for the under-investment problem in 
Myers (1977). Little statistical significance for the other coefficients is found. 
 
These results suggest that there is further adjustment to capital structure that occurs 
in the second year after the year of the financing deficit.  If this behaviour is evidence 
of the company adjusting to its target gearing ratio, then the implication is that the 
process of adjustment is at least a full year in length. 
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Table 3.13 Determinants of changes in gearing in the second year following the 
financing deficit  
This table sets out the regression results of the change in gearing in the second year after the year 
in which the financing deficit is generated (dependent variable) against the variables in the left-hand 
column (hypothesis 3). 
Variables Fixed effects (1) Fixed effects (2) System 
GMM 
Change in net gearing after deficit year  -0.375*** -0.276***  
 (-16.72) (-11.23) 
Change in net gearing in the deficit year  
 
-0.153  
 
 
(-1.418) 
Net gearing at the end of the deficit year -0.120*** -0.226*** -0.0736**  
(-8.484) (-15.24) (-1.980) 
Market to book value ratio 0.00308 0.00488 0.00898**  
(1.053) (1.634) (2.298) 
Regulation dummy - - 0.0790  
 
 
(0.538) 
Abnormal earnings -0.00713 -0.00875 0.00233  
(-1.166) (-1.616) (0.322) 
Fixed asset ratio 0.0409 0.00659 0.0977  
(0.767) (0.130) (1.320) 
Net average asset life 0.000120 8.70e-05 0.000145  
(1.177) (0.706) (0.838) 
Natural logarithm of size -0.000124 0.00117 -0.00945  
(-0.0212) (0.194) (-0.750) 
Commercial paper dummy 0.00452 0.00222 -0.0349 
 (0.695) (0.347) (-0.946) 
Yield curve -0.320 -0.863* -0.737  
(-0.672) (-1.938) (-0.419) 
Bond spread 0.101 0.263 0.510  
(0.273) (0.731) (1.246) 
Inflation 0.622 0.490 0.788  
(1.410) (1.238) (0.881) 
Short-term interest rate 0.373 0.168 0.0187  
(1.018) (0.451) (0.0170) 
Constant 0.0214 0.0791 0.0351  
(0.409) (1.553) (0.567) 
F test 9.91*** 38.59***  
Adjusted R squared 0.0399 0.160  
Hausman p value 0.00*** 0.00***  
Wald test p value   0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)   0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)   0.71 
Sargan statistic   0.00 
Observations 18,570 18,570 18,061 
Number of firms 0.0214 0.0791 0.0250 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - as 
pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test statistic is 
not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, the 
variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the variables are set out in 
Table 3.8.  Fixed effects (1) excludes the lagged value of the dependent variable as an explanatory variable but is 
included in Fixed effects (2). 
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The tests of hypotheses 4 and 5 essentially repeat the two regressions above 
(hypotheses 2 and 3 respectively) but gearing at the end of the year of the financing 
deficit is omitted as an explanatory variable.  Hypotheses 4 and 5 are supported by 
the results. 
 
Table 3.14 reports the results of the test of hypothesis 4 that changes in gearing in the 
year following the year of the financing deficit are negatively related to the change in 
gearing during the year of the financing deficit (which in the sample selected is 
positive).  Here, it is not appropriate to include a further column of fixed effects results 
excluding the lagged value of the dependent variable since that is the subject of the 
hypothesis.  
 
Table 3.14 confirms the hypothesised negative relationship between changes in 
gearing in the year following the deficit and changes in gearing in the deficit year: the 
coefficient of changes in gearing in the deficit year is negative and significant.  This 
reversed the result in Table 3.12 where this coefficient was positive – the difference 
being the exclusion of gearing at the end of the year of the financing deficit (as an 
independent variable) which is negatively correlated with changes in gearing. 
 
The coefficient of the market to book value ratio is negative under the fixed effects 
estimator and positive under system GMM.  Here the two-year gap between the 
changes in gearing and the change in gearing in the deficit year is longer than in the 
previous hypotheses so the link between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables (with a lag of 2 years) is likely to be weakened.   
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These results are largely unexceptional except for the coefficient of abnormal earnings 
which is again negative as in Table 3.12, supporting the result there and suggesting 
that management appear to reduce gearing in the year after becoming aware of a 
pending upswing in earnings. 
 
Of the variables representing debt market conditions, all are significant under one (or 
more) of the estimators and three of them are positive contrary to the expectation.  
However, this result does not impact on the hypothesis. 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 3 Managing information symmetry 
249 
 
Table 3.14 Determinants of changes in gearing in the year after the year of the 
financing deficit 
This table sets out the regression results of the change in gearing after the year in which the financing 
deficit is generated (dependent variable) against the variables in the left-hand column (hypothesis 4). 
Variables Fixed effects System GMM 
Change in net gearing in the deficit year -0.287*** -0.0294* 
  (-11.30) (-1.945) 
Change in net gearing in the year preceding the deficit 
year 
 
-0.0484*** 
  
 
(-3.604) 
Market to book value ratio -0.00463*** 0.00280** 
  (-2.882) (1.972) 
Regulation dummy - 0.0867 
  
 
(1.451) 
Abnormal earnings -0.0112** -0.00840** 
  (-2.575) (-2.471) 
Fixed asset ratio -0.187*** -0.0298 
  (-5.020) (-0.674) 
Average asset life 7.84e-05** -1.97e-05 
 (2.133) (-0.319) 
Natural logarithm of size 0.0147*** -0.00242 
  (4.256) (-0.849) 
Yield curve -0.590* -0.287 
  (-1.787) (-1.354) 
Bond spread 0.520** 0.256* 
  (2.106) (1.751) 
Inflation 0.260 0.326** 
  (1.110) (2.189) 
Short-term interest rate 0.284 0.432** 
  (0.959) (2.310) 
Constant 0.0447 0.0222 
  (1.553) (1.056) 
F test 31.4***  
Adjusted R squared 0.045  
Hausman p value 0.00***  
Wald test p value  0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  0.88 
Sargan statistic  0.00 
Observations 32,435 16,297 
Number of firms 9,719 6,797 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - 
as pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test 
statistic is not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for 
collinearity, the variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the 
variables are set out in Table 3.8.   
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Table 3.15 sets out the regression results for the test of hypothesis 5 that changes in 
gearing in the second year following the year of the financing deficit will be negatively 
related to the changes in gearing in the year of the financing deficit.  The results 
support the hypothesis. 
 
Here, a further column of fixed effects results has been included which contains a 
once-lagged value of the dependent variable (in addition to the twice-lagged value 
which is the subject of the test). 
 
The results in Table 3.15 indicate that the coefficient of the change in gearing in the 
year of the financing deficit is negative and statistically significant (in fixed effects but 
not system GMM).  The coefficient of the change in gearing in the year following the 
year of the financing deficit is also negative and statistically significant (in both fixed 
effects and system GMM). 
 
The coefficient of the market to book value ratio is negative and significant under the 
fixed effects estimator but positive and significant under the system GMM estimator.   
 
Few of the other control variables provide statistically significant coefficients except 
for the average asset life which is positive but very small and economically 
insignificant.  Several of the variables representing debt market conditions have 
positive and significant coefficients as in Table 3.14. 
 
These results provide support for the idea that companies use short-term increases in 
gearing to finance investment and that such increases are reduced at least in part in 
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the following two-year period.  This is consistent with the idea of using bridge financing 
to manage problems of information asymmetry.  To be able to use bridge financing or 
other short-term financing, a company needs to be able to borrow sufficient to make 
the investment financed entirely with debt which suggests a conservative capital 
structure.  Such a capital structure would not be consistent with the trade-off theory 
which includes only tax and distress costs in the trade-off equilibrium. 
 
This conservative approach is consistent with results such as Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz 
and Williamson (1999) where firms that do not have the greatest access to capital 
(such as large firms and those with a credit rating which have ready access) hold 
higher ratios of cash (in proportion to total assets).  Such companies are managing 
their capital structure and access to capital in a way that reflects their need to be able 
to continue investing. 
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Table 3.15 Determinants of changes in gearing in the second year succeeding the 
year of the financing deficit  
This table sets out the regression results of the change in gearing in the second year after the year in 
which the financing deficit is generated (dependent variable) against the variables in the left-hand column 
(hypothesis 5). 
Variables Fixed effects 
(1) 
Fixed effects 
(2) 
System 
GMM 
Change in gearing in the year after the deficit year  -0.255*** -0.154*** 
   (-14.58) (-5.461) 
Change in gearing in the year of the deficit -0.209*** -0.287*** -0.0285  
(-7.764) (-11.35) (-1.151) 
Market to book value ratio -0.000432 -0.00190 0.00146  
(-0.262) (-1.146) (0.748) 
Regulation dummy - - (-1.151)  
 
 
-0.0237 
Abnormal earnings -0.00428 -0.00669 0.00435  
(-0.909) (-1.511) (1.103) 
Fixed asset ratio -0.0293 -0.0777** -0.0466  
(-0.798) (-2.093) (-1.059) 
Average asset life 9.54e-05** 0.000114** 7.09e-06  
(2.189) (2.437) (0.123) 
Natural logarithm of size 0.00305 0.00740** -1.03e-05  
(0.842) (1.984) (-0.00287) 
Commercial paper dummy -0.00532 -0.0105 -0.0129 
 (-0.834) (-1.612) (-0.966) 
Yield curve -0.388 -0.404 -0.440*  
(-1.138) (-1.210) (-1.806) 
Bond spread 0.150 0.267 0.273*  
(0.558) (1.011) (1.772) 
Inflation 0.524* 0.651** -0.266  
(1.660) (2.186) (-1.311) 
Short-term interest rate 0.235 0.413 0.0502  
(0.952) (1.622) (0.282) 
Constant 0.0286 0.0322 0.0318  
(0.917) (1.031) (1.221) 
F test 7.59*** 29.5*** 
 
Adjusted R squared 0.019 0.0815 
 
Hausman p value 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
Wald test p value  
 
0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  
 
0.00   
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  
 
0.19 
Sargan statistic  
 
0.00 
Observations 28,212 28,212 15,514 
Number of firms 8,565 8,565 6,413 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - as 
pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test statistic is 
not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, the 
variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the variables are set out in 
Table 3.8.  Fixed effects (1) excluded the lagged value of the dependent variable as an explanatory variable but is 
included in Fixed effects (2).  
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3.6 Conclusions 
The contributions identified in this Chapter are listed at the beginning of this Chapter 
and in Chapter 1.  Here, the main findings are presented more briefly with more 
emphasis on the empirical tests conducted. 
 
The key contribution is to show i) that transfers in value from debt-holders is not 
sustainable as a strategy since debt investors will react to a strategy that seek to 
disadvantage them by demanding either higher returns or greater restrictions on the 
company or both; and ii) that information asymmetry that restricts the issue of new 
shares (at a price that represents an under-valuation) can be managed by using a 
number of alternatives to conventional debt such as bridge financing in a way that 
removes the rationale for the pecking order theory.  This result is supported 
empirically.  
 
It is also shown that the over-investment problem is the converse of the under-
investment problem in the sense that under-investment can occur because of the 
possible transfer of value from shareholders to debt-holders and that over-investment 
can occur where the reverse transfer (from debt-holders to shareholders) can 
subsidise a negative present value investment opportunity.   
 
One of the methods proposed in Chapter 2 to reverse or recapture a transfer of value 
(from shareholders to debt-holders) is to increase gearing after investment in a way 
that reduces the value of pre-investment debt.  This creates a transfer of value that if 
it were large enough could create the circumstances of the over-investment problem.  
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This is a simple way of creating the circumstances of the over-investment problem 
without resorting to asset substitution as in Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
 
This suggests that a strategy that companies should pursue to maximise shareholder 
value is to implement value transfers from debt-holders to shareholders.  However, it 
is demonstrated by a simple experiment that investors will be able to detect such 
behaviour and will respond appropriately.  Investors learn about the behaviour of 
management that seeks to deceive investors as in the experiment performed to test 
the ability of subjects (Masters students) to learn about the veracity of statements 
made by management.  There is clear evidence of learning – the subjects identify the 
behaviour of management teams seeking to mislead investors and respond 
appropriately.   
 
This reaction will not be beneficial for the company or its shareholders.  It might restrict 
access to debt and such restriction might represent a serious competitive 
disadvantage – this is not in the interests of management where there are advantages 
for managers associated with being able to raise debt easily and cheaply to compete 
as buyers in competitive auctions for the sale of companies.  These advantages are 
discussed more fully in Chapter 4.  There is also the possibility that debt investors 
seek a higher rate of return for the perceived risk. 
 
Given such advantages, it is unlikely that companies will adopt a policy to deceive debt 
investors.  Indeed, this analysis suggests that the companies should take steps to 
assure debt investors of their intentions to respect their rights and to protect their 
investment so that the cost of debt is minimised and a good way to achieve this is with 
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a policy that maintains a stable capital structure with only temporary deviations from 
such a policy.  Managers should adopt a policy of signalling to investors their intention 
to behave in a way that prejudices neither debt-holders nor shareholders.  This will 
reduce the risk of debt investors seeking a premium cost of debt to compensate for 
any perceived risk of value transfers. 
 
The technique of deceiving the debt investors is an example of information asymmetry 
– the problem that motivates the pecking order theory.  The preference implied in the 
pecking order theory is that management are unwilling to issue shares at a time when 
the issue price of the shares does not reflect the management’s view of their value.  
To avoid this problem, the pecking order theory suggests that the company will prefer 
to finance with debt. 
 
This Chapter identifies one group of companies for whom new issues of equity are not 
needed other than for acquisitions: these are the self-sustaining companies.  It could 
be argued that such companies provide evidence for the pecking order theory in that 
they make no equity issues and are self-sustaining in terms of generating capital for 
investment without the need to issue equity.  No problems of information asymmetry 
arise as these companies simply have modest requirements for new capital which is 
the direct consequence of modest growth and that such requirements can be satisfied 
by a combination of retained profits and increased debt (generated by increases in 
retained profits and at the same time) without increasing overall gearing.  A simple 
model demonstrates that given some basic assumptions, modest growth rates can be 
sustained without raising new equity.  These companies are labelled self-sustainers – 
they can develop without requiring access to equity although that might be needed for 
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large investments such as acquisitions.  The absence of a need for equity does not 
provide support for the pecking order theory since their capital structure policy is to 
maintain a constant ratio of debt to equity. 
 
Solutions are presented that are alternatives to the debt solution proposed in Myers 
and Majluf (1984). These solutions include the use of debt financing on a short-term 
bridge basis – i.e. to enable the investment to be pursued prior to resolution of the 
information asymmetry that would damage the interests of the company: there is an 
overlap between this solution and the pecking order prediction for a preference for 
debt over equity since the bridge finance option involves using debt.  However, in the 
solution proposed, bridge financing is temporary with the objective of refinancing at a 
time when the information asymmetry problem has been resolved.  
 
The solutions proposed resolve the problems raised in the justification for the pecking 
order theory and allow the company to pursue capital structure choices in an 
unconstrained manner subject to one qualification.  If a company wishes to have the 
option to use bridge financing when faced with a situation of information asymmetry, 
then it must have a balance sheet that can support the amount of debt that might be 
envisaged in such an investment opportunity or acquisition.  This provides an 
explanation for capital structure that does not exploit to the full the potential to reduce 
tax by maximising interest payments.  A conservative balance sheet is needed to 
provide a platform for substantial short-term debt financing. 
 
This analysis shows that the motivation for the pecking order theory of capital structure 
is limited to a preference for short-term bridge financing (as one of several possible 
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financing solutions).  The company is free to pursue any long-term capital structure 
policy without any preference for debt over equity or vice versa. 
 
This Chapter also reports empirical results for a sample of companies with both 
positive financing deficits and increases in gearing (in the same year).  These results 
document changes in gearing in the years following the year of the financing deficit.  
The results indicate that in each of the two years following the year of the financing 
deficit, there are reductions in gearing.  This suggests that such companies are 
adopting increases in gearing in the year when the financing deficit arises but that 
such increases are temporary as there are reductions in each of the two following 
years. 
 
This supports the idea that companies use short-term bridging finance which is then 
refinanced.  This is consistent with one of the solutions proposed to manage 
information asymmetry.  The solutions proposed to manage information asymmetry 
and the empirical results obviate the need for the pecking order explanation of capital 
structure.  
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Appendix to Chapter 3: Derivation of the expression for the rate of growth of a 
self-sustaining capital structure 
 
Derivation of the growth rate formula for self-sustainers (companies that can finance 
their growth by maintaining a constant capital structure and generating additional 
capital from retained profits and additional debt that is associated with the retained 
profits by maintaining a constant gearing ratio.  The self-sustaining growth rate is 
given by the following formula: 
(1-Po).(WACC – Kd(1 – t).G)/(1-G)  
Where: 
WACC = weighted average cost of capital; 
Po = pay-out ratio to equity holders; 
t = corporate tax rate; 
G = gearing based on market values;  
Kd = cost of debt; and, for convenience in the manipulation of expressions, let EV = 
enterprise value (sum of the market value of debt and equity). 
 
Income after tax but before interest will be given by the product of the enterprise value 
and the weighted average cost of capital = EV x WACC.  The interest cost will be given 
by the product of the amount of debt (itself the product of the enterprise value and the 
gearing) and the interest rate which net of tax will amount to: EV.G.Kd.(1-t).  Hence 
the net income to equity holders is given by: total income less the net of tax cost of 
interest = EV.WACC – EV.G.Kd.(1-t)  = 
EV.(WACC - G.Kd.(1-t)) 
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If it is assumed that a proportion Po of the net profits are paid out as dividend, then 
the amount retained will be given by: 
(1 – Po).EV.(WACC - G.Kd.(1-t)).   
This amount will generate some additional debt such that the additional debt maintains 
the same gearing ratio as the pre-investment gearing ratio.  If the additional debt so 
generated amounts to ΔD then the gearing ratio calculated by reference to the new 
investment will be additional debt/(additional debt + retained profits) = G which can be 
expressed as:  
ΔD/(ΔD + retained profits) = G which is easily reorganised to give: 
ΔD = retained profits.G/(1 – G)  
and the total amount invested will be given by: 
ΔD + retained profits = retained profits.(1 + G/(1 – G)) = retained profits/(1 – G) 
Hence the incremental gross profits in the year following the year in which the retained 
profits are generated will be the additional amounts earned on the new investment (the 
product of WACC and the incremental investment) which will be: 
WACC.retained profits/(1 – G)  
and the growth rate will be the incremental profits divided by the previous year’s gross 
income which is EV.WACC 
Hence growth is given by: 
(WACC x (1 – Po).EV.(WACC – G.Kd.(1-t))/(1 – G))(EV.WACC) which simplifies to the 
expression above.   
Growth in the equity income will be given by the same formula. 
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CHAPTER 4 A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, the impact of the personal objectives of managers on capital structure 
decisions is examined including strategic considerations such as the relevant position 
of the company in relation to the structure of competitors in the sector in which the 
company operates and the feasibility of growing by acquisition.  The title of this 
Chapter refers to the impact on capital structure of a desire by management to be able 
to make acquisitions.  Managers have an interest in expanding by acquisition which is 
facilitated by a conservative balance sheet. 
 
The research question addressed in this chapter investigates how the ambitions of 
managers to grow their company by acquisition impact on the decisions they take 
regarding their choice of capital structure.  In particular, the impact of the competitive 
structure or degree of concentration of the sector in which a company operates on a 
company’s capital structure is examined.   
 
The conclusions of Chapter 2 suggest that transfers of value from shareholders to 
debt-holders can be reversed by subsequent adjustments to capital structure.  But in 
Chapter 3, it was shown that transfers from debt-holders to shareholders could lead 
to investors requiring higher returns for the risk which would increase the company’s 
cost of debt.  To avoid such an outcome, companies can adopt a capital structure 
policy that aims to maintain a constant gearing ratio.  Such a policy addresses agency 
costs but provides no guidance as to the level at which the constant gearing ratio 
should be set.   
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The analysis in Chapter 3 in relation to asymmetric information problems identified 
several techniques to manage this problem one of which is the use of bridge financing 
thus providing no support for the pecking order theory.  Bridge financing requires a 
balance sheet with unused borrowing capacity – reserve borrowing capacity.  This 
strategy does provide some guidance on the level at which the gearing ratio should be 
set.  This suggests that companies should not be aiming at the gearing level implied 
by the trade-off theory. 
 
This Chapter extends the rationale for companies to maintain reserve borrowing 
capacity by considering a company’s interest in being able to acquire other companies.  
It is shown that managers have an incentive to pursue acquisitive growth strategies as 
this has two important benefits: first, an expanding company pays expanding salaries 
and other personal benefits: Conyon and Murphy (2000) document a positive 
relationship between company size and the compensation of the chief executive 
officer; and secondly, by acquiring other companies and expanding, managers reduce 
the chances of their employing company being acquired and thereby reduce the risk 
of career damaging events associated with being an acquisition target of a larger 
company and becoming a source of cost-cutting after acquisition. 
 
There is a further benefit for chief executive officers as they are usually paid a cash 
bonus for completing an acquisition transaction as reported in Grinstein and Hribar 
(2004).   
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Management interest in expanding or empire building is not necessarily beneficial for 
shareholders.  There is evidence that acquisitions do not always generate positive 
returns for the acquirer’s shareholders: Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003), 
identify substantial negative announcement returns and substantial losses for large 
acquiring firms, especially for acquisitions occurring after 1997. 
 
A strategy to grow by acquisition is facilitated by reserve borrowing power enabling 
the company to use bridge financing in an acquisition scenario.  This strategy avoids 
the risk of being unable to make an equity issue (either at all or quickly enough) at the 
time of an acquisition or finding that at the time of acquisition, a competitor company 
without the need to issue equity can appear to be a more desirable suitor for the target 
company and thereby reduce the chances of success for a company needing to issue 
shares. 
 
This approach implies that capital structure is it not solely a question of balancing tax 
shelter against financial distress costs as in the trade-off theory.  The capital structure 
decision is more complex and involves several additional considerations including the 
relative strategic position of the company within the sector in which it operates as well 
as the personal objectives of managers who have an interest in growing the scale of 
the company by acquisition which can be facilitated by a capital structure that supports 
bridge financing and hence requires reserve borrowing capacity (the ability to increase 
borrowings significantly for a short-term period until refinancing can be completed).   
 
The incremental contributions of this Chapter show that: 
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• management have an incentive to engage in empire building for two reasons: first, 
a bigger company leads to bigger remuneration; and secondly, growing larger 
reduces the risk of becoming a target for a competitor that grows faster (with the 
downside of management of the acquired company becoming a cost saving with 
obvious implications for personal welfare); 
 
• to be successful in making acquisitions, buyers must compete with other potential 
purchasers: this process is facilitated by a balance sheet that can provide financing 
for acquisitions easily and quickly.  Bridge financing (described in Chapter 3 as a 
tool to manage problems with asymmetric information) can be deployed quickly to 
finance acquisitions providing the balance sheet is sufficiently conservative to 
support the debt; 
 
• company gearing will reflect a company’s acquisition ambitions and the availability 
of opportunities in the sector in which it operates: so, in a highly fragmented sector, 
company gearing is likely to be low to provide the platform to launch acquisitions 
and vice versa; 
 
• thus, company gearing is related to measures of concentration of other companies 
in the sector in which it operates.  This is a factor that is external to the company 
but affects its decisions about capital structure.  This provides an additional factor 
that explains capital structure decisions.  A measure of concentration is developed 
to assess the ability of a company to finance acquisitions which combines size and 
balance sheet – the firepower index – derived from the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index; 
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• the hypothesised relationship is tested empirically using firepower (and more 
conventional measures of concentration using market values and sales) and both 
gearing and relative gearing (gearing relative to the other companies in the sector).  
The results provide support for the hypothesised positive relationship between 
company gearing (and relative gearing) and the firepower measure of 
concentration in the sector in which the company operates. 
 
Section 2 discusses the impact of the following strategic factors on capital structure 
decisions: liquidity; flexibility; acquisitions; management remuneration and personal 
objectives; and competition.  In section 3 a particular strategic factor, firepower, is 
developed.  Firepower is a measure that seeks to combine the impact of the relative 
market power and financial power of the companies operating in a sector.  It is based 
on the Hirschman-Herfindahl (HH) measure of concentration and is calculated using 
a measure that incorporates both the company’s size and its capital structure (this is 
the best measure of firepower).  HH measures are also calculated using market values 
and market shares.  Conclusions are in section 4. 
 
4.2  Strategic advantages of debt 
 
4.2.1 Literature review 
Frank and Goyal (2008) ask why debt was used prior to the introduction of corporation 
tax in the United States?  Their question is simply that as tax shelter did not exist prior 
to the creation of corporation tax, why did companies borrow at all?  This question 
suggests that tax is a major driver for borrowing as it generates a tax shield. Graham 
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(1996, 1996a, 1996b, 1999, 2000, 2003 and 2006) studies this problem in the context 
of marginal tax rates and concludes that companies with high marginal tax rates tend 
to issue more debt – see also Graham and Tucker (2006).   
 
However, Graham and Leary (2011) surveys empirical capital structure research and 
in respect of tax, highlight the problem that companies do not always use the amount 
of debt implied by the trade-off model.  Even allowing for non-income statement items 
such as pension costs, capital expenditure or the exercise of stock options (see 
Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010) and Graham, Lang and Shackleford (2005)), the 
incremental tax benefits of higher gearing appear to be substantial suggesting that 
debt and tax shelter is not being traded off against the costs of default.  Similarly, 
Strebulaev and Yang (2012) document that between 1962 and 2009, on average 
10.2% of large US firms have zero debt and almost 22% have less than 5% gearing 
(based on book values). These results imply that for at least some companies there is 
significant reserve borrowing capacity which is consistent with the idea of managing 
capital structure in a way that facilitates the availability of bridge financing and does 
not support the trade-off theory.   
 
The negative relationship between profitability and gearing is also presented as 
evidence that does not support the trade-off model.  Frank and Goyal (2015) describe 
this inverse relationship as a serious defect (for the trade-off model) and offer a simple 
explanation that when profitability rises, share prices rise and companies borrow to 
retire equity and vice versa thus generating the observed negative relationship.   
 
Chapter 4 A Strategic Approach to Capital Structure 
266 
 
Regardless of tax shelter, debt is very useful for managing liquidity.  Cash flows are 
not predictable with precision.  Therefore, a company needs to manage its cash flows 
with a margin for error.  This safety margin could be financed by equity, but it would 
be costly.  The problem with liquidity management is that the company needs a safety 
margin so access to cash must be available although it might not be used.  If this 
safety margin were to be funded with equity, it would be necessary to pay the cost of 
equity for this capital for all time even if the cash were deposited in a bank.  This would 
reduce the overall return earned by the company although it would also reduce risk.  
The deposit rate for these funds would not be as high as an investment made by the 
investor in a bond issued by the company or other comparable fixed income 
investment.  The company would need to deposit surplus cash in a way which provided 
immediate access – as a result, the interest rate earned would not be high.   
 
The problem the company needs to solve is to minimize the cost of financing variations 
in working capital requirements.  As an alternative to bank deposits, the company 
could purchase treasury bills or other securities but to obtain immediate cash, sales of 
these securities would necessitate transaction costs and reduce the amount earned.  
It is more cost effective if the financing shortfall can be covered by bank finance or 
other capital market debt instruments than to employ equity capital for such a purpose.  
There is also a maturity impact.  The expected period of the shortfall will also affect 
the company’s decision as to how it should be covered.  A permanent shortfall might 
need to be covered by equity capital but occasional shortfalls (such as working capital 
variations) can be more easily and efficiently accommodated using banking facilities 
with short-term maturities. 
 
Chapter 4 A Strategic Approach to Capital Structure 
267 
 
Debt and equity have important differences.  Perhaps the most obvious is that debt 
must be repaid – it is not permanent capital as is equity capital.  Debt can take on the 
characteristics of permanence if there is confidence that debt can be refinanced.  If 
there is certainty that debt can always be replaced with new debt, then it could be 
reasonably regarded as permanent.  But such certainty does not exist.  There is always 
some risk associated with the refinancing of debt.  This means that debt must be 
managed by companies in a manner that ensures that the refinancing risk is 
reasonable which can be achieved by a modest level of gearing that provides flexibility 
to the borrower. 
 
One way to manage this risk is to spread maturities of debt over time.  In this way, all 
a company's borrowings will not mature at a single point in time.  This makes the 
refinancing task more easily achievable.  By reducing the proportion of total debt that 
falls to be refinanced in any one year, the risk of a problem in the debt markets in any 
one year affecting the ability of the company to refinance is reduced.  The actual 
spread of maturities selected will also depend on the nature of any funding shortfall 
expected over time.  The diversification of debt maturities benefits lenders which are 
also exposed to refinancing risk and for the borrower also spreads interest rate risk 
over different maturities. 
 
Warner (1977) points out that larger firms are less exposed to default risk and hence 
are likely to be able to borrow more and so have better access to debt capital.  
Faulkner and Petersen (2006) provide evidence that firms with better access to public 
debt markets generally have higher gearing ratios: they show that when they create a 
proxy for the company’s access to debt markets (by attempting to measure its visibility 
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to capital markets) that the inclusion of this proxy in the regression renders the size 
effect insignificant.  This suggests that access is linked closely to size.  So, access is 
enhanced by size and therefore growing a company by acquisition increases size and 
therefore access to debt markets which facilitates further acquisitions.  This enhanced 
access is a further benefit to management of increased scale.  Li, Carline and Farag 
(2016) report that larger and better performing firms are particularly likely to undertake 
repeat acquisitions. 
 
For a highly geared company, an additional debt issue may not be easy to arrange – 
the contractual arrangements with existing lender might have to be renegotiated (to 
overcome limitations or restrictions in such agreements) or even refinanced in extreme 
cases.  Here, monitoring by new lenders would be intense.  But for a large lowly-
geared company, large amounts of additional debt can usually be comfortably 
arranged. 
 
A company wishing to maintain its ability to mount a significant acquisition at relatively 
short notice and without the complication of an equity issue would aim to ensure that 
it can arrange large debt facilities at short notice.  The need to enter an acquisition 
auction and at the same time avoid possible difficulties with an equity issue timetable 
means that a company needs to maintain a balance sheet that provides a substantial 
margin of unused or reserve borrowing capacity.  Uysal (2011) finds that firms that are 
more highly geared relative to their target gearing are less likely to make acquisitions 
and less likely to use cash.  Uysal (2011) also documents that firms adjust their gearing 
more quickly when they are highly geared than when they have lower gearing and that 
high gearing is an impediment to making acquisitions.   
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The availability of cash to acquirers affects their acquisition strategy.  Harford (1999) 
reports that cash-rich firms are more likely than others to attempt acquisitions and that 
acquisitions by cash-rich firms are followed by abnormal declines in operating 
performance.  Bates (2005) examines companies that make sales of subsidiaries to 
investigate how the proceeds of sale are utilised and finds that such firms invest at a 
greater rate compared to an industry benchmark.  The proceeds are more likely to be 
reinvested than distributed to shareholders allowing the firm to bypass external capital 
markets which would necessitate greater scrutiny.  This suggests that access to capital 
is an important strategic factor in financing acquisitions. 
 
Harford, Klasa and Walcott (2009) studies large acquisitions (at least 20 per cent of 
the size of the purchaser) and the impact on capital structure reporting that where the 
purchaser pays cash, that there is a significant increase in gearing beyond the 
estimated target gearing ratio.  They also report that purchasers reduce this deviation 
from target in the years following acquisition and that more than 75 per cent of the 
deviation is reduced within 5 years of the acquisition.  This behaviour is consistent with 
the argument presented here that to be able to make acquisitions, companies need to 
manage their capital structure strategically. 
 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) construct a model that incorporates flexibility with 
long-run low levels of gearing where debt issues are temporary deviations from target 
to meet unanticipated investment needs explaining why profitable firms pay dividends 
and maintain low gearing despite the tax benefits of debt.  A similar model is described 
in DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Whited (2011). 
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This strategic approach enables the company to finance an acquisition with debt at 
short notice by utilizing access to debt which is quick, and which may represent an 
advantage compared to a competitor.  Financing in this way enables the company to 
refinance after completing the acquisition and such refinancing could then involve 
equity at a convenient time.  Such an equity issue could return the company to its long 
run target capital structure which might include maintaining reserve or unused 
borrowing capacity.  The lenders need to consider the refinancing risk which will be 
included in their assessment of the overall risks.  Bridge finance for acquisitions is 
usually provided by a small group of banks on a short-term basis which makes the 
arrangement process efficient and fast avoiding the marketing of debt or equity 
securities to investors in the public markets. 
 
Other evidence for increases in gearing around the time of acquisition includes Ghosh 
and Jain (2000) who report that the average gearing of the combined entity (post-
merger) is greater than the gearing of the two companies prior to the merger.  They 
suggest that this demonstrates an increase in debt capacity which is likely given the 
increase in size, but it also signifies the use of debt to make the acquisition to avoid 
problems of information asymmetry in a way that is consistent with the idea of using 
debt either temporarily or permanently. 
 
Refinancing risk is considered by short-term lenders considering supplying bridge 
finance so the borrower’s ability to access longer term financing is important.  A visit 
to the capital markets amounts to a monitoring event as described in Easterbook 
(1984) commenting on dividends and their impact.  Capital market access is facilitated 
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by companies being well known to e.g. bond investors.  It is much easier to sell new 
bonds to investors who already know the company.  So, it is helpful if a company is a 
regular issuer in the capital markets.  The regular issue of bonds and other instruments 
can facilitate subsequent capital market activity.  A further factor is that the 
arrangement of debt capital is made easier if the borrower has low gearing otherwise 
the arrangement of additional debt may not be so straightforward, and it may take 
longer to find the providers.  Low gearing is important as additional debt can create a 
conflict with existing lenders for example in the contractual protections in the loan 
agreements such as negative pledges or other restrictions on further borrowing.  Low 
levels of gearing are consistent with low levels of protections for lenders thus 
facilitating bridge financing: Billett, King and Mauer (2007) report that covenant 
protection increases with growth opportunities, debt maturity and gearing 
 
For reserve borrowing capacity to be effective and therefore valuable, several 
requirements must be satisfied: 
 
1. amount: sufficient to make a substantial acquisition (where "substantial" is 
measured in terms of the size of the company and in terms of the potential 
candidates for such an acquisition – possibly other companies in the sector); 
 
2. speed: the reserve borrowing capacity should be easy to arrange – this is facilitated 
where credit quality of the new facilities would be good; 
 
3. such additional facilities should be able to be arranged without causing any conflict 
with existing borrowing arrangements and loan covenants; and 
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4. it should be apparent to outsiders that such debt is readily available – so the 
balance sheet will provide the necessary signal and reassurance to vendors. 
 
If a company had such reserve borrowing capacity, then it would be a potential 
purchaser should a company become available for acquisition.  This is particularly 
important if that opportunity had strategic advantages and/or was available at an 
attractive price.  For a different company in that sector without that reserve borrowing 
capacity – perhaps a company with much greater gearing – then it could be at a 
strategic disadvantage in terms of competing in the auction to buy the target.  The 
more highly geared company would not be able to compete as strongly with the 
company with the reserve borrowing capacity.  This disadvantage could be highly 
costly.  Missing out on an opportunity to make a significant acquisition could affect the 
long-term value of the business and could affect management prospects significantly. 
 
In summary, the ideal strategic position for a company is to have immediate or rapid 
access to substantial capital resources.  Although the company usually can issue 
equity, access varies over time and may be constrained by issues of information 
asymmetry.  Also, there are time constraints in that equity issues still take some time 
to arrange – more than for simple debt raising.  As an alternative, the ability to fund a 
substantial acquisition entirely with debt with a view to subsequent refinancing (with 
debt and/or equity) can provide rapid access to capital without the uncertainty or time 
constraints associated with equity issues.  It should also be borne in mind that 
acquisitions sometimes become available at times when trading is poor and equity 
markets are not in a condition to provide equity as readily as at other times.  So, equity 
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might not be available, or it might be available at a cost that the company considers 
too high.  Hence at such times, debt, if it is available, is clearly a superior option.  So, 
access to debt capital can be ensured when the company has low levels of gearing 
and the debt is provided in a way which does not impose onerous constraints 
(restrictive loan covenants) on the company's ability to pursue its strategic objectives.   
 
This approach can be considered in terms of options – DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Whited (2011) consider the option to issue debt in their model of transitory debt.  
Where the company has access to substantial finance resources, it has an option to 
access capital that enables it to compete more effectively in the market place for 
opportunistic acquisitions or other investments.  This is a valuable option.  Such value 
could be computed by considering the possible additional value an acquisition might 
generate (the present value of synergies less the premium paid over the standalone 
value for the target) or the additional value that might accrue to managers via agency 
costs.   
 
These considerations dictate a low gearing policy.  The strategic approach requires 
there to be unused debt capacity.  The bridge finance is debt, but this does not argue 
in favour of the pecking order theory since the bridge is constructed with refinancing 
in mind: the refinancing could be all debt, all equity or a combination and it could be 
arranged in stages over time as in Harford, Klasa and Walcott (2009).   
 
The strategic approach also contradicts the trade-off theory as it implies that the 
balance sheet is under-geared as discussed above, see Shivdasani and Stefanescu 
(2010) and Graham, Lang and Shackleford (2005), in that it could support more debt 
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(since it can support a bridge) that would generate further tax shelter implying also 
that the strategic advantages of the availability of the bridge finance option must be as 
valuable as the tax shelter foregone.   
 
This approach to balance sheet management is perhaps more important at times when 
a sector has not yet reached maturity and when there are more acquisition 
opportunities.  At sector maturity, there will still be acquisition opportunities but there 
are likely to be more during the earlier stages of sector consolidation.  The stage of 
sector consolidation may affect the capital structure decision. 
 
4.2.2 Personal motives of management 
The pecking order and trade-off theories take no direct account of the personal 
objectives of management.  The managers that are relevant are those individuals 
inside the company that control or influence policy decisions on capital structure – 
usually the most senior executives and directors.  However, the arguments presented 
here apply to varying extents to other layers of management with influence.   
 
Agency costs are associated with the role of managers who do not have identical 
interests to the shareholders – such managers are not significant shareholders.  
Jensen (1986a and 1986b) discusses the agency costs associated with free cash flow 
in the context of acquisitions.  The differences in interests between managers and 
shareholders can impact on capital structure decisions.  Jensen (1986b) mentions the 
use of debt in constraining such costs by committing the company to debt service but 
this is a solution under the control of those needing to be controlled.  Low gearing will 
not provide the necessary control. 
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Guney and Ozkan (2005) report on the negative relationship between management 
share ownership and debt maturity.  As they also report debt maturity as being highly 
correlated to gearing, there is an implied negative relationship between management 
ownership and gearing.  Friend and Lang (1988) show that where managers have a 
degree of control (as defined as the managers having a shareholding above the 
median of 13%) then such companies tend to have lower book gearing ratios.  This 
supports the hypothesis that shareholding managers prefer less gearing to more. 
 
The remuneration and financial interests of managers is different to those of 
shareholders.  This is acknowledged in the manner of structuring remuneration for 
non-shareholding managers.  Share options are designed as an incentive for 
managers that aligns their interests more closely with the interests of shareholders.  
Similarly, annual bonuses linked to a performance metric such as earnings per share 
or growth in such parameters are intended to link management rewards to variables 
which enhance shareholder value.  These arrangements attempt to close the gap 
between the interests of shareholders and the interests of managers that can 
otherwise give rise to agency costs. 
 
However, the gap is not easy to close.  While individual circumstances can vary, two 
types of manager can be considered.  First, the manager with no direct or underlying 
financial interest in the company – i.e. only share options; and secondly, the manager 
with a significant shareholding in the company. 
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In the latter case, if the manager's shareholding represents a substantial proportion of 
his total wealth, perhaps because his shareholding arose because of building the 
business and so he has no other wealth, then from a portfolio risk management 
perspective, it would be sensible for that manager to adopt a low risk policy to manage 
his wealth.  A large shareholding in a single stock has no diversification and spreading 
risk is difficult.  An obvious strategy is to avoid introducing additional financial risk 
through gearing.  The manager with a substantial investment in his employing 
company has an incentive to minimize financial risk to a level that compensates for 
the lack of diversification. 
 
For the first group of managers, those without substantial shareholdings but with share 
options, the analysis is slightly different.  If the share options are significantly valuable 
(e.g. deeply in the money) then the manager may take a view that is like the managers 
in the second group.  But if the share options have yet to achieve value beyond their 
value at issue (say where the exercise price is close to the current share price) then 
the manager may consider the following analysis more appropriate.  Suppose the 
manager's compensation package comprises those elements set out in the following 
Table.  This is an illustration since individual remuneration packages vary.  However, 
the approach can be applied to most remuneration packages. 
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Table 4.1 Welfare components for a manager with share options  
This table sets out the benefits included in the compensation package for a 
manager with a description of the factors affecting the value of each component 
Component of remuneration Factors affecting component 
value 
Share options: granted as a multiple of salary at 
the current share price 
Granted over time with 
restrictions on vesting and 
exercise 
 
Value of options based on an option pricing model 
taking account of volatility estimates, the term to 
exercise, and exercise price equal to the share 
price at issue, dividends and the risk-free rate 
Option value = function of the 
exercise price, share price, 
volatility, term, dividend yield 
and the risk-free rate subject 
to restrictions on exercise 
 
Pension benefits – to be received at a future date Value is a function of current 
salary and prospects for 
future growth 
 
 
 
The main components of the compensation packages that are available for the 
manager are set out in Table 4.1, above.  The valuation of those benefits involves 
applying a suitable discount rate after making some assumptions about growth in 
salary.  This analysis will also need to consider the risk of financial distress.  For a 
given level of salary, lower risks of distress will increase the manager’s welfare. If 
financial distress occurs, there may need to be a restructuring, or the company may 
be forced to accept a takeover to avoid financial distress later.  In both situations, there 
could be career damage for managers leading to a loss of welfare.   
 
The literature supports this argument: Gilson (1989) presents evidence showing that 
managers of financially distressed firms are more likely to lose their jobs and that such 
managers are not able to find new employment quickly in the three years after the 
event of distress.  This is the perception that will encourage managers to prefer less 
gearing to more. 
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Also, managers view the loss of reputation or credibility as a significant financial blow.  
There is the loss of prestige, standing, social position etc.  These are significant 
disadvantages which go beyond financial losses and are difficult to quantify.  They 
provide more encouragement to the executive to prefer low gearing to high gearing.  
This is a behavioural issue and there is evidence that there are behavioural aspects 
influencing takeover activity.  Roll (1986) developed the hubris hypothesis to explain 
the poor returns reported by acquirers (see Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003)).  
The explanation in Roll (1986) is that of overconfidence which was developed further 
in Malmendier and Tate (2005) in the context of corporate investment showing that 
managerial over-confidence leads to over-investment when they have abundant 
internal cash but curtail investment when they require external financing.  This 
approach was extended to acquisitions in Malmendier and Tate (2008) where they 
report that over-confident managers pursued acquisitions that destroyed value and 
that such behaviour was facilitated by cash and untapped debt capacity. 
 
These incentives are neatly summarised in the phrase “eat or be eaten” (see the title 
of Gorton, Kahl and Rosen (2009)). 
 
The behavioural approach was extended in Aktas, de Bodt, Bollaert and Roll (2016) 
where narcissistic tendencies of the chief executive officer were linked to acquisition 
activity.  Narcissism (measured as a function of the number of times the first person 
singular pronoun appears in speeches by the chief executive officer) although linked 
to overconfidence is different.  They found that shareholders in the acquirer (with a 
narcissistic chief executive officer) reacted less favourably to takeover 
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announcements suggesting a market perception equivalent to over-confidence: they 
also found that narcissistic chief executive officers are also marginally more likely to 
initiate deals.   
 
The discussion above has been aimed at full-time managers.  There are non-executive 
or independent directors present on company boards with a corporate governance 
role.  These individuals do not have any interest in recommending increasing gearing 
if it puts the company at higher risk of financial distress.  The independent directors 
have no shares and their remuneration is not linked to the company performance (by 
share options or bonuses).  Their objectives will be to avoid risk and so they will not 
be uncomfortable with modest levels of gearing.  Kolasinski and Li (2013) provide 
evidence that the presence of strong and independent boards helps constrain the 
enthusiasm of over-confident chief executive officers when making acquisition 
decisions. 
 
Employees clearly prefer less gearing to more as less financial risk avoids risking their 
jobs.  The influence of employees on the capital structure decision is much weaker 
than that of managers unless there is collective action or pressure that can be brought 
to bear. 
 
The arguments above demonstrate that executives should prefer less gearing to more.  
But the analysis needs to include the impact of acquisitions on the managers’ utility.  
The scope for consolidation within a sector depends on several factors including the 
stage of development reached.  In the early years of development within a sector, 
Chapter 4 A Strategic Approach to Capital Structure 
280 
 
consolidation is more likely but slows as maturity is reached.  The process of 
consolidation can impact on managers’ welfare directly. 
 
If a company has the resources to make acquisitions, then it is more likely to grow 
faster than those companies unable to compete in the market for corporate control.  
There are two important consequences for managers: first, when acquisitions occur, 
the acquirer gets bigger and so the responsibilities of the managers also increase as 
do their salaries and hence their eligibility for further share option entitlements.  Also, 
by increasing in size, the company increases its prospects of generating synergies 
and the greater scale makes further progress and acquisitions more likely. 
 
Secondly, for those companies that are less able to make acquisitions because of a 
restricted balance sheet caused by higher gearing, they may become targets of 
acquirers.  For the manager of such a company, being taken over may generate some 
value in terms of share options but it may also lead to being part of the cost savings 
that generate value for the acquirer.  Managers in the target company may get fired.  
So, there are some negative aspects for the managers of those companies that are at 
greater risk of acquisitive action.  They may suffer career damage as has already been 
argued.  Aktas, de Bodt, Bollaert and Roll (2016) report that acquisition targets with 
narcissistic chief executive officers secure higher bid premia suggesting that such 
managers demand extra compensation for the damage to their ego associated with a 
loss of control. 
 
Managers must also consider the impact of competition in the marketplace between 
companies and its impact on their personal position.  If a company chooses to adopt 
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an aggressive pricing strategy or increases competition in other ways, those 
companies with stronger balance sheets are better able to withstand such action and 
so the managers’ utility will be greater.  To the extent that such action can damage 
another company, the managers in that other company will suffer a loss of personal 
utility whereas the company causing the damage will be strengthened by the 
weakening of a competitor and so its managers will also benefit. 
 
Another way to express this is that managers prefer to work in larger companies or 
companies that can get larger rather than in small companies that may exist only to 
make large companies larger. 
 
The effects of these factors are summarised in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 Comparative analysis of management utility or welfare  
This table sets out a comparison of the benefits or welfare factors for managers 
employed by non-large companies with higher gearing than a large company with 
lower gearing.  The comparison covers benefits such as: salary, share options, 
continuity of employment, pensions, risk of financial distress, risk of takeover, and 
benefits of takeover.  The analysis compares the benefits in relative terms rather 
than absolute terms: so “less” means less than in the other column and similarly 
for “more”. 
Welfare factor for managers Non-large 
company with 
higher 
gearing 
 
Large company with lower 
gearing 
Net present value of salary and 
pensions 
Less The same salary would be 
more valuable in this 
company type because the 
risk of financial distress 
would be less but in any 
case, the salary would likely 
be higher 
Share option value  
 
? ? 
Ability to make acquisitions (and 
so increase salary, pension and 
option value)  
Less More  
Likelihood of avoiding risk of 
takeover and damage to income  
Less More 
Likelihood of avoiding damage to 
income through competition 
Less More 
Ability to improve company and 
personal prospects through 
competitive success against 
smaller companies 
Less  More 
Risk of financial distress More Less 
 
In only one respect does the higher gearing/smaller company combination produce a 
benefit for managers that is not obviously worse than in the lesser gearing/larger 
company.  That exception relates to the value of the share options.  Here, an argument 
could be made that for more highly geared companies, the equity volatility will be 
greater than for the larger but lowlier geared company all other things being equal.  
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So, share options could be more valuable ignoring other factors such as the extra risk 
of distress that would not support greater value.  However, the manager will need to 
trade off extra option value against the welfare loss associated with greater financial 
distress risk.  Sharpe (1994) and Hanka (1998) show that firms with higher gearing 
tend to pay lower wages and provide fewer pension benefits and less job security in 
downturns.  This does not directly address the issue of the trade-off between option 
value and non-option value, but it does explain clearly that there is a reduction in 
welfare associated with the higher levels of gearing. 
 
Share options do not usually vest immediately – they are granted over time and can 
only be exercised within a delayed time frame.  This is likely to encourage the manager 
to take a longer-term view that matches the vesting timetable.  While increased 
gearing can increase volatility (and hence the option value) there will be increased 
financial distress risks associated with the extended time frame of option exercise that 
mitigate these advantages. 
 
Harford and Li (2007) report that even in acquisitions where shareholders in the 
purchaser are worse off, the chief executive officers are better off in 75 per cent of 
cases examined.  This supports that argument that company management benefits 
from an active programme of acquisitions. 
 
Other corporate objectives such as the need to maintain flexibility dictate a high level 
of conservatism.  This objective coincides with the objective of executives to avoid 
unnecessary financial risk.  The conclusion is that managers prefer less risk and hence 
a conservative capital structure that will facilitate acquisitions. 
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Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) develop a model in which the bidder with the lowest 
gearing wins the takeover contest which they compare with actual transactions 
confirming that successful bidders are under-geared by about 6-7%. 
 
4.2.3 Other stakeholders 
Managers will assess the employment risk they face on a personal level.  They are in 
effect a supplier of services to the company.   Other suppliers and customers (and 
other stakeholders) will also take a view on the risk associated with doing business 
with that company.  Such stakeholders are likely to prefer lower counterparty risk to 
higher. 
 
Banerjee, Kim and Dasgupta (2008) study companies that have important dependent 
relationships with suppliers or customers.  In their study, “dependent” relationships 
between a customer and supplier arise where sales to the customer are more than 
10% of the supplier’s total sales.  For both customer and supplier in such an 
arrangement there are significant risks.  Banerjee, Kim and Dasgupta (2008) find that 
i) where dependent relationships exist, both customers and suppliers tend to have 
lower debt ratios than companies without dependent relationships; ii) both 
relationships hold only for the durables sector; and iii) are strongest for small firms – 
which are of course poorer credit risks by virtue of their size. 
 
Kale and Shahrur (2007) find that a firm’s gearing is reduced then it has entered into 
either a strategic alliance or joint venture with its suppliers or customers.  Here they 
are defining a dependent relationship in terms of the presence of a close link with a 
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customer or supplier.  This supports the argument that a company’s capital structure 
can affect relationships with both customers and suppliers and that decisions about 
gearing need to be taken in the context of the impact on all stakeholders.  Kale and 
Shahrur (2007) also note that a company’s gearing is lower when its customers 
operate in industries that have high research and development activities: such 
companies are poorer credit risks than companies with less research and development 
spending since their investment may be wasteful.  This provides a further insight into 
the capital structure decision – the credit risk associated with suppliers and customers 
is an important input into the capital structure decision. 
 
A weakening of the balance sheet may put the company at a competitive disadvantage 
that may adversely affect the company’s development.  The company may lose out on 
a significant investment opportunity.  A range of adverse consequences could occur 
prior to formal financial distress.  The managers would seek to avoid such problems 
to avoid any personal consequences. 
 
4.2.4 Leveraged buy-outs as a counter example 
Leveraged buy-outs provide a useful counter example.  Such companies are financed 
with the maximum amount of debt that banks are willing to advance.  The leveraged 
buy-out capital structure is quite different to that of a listed company.  Axelson, 
Jenkinson, Strömberg and Weisbach (2013) report that leverage in large international 
deals is unrelated to factors suggested by traditional theories of capital structure (such 
as profitability, earnings volatility or growth opportunities) but rather it is prevailing 
conditions in the debt markets that explains gearing best: they find no relationship 
between gearing prior to buy-out and gearing post buy-out. 
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The leveraged buy-out capital structure is not consistent with the analysis above where 
it is argued that management prefer lower gearing to achieve personal welfare 
enhancement.  The choice of capital structure is the prerogative of the buy-out investor 
rather than the management team. 
 
These two different approaches to capital structure can be rationalised.  The 
management incentive structures in place in leveraged buy-outs are quite different to 
those in a conventional listed company.  The objective of a leveraged buy-out business 
plan normally includes achieving an exit within 5 years.  This is usually arranged by 
selling the company which may involve a change of management and so the 
managers may be fired.  Also, in the period until the investor exits, acquisitions are 
unlikely (although not impossible) – this is because of the lack of availability of 
additional finance (debt or equity).   
 
This plan is quite different to that of a conventional listed company.  However, in the 
leveraged buy-out company, managers are rewarded with substantial equity 
participation which compensates them in a way that enables them to accept the 
relatively short time horizon and the prospect of being replaced at the exit event with 
the need at that time to seek new employment.  The equity benefits provided to 
managers in a buy-out are substantial and compensate them for what they would 
otherwise get as managers in a listed company.  Mao and Renneboog (2013) report 
negative earnings manipulation ahead of management buy-outs and that this is much 
more likely than is the case for leveraged buy-outs (where incumbent management 
are less likely to be involved as equity participants).  This finding demonstrates the 
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interest of management in seeking a low entry price which will enhance the value of 
their equity participation. 
 
In the leveraged buy-out company, management prefer high gearing because higher 
gearing contributes to their equity reward when the investor exits successfully.  
Managers readily trade-off the substantial equity rewards against the loss of personal 
welfare that derives from the lack of opportunity to expand the company significantly 
by acquisition and the possibility of being fired at the exit event. 
 
The difference in incentive structure reinforces the argument that the personal welfare 
objectives of managers affect capital structure. 
 
The leveraged buy-out example provides a comment on the trade-off theory.  For the 
leveraged buy-out, debt is maximized.  It is likely to be a good example of the trade-
off between financial distress risk and tax shelter being optimized.  The point of 
equilibrium is simply the point at which no more debt is available.  This capital structure 
is very different to that of a listed company so clearly the capital structure of the listed 
company does not support the trade-off theory. 
 
An interesting and relevant example is the acquisition of the British high street 
cosmetic and pharmaceutical retailer, Boots, by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts in the 
summer of 2007.  Before the transaction, Boots had a total enterprise value of around 
£9 billion of which around £1 billion was debt.  The company was purchased at a 
premium of 40% for around £13 billion of which £9 billion was debt (described in more 
detail in Slaughter and May (2007)).  It is easy to see that the balance sheet of Boots 
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could have supported more debt and that more tax shelter would have been 
generated. 
 
Leveraged buy-out capital structures support the trade-off theory and, because of their 
management remuneration arrangements, explain why managers in listed companies 
do not follow the trade-off theory but opt for low risk balance sheets. 
 
 
4.3 The effect of market concentration on gearing  
 
4.3.1 Capital structure and competition 
The above analysis suggests that management are incentivised to make acquisitions 
and that this is facilitated by low levels of gearing.  The feasibility of acquisitions will 
be affected by the structure of the competitive landscape and the other competitor 
companies within a sector.   
 
Capital structure is also influenced by competition within a sector.  Graham and Harvey 
(2001) show almost 25% of companies surveyed identified the behaviour of 
competitors as an important factor in their financial decisions. 
 
Companies with strong market positions combined with strong capital structures 
enable them to compete more effectively against smaller and more highly geared 
companies.  Such companies (with stronger market and financial positions) will be the 
most likely acquirers of smaller companies.   
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The competitive landscape is also recognised by lenders as they prefer to lend to 
those companies with a competitive edge rather than lend to companies faced with 
strong competitors. 
 
A strong balance sheet also provides support should the larger companies wish to 
promote competition by aggressive pricing.  A strong balance sheet will enable a 
company to withstand better any adverse consequences arising from pressure on 
margins due to price competition.  But competition could take other forms.  Companies 
with stronger balance sheets might offer longer credit terms to customers – this would 
put pressure on those companies with weaker balance sheets less able to provide 
improved credit terms to their customers. 
 
The smaller companies are less likely to need a balance sheet that should enable 
them to make acquisitions as they are less likely to be able to compete in the market 
for corporate control. 
 
The threat of such pressure (actual or potential) should encourage smaller companies 
to select capital structures that can enable them to survive such competitive pressure.  
However, for some of the smaller companies, the need to make acquisitions will not 
be as significant as they may accept that they are more likely to be acquired than to 
be an acquirer.  Such companies will nevertheless need to manage their capital 
structure in a way that does not put them at a disadvantage as regards their 
competitors (particularly the larger companies who are potential aggressors either by 
acquisition or by competitive threat in the marketplace). 
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Studies of capital structure have included industry effects (usually an industry dummy) 
in an attempt to distinguish differing characteristics.  These studies (such as MacKay 
and Phillips (2005) generally compare company gearing with sector gearing.  Parsons 
and Titman (2008) point out that measures such as profitability or size do not consider 
the presence of a predator or, more generally, the industry or sector structure and 
hence the nature and extent of competition in the sector. 
 
It is already established that gearing is very stable over time.  Lemmon, Roberts and 
Zender (2008) show that a firm’s lagged gearing ratio (in some cases, lagged by up to 
15 years) is a highly significant determinant of its current gearing ratio.  However, at 
the same time, there are changes that occur within an industry.  Hovakimian, Opler 
and Titman (2001) show that companies adjust their gearing ratios towards the 
industry median gearing ratio.  This demonstrates that companies that have gearing 
ratios that are out of line with competitors tend to revert to the industry norm thus 
supporting the observation that companies tend to have long run stable gearing ratios.  
When a company’s gearing ratio is higher than competitors, they may be at a 
competitive disadvantage so returning to a similar level of gearing reduces the impact 
of such a disadvantage. 
 
Mimicking sector gearing is also consistent with signalling in that bad companies copy 
good companies which includes copying their policy on gearing. 
 
MacKay and Phillips (2005) analyse movements within an industry observing that 
companies within the bottom quintile of gearing ratios adjust their gearing only when 
other companies within the same quintile make adjustments.  This suggests that 
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companies’ capital structure decisions are influenced by the capital structure decisions 
of other companies in their industry. 
 
The MacKay and Phillips (2005) study also highlights differences in gearing within an 
industry despite the general stability of gearing within an industry as observed in 
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001).   
 
Almazan and Molina (2005) studied dispersion in gearing ratios finding that 
concentrated industries and those where leasing is intense exhibit greater variations 
in gearing within the sector: they also identify similar dispersion in industries where 
incentive compensation is used less, where there are more insiders on the boards, are 
older and have larger capital expenditures.  
 
This suggests that there is more dispersion in gearing ratios in mature industries and 
hence that there is less dispersion in less mature industries that are still consolidating.  
This could suggest that relative gearing is less (more) important in industries that are 
mature (not yet mature). 
 
Studies of changes in capital structure also provide insights into industry effects and 
the interaction of capital structure with competition.  Phillips (1995) examined how 
sharp increases in gearing affect pricing and production decisions in four industries.  
The sharp increases in gearing were triggered by leveraged buy-outs.  The study 
examined output prices and quantities and the results indicated that debt positively 
influenced product prices and negatively affected output (with one exception). 
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Kovenock and Phillips (1997) extended this approach by examining how leveraged 
recapitalizations (a refinancing of an existing leveraged buy-out) affected company 
investment and plant closure decisions. They find that after recapitalisations, firms in 
concentrated industries are more likely to close production facilities and less likely to 
invest whereas for the rival firms the opposite is true particularly when the recapitalised 
business has a large market share (which is a common characteristic of leveraged 
buy-out investments).  This result is in line with the investment philosophy of leveraged 
buy-out investors: their strategy is to trim off marginal production where that production 
is not sufficiently profitable and to retreat to the profitable core.  This can be achieved 
by some closures and that may trigger competitors to compete for those marginal 
sales opportunities.  This supports the idea that there can be an interaction between 
capital structure and the competitive structure within a sector. 
 
Chevalier (1995a, 1995b) and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) studied leveraged 
buy-outs in the supermarket sector.  They make several observations: first, that the 
buy-out tended to soften competition.  This was reflected in a rise in the share price of 
rival companies around the time of the announcement of the transaction.  However, 
this price movement might simply reflect the information content in the announcement 
of the actual buy-out investment.  Secondly, they find that supermarket prices go up 
when a company that is competing with highly leveraged rivals itself undertakes a 
leveraged buy-out.  This is the obvious strategy for such companies.  However, where 
there is a single large competitor with very little debt, product prices were observed to 
decline.  This shows that companies can modify their strategy in ways that seek to 
exploit a relative weakness arising from a capital structure decision of a competitor. 
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Dasgupta and Titman (1998) and Faure-Grimaud (2000) developed models to predict 
that under both Cournot and Bertrand type competition, gearing will encourage a 
company to engage in softer competition.  These two types of competition predict 
different competitive responses.  Softer competition induces the rivals in a Cournot 
market to increase output (because the products are strategic substitutes) whereas in 
a Bertrand market, rivals would increase prices (because the products are strategic 
complements).  
 
de Jong, Nguyen and van Dijk (2008) examined market share and capital structure.  
They argued that a levered company in a Cournot market would suffer a reduced 
market share but that there would be no clear impact on a levered firm in a Bertrand 
market.  Competition type is measured by the competitive strategy measure (CSM) 
developed originally by Sundaram, John and John (1996).  The CSM is the correlation 
between the change in a company’s profit margin and the change in the competitors’ 
output.  They measure market share using the Hirschman-Herfindahl index.  
Describing their results, the authors claim that in Bertrand/Cournot competition, 
leverage positively/negatively affects market share. 
 
Leary and Roberts (2014) show that within a sector, corporate financial policies are 
highly interdependent and that smaller more financially constrained firms are more 
likely to mimic their peers. 
 
These studies suggest that the competitive situation within a sector can impact upon 
a company’s capital structure decisions.  In one sense, the degree of concentration in 
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a sector is a measure of the stage reached by the sector in its life cycle or 
development.   
 
There are two factors that affect the extent of competitive threat: first, the degree of 
market power; and secondly, the degree of financial power – the ability to use debt 
finance to make acquisitions and to withstand (or promote) aggressive price 
competition. 
 
These factors could be described as a company’s competitive threat within a market 
sector.  Of course, not all competitive factors are included here – for example, 
companies with products that have competitive advantages are not specifically 
included although company size tends to be associated with greater investment in 
research and development and so company size will tend to be a good proxy for many 
competitive factors including economies of scale which can enhance profitability in 
comparison with a smaller rival.  Similarly, companies with competitive advantages 
tend to be more profitable and this will be reflected in higher market values and hence 
size. 
 
The ability to compete, as represented by the factors above, represents a combination 
of market and financial power (which could be referred to as “firepower”).  The 
hypothesis is that in any sector, there will be some companies with greater firepower 
(being larger in size and with stronger balance sheets than smaller companies) and 
that this is a deliberate strategic choice to enable them to maintain and enhance their 
competitive position including by acquisition, by the threat of acquisition or by the 
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threat of competitive action such as pricing.  The companies with large firepower are 
predators and the other companies in the sector with less firepower are the prey. 
 
This hypothesis implies that larger companies tend to have less gearing to provide 
reserve borrowing capacity.  This maximises their firepower to be able to acquire and 
intimidate smaller companies and so grow.  The negative relationship between gearing 
and size was noted in Chapter 2.  However, this approach does not include any 
attempt to measure the opportunities to make acquisitions that may encourage or 
support a strategy of acquisition. 
 
The capital structure decision should reflect the nature of the degree of concentration 
in other companies in the sector.  So, if the other companies in a sector are fragmented 
with a low degree of concentration then a company is more likely to have low gearing 
to be able to make acquisitions within a fragmented sector.  Conversely, faced with a 
highly concentrated group of companies in a sector, an individual company is unlikely 
to have many acquisition targets or indeed an acquisition strategy and so is less likely 
to need reserve borrowing capacity, so its gearing will tend to be higher than for a 
company faced with low levels of concentration.   
 
The hypothesis is therefore that gearing will be positively related to a measure of 
concentration of the other companies in the sector.  This hypothesis is tested in the 
next section. 
 
Companies with higher levels of firepower will have higher levels of profitability (in 
relation to companies with lesser firepower) and hence will represent better credit risks 
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and so have better access to debt and so may have more gearing than smaller 
companies and yet represent lower credit risk.  However, higher levels of firepower 
tend to be associated with size which is negatively related to gearing.  Therefore, it is 
not so easy to predict the relationship between company firepower and its gearing. 
 
4.3.2 Measurement of firepower 
Market power is usually described in terms of market concentration – a measure of 
the relative market power of companies in a sector.  The degree of concentration is 
usually measured using the Hirschman-Herfindahl (HH) index.  Interestingly, Tobin’s 
q which is related to the market to book value ratio has also been considered as a 
measure of market power (see Lindenberg and Ross (1981)). 
 
This is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the companies in a 
sector. 
 
HH index in sector “j” = ∑i (mij)2        (4.1) 
 
where mij is the market share of company “i” in the “jth” sector and the summation is 
over the “i” companies in sector j.   
 
The market share factors are squared.  As the market shares are all less than one (by 
definition), the process of squaring the values has the effect of reducing the impact of 
small market shares much more than large market shares.  The HH index will take 
larger values where there are companies with large market shares (and vice versa). 
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The HH index for the sector is a useful proxy for the degree of concentration in a sector 
or industry and hence of the stage of consolidation reached.  A high HH index value 
suggests that the sector has already reached a relatively high degree of concentration 
whereas a low HH index value means there is more scope for consolidation. 
 
The HH index is commonly used to measure market concentration where regulators 
are concerned to protect consumers by avoiding too high a level of concentration that 
might lead to consumer detriment.  Where a merger would have the effect of increasing 
concentration to a level that might lead to consumer detriment, the regulator may 
consider imposing conditions on a merger such as requiring the acquirer to reduce its 
market power by disposal or even prohibiting the transaction. 
 
For example, Guney, Li and Fairchild (2011) use the HH index (based on sales) and 
Tobin’s Q to study gearing and product market competition among Chinese firms: they 
report an inverse relationship between intensity of competition and gearing showing 
that gearing is impacted by the competitive structure within a sector. 
 
Although market shares are usually used to compute the HH index, it is also possible 
to use other measures of relative company size such as enterprise value.  This can be 
computed by measuring the share of total sector enterprise value an individual 
company represents.  The modified formula would be: 
 
Modified HH index (“HH (enterprise value)”) in sector “j” = ∑i (EVij)2   (4.2) 
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where EVij is the enterprise value of company “i” in the “jth” sector (expressed as a 
proportion of the total enterprise value in the sector) and the summation is over the “i” 
companies in sector j.   
 
HH measures based on market values or market shares take no account of the 
company’s financial position.  For example, suppose a company in a sector had a 
large market share and benefitted from economies of scale resulting from its size 
leading to better margins and hence profits.  These factors would be captured in the 
HH index computed using the market value of the enterprise.  Computing the HH index 
using only market shares excludes the element of profitability. 
 
Hou and Robinson (2006) examine the relationship between share price returns and 
industry concentration using the HH index which is calculated using i) enterprise 
values; ii) equity values; and iii) market shares.  The approach of using market values 
is to deal with data limitations particularly where market share information is not 
available.  Although these measures of concentration are different to those computed 
using market shares, the authors point out that their modified HH values are highly 
correlated and provide support for the approach described above.  Their main 
conclusions are that firms in highly concentrated industries earn lower returns.  They 
also comment that average gearing does not vary much across different concentration 
levels.   
 
Related to this comment is the observation in Frank and Goyal (2009) that gearing is 
relatively constant within a sector.  If gearing does not vary much within a sector, then 
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the firepower effect may not be easy to detect as it is internal to a sector and is 
dependent on the competitive conditions within the sector. 
 
To examine the firepower hypothesis of capital structure, it is necessary to test the 
relationship between a specific company’s firepower and its capital structure.  But this 
relationship takes little direct account of the firepower of the other companies in the 
sector.  So, two measures of market power could be considered – first, a specific value 
for each company; and secondly, a value for all the other companies in the sector.   
 
This second measure involves computing the HH index to exclude the company.  This 
enables the company’s decision about its capital structure to be examined – a decision 
taken in the light of the concentration of firepower in the other companies in the sector.  
This is a subtler decision which looks at the relative position of the company within the 
competitive structure of the sector.  
 
This second value can be defined as the “non-firm HH index value”.  Similarly, a value 
for the specific company can be defined as the “firm HH index value”.   
 
The firepower hypothesis suggests that there is a relationship between a company’s 
gearing and the competitive structure within a sector measured by the non-firm HH 
value (the concentration measure of companies in the sector other than the subject 
company).   
 
The above definitions of HH values are based on market values and sales and so take 
no direct account of gearing.  The ideal measure of market power should combine 
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both market share and financial power in a single value.  Obviously, a sector with a 
high HH index value based for example on market values would be more (less) 
intimidating to a small participant where the large index value companies were also 
lowly (highly) geared. 
 
This can be attempted by computing a further HH index value which takes account of 
both these factors.  The idea is to scale the HH value by a factor which represents the 
company’s ability to borrow.  Such a value models market power but adjusts it for the 
relative ability of the company to borrow further. 
 
A company with large market power and high borrowing power should have a larger 
HH value than a similar company with less borrowing power. 
 
Borrowing power can be defined or measured as “1 – gearing ratio %”.  The gearing 
ratio itself can’t be used directly as it can be zero so the reverse ratio (equivalent to 
equity gearing) is more suitable.  High values indicate potential spare borrowing 
capacity and vice versa other things being equal.  The idea is to scale the HH value 
based on market values by the equity gearing ratio.  The HH index value that combines 
both market and financial power is defined as: 
 
HH index of market and financial power in sector “j” = ∑i (EVijgij)2  (4.3) 
 
As above, EVij is the enterprise value of company “i” in the “jth” sector (expressed as a 
proportion of the total enterprise value in the sector) and gij is the equity gearing ratio 
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for company “i” in the “jth” sector and where the summation is over the “i” companies 
in sector j. 
 
Three versions of the HH index can therefore be used: 
HH based on the market values scaled by equity gearing hereafter referred to as HH 
(equity gearing) or firepower; 
HH based on market values hereafter referred to as HH (market values); and  
HH based on sales hereafter referred to as HH (sales). 
 
This approach follows that of Hou and Robinson (2006) where sales, book values of 
total assets and book values of equity were used to calculate indices of concentration. 
 
The HH index value can be computed in three different ways for each of the company; 
the sector and for that part of the sector that excludes the company (the non-firm HH 
index value: this computes for each company the HH index value that excludes the 
company value).  This quantity is a proxy for the market and financial power that the 
company must compete against.  
 
To compute the non-firm HH index value, the company’s HH index value is deducted 
from the value for the sector.  This produces a measure of the market and financial 
power of the companies in the sector other than the subject company and it is adjusted 
to ensure that it contains no input from the firm (which would otherwise be included in 
the denominator).  This is to ensure that the non-firm HH value tests the effect of the 
concentration of other companies in the sector (the non-firm companies) on a 
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company’s capital structure decisions.  The hypothesis is that a company will take 
account of the firepower of its competitors when making decisions on capital structure. 
 
4.3.3 Developing hypotheses  
The three different definitions of the HH index value can be used in separate 
specifications to test the hypothesis that company gearing is affected by the degree of 
concentration facing an individual company.  Companies facing a low degree of 
concentration are more likely to have lower gearing to be able to make acquisitions 
whereas companies facing more concentration are less likely to see many acquisition 
opportunities and so may not choose a balance sheet with high borrowing capacity.  
Thus, gearing should be positively related to the level of concentration among other 
companies in the sector.  Formally, the hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Faced with a high level of concentration, a company will have few 
prospects for acquisition so that a low gearing policy to facilitate acquisition will be 
unnecessary with the result that gearing will be higher. However, for a company faced 
with low levels of concentration, there will be greater prospects for acquisition and so 
gearing will be lower to facilitate an acquisition policy.  So, company gearing should 
be positively related to the degree of concentration faced by the company as 
measured by the non-firm HH index value (based on each of the three versions: equity 
gearing, market value and sales).  Each of the three HH index values will be tested 
separately. 
 
Frank and Goyal (2008) include a description of the established relationship between 
a company’s gearing and industry or sector gearing.  This relationship suggests that 
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an individual company will select its gearing policy in a way that avoids the company 
being significantly more highly or lowly geared than the sector average – this is 
inconsistent with the firepower hypothesis which goes further in suggesting that 
decisions on gearing are taken in the light of the relative market positions of the 
companies in a sector as well as other factors including sector factors.   
 
Two sector effects (the fixed asset ratio and average asset life) are included in the 
regression equations in Chapters 2 and 3.  Both variables are sector specific.  
Companies in the same sector tend to have assets with similar lives and tend to have 
similar fixed asset ratios.  These common factors explain why gearing within a sector 
tends to be similar across companies reflecting these common factors, but this does 
not mean that gearing is identical.  Differences in gearing within a sector will also 
depend on differences in the structure of competition within the sector.  A company’s 
gearing decision will depend on both sector factors and competitive factors within the 
sector.   
 
Consistent with Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008), Graham and Leary (2011) find 
that leverage varies more cross-sectionally than within firms estimating that 
approximately 60% of leverage variation is cross-sectional for gearing measured using 
both book values and market values.  They also identify that of the cross-sectional 
variation, most is across firms within a given industry rather than between industries – 
a result consistent with that of MacKay and Phillips (2005).  Graham and Leary (2011) 
estimated that intra-industry leverage variation is three times as large as inter-industry 
variation for gearing based on book values (as opposed to twice for gearing based on 
market values). 
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While sector characteristics such as asset life and the fixed asset ratio can explain 
sector gearing in part, the HH index values are trying to identify subtle differences in 
gearing between companies that arise from differences in firepower between 
companies within a sector.  Some sector characteristics may also vary between 
companies within a sector.  While it has been established that gearing is positively 
related to asset life and the fixed asset ratio, these quantities can vary within a sector.  
These considerations suggest that a subtler and more suitable approach is to examine 
relative gearing. 
 
The firepower hypothesis seeks to explain differences in gearing within a sector rather 
than the absolute level of sector gearing.  Sector gearing is more directly explained by 
variables such as asset life and the fixed asset ratio.  The firepower hypothesis needs 
to be tested in a way that is independent of the effect of sector variables.  This can be 
achieved if relative gearing is used in place of actual gearing in the above regression.  
Relative gearing is defined as company gearing expressed as a proportion of average 
sector gearing in each case measured using book values. 
 
The use of relative gearing should reduce the effects of sector factors on gearing.  For 
instance, if a sector employs assets with a long life, then as already established, there 
tends to be more debt and of a greater maturity.  This is a feature of that sector.  The 
fact that a sector has high or low gearing (in absolute terms) can be explained at least 
in part by sector factors (i.e. factors that are common to companies with that business 
activity such as asset life and the mix of assets).  Relative gearing has the advantage 
of reducing the impact of sector factors. 
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Fosu (2013) used relative gearing in a study of South African companies seeking to 
identify a relationship between gearing and performance.   
 
Relative gearing can be compared with the HH index values to judge how a company 
manages its relative gearing in the light of its own firepower and that of the other 
companies in its sector.  Accordingly, hypothesis 1 can be reformulated to address 
relative gearing. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Faced with a high level of concentration, a company will have few 
prospects for acquisition, so a low gearing policy to facilitate acquisition is less 
important with the result that relative gearing will be higher.  Faced with low levels of 
concentration, there will be greater prospects for acquisition by a company and so 
relative gearing will be lower to facilitate an acquisition policy and the associated use 
of bridge financing will be lower.  So, relative company gearing should be positively 
related to the degree of concentration faced by the company as measured by the non-
firm HH index value (based on each of the three versions: equity gearing, market value 
and sales).   
 
Each of the three HH index values will be tested separately. In this case, it is not 
necessary to include the debt market conditions as independent variables as such 
conditions apply to all companies in a sector and it is relative gearing that is being 
analysed. 
 
4.3.4 Data and methodology  
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This section describes the data, the variables, the regression equations and the 
estimation methods. 
 
The data are taken from Compustat for North American companies for the period 1995 
– 2014 restricted to non-financial company data. The sample includes data where the 
company is not present for the full period, thereby avoiding survivorship bias.    Yield 
curve data are taken from the US Treasury website; US consumer price index data 
are downloaded from US Department of Labour website; and yields on corporate 
bonds by maturity are from Bank of America Merrill Lynch/Federal Reserve Bank of St 
Louis, Economic Data.  A more extensive description of the data is contained in section 
2.3.3 of Chapter 2 which employs the same data.  
 
A total of 195,600 company-year observations in respect of 23,600 companies are 
included.  However, not all company-year observations are complete and so the 
usable data are smaller in number: the sample size available varies between each 
regression depending on the variables employed.  A further constraint is the 
requirement to use lagged values of the variables: this requires that each company-
year observation has a corresponding value for the previous year.  This requirement 
leads to a further reduction in sample size where there is no previous company-year 
value.  For instance, using system GMM with two lags requires 3 consecutive 
company-year observations and so the sample size for this approach is smaller than 
for fixed effects modelling where only two consecutive company-year observations are 
required.  For these reasons, the sample size varies between regression analyses. 
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The choice of data follows that in Lemmon and Zender (2010) (which covered an 
earlier period than in this case, although with some small degree of overlap).  This 
sample includes some companies present for the whole sample period and others for 
shorter time frames, thus avoiding survivorship bias. 
 
The variables are defined in Table 4.3.  Summary statistics of the data are set out in 
Table 4.4 except for those variables defined in Table 2.5 of Chapter 2 and that are 
summarised in Table 2.6.  Table 4.5 contains the respective correlation statistics 
except for cross-correlations for those variables defined in Table 2.5 of Chapter 2 
which are reported in Table 2.7. 
 
4.3.4.1 The variables and expected signs of the coefficients 
The dependent variable is gearing measured using book values (for hypothesis 1) and 
relative gearing measured using book value (for hypothesis 2). 
 
The independent variables are the non-firm HH index value and the firm HH index 
value (in each case, computed in three different ways); and the additional control 
variables introduced in Chapter 2 and which are included since they clearly have an 
impact on gearing and to exclude them could cause under-specification bias.  These 
additional control variables are as follows: the market to book value ratio; regulation 
dummy; abnormal earnings; fixed asset ratio; average asset life; size; yield curve; 
bond spread; inflation; and short-term interest rate.  The full definitions of the control 
variables are set out in Table 2.5 of Chapter 2.   
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Table 4.3 contains definitions of the variables (or references to the variable definitions 
in other chapters) and their expected signs. 
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Table 4.3 Definitions of the variables and expected signs of coefficients 
This table sets out the definitions of the variables and their expected signs 
Gearing (book 
value) 
The total amount of debt expressed as a proportion of the book value of assets.  
Non-firm index 
value (as per the 
SIC code)  
i) the HH value for the sector based on equity gearing that is derived from market-
based enterprise values weighted by the equity gearing (being 1 minus the actual 
gearing) but excluding the subject firm for each sector  
 ii) the HH value for the sector based on market-based enterprise values without 
any weighting but excluding the subject firm 
 iii) the HH value for the sector based on sales but excluding the subject firm 
   Expected sign “+” since the smaller non-firm HH index value reflects a fragmented (non-firm) 
sector which would encourage a company to pursue an acquisition strategy which 
would require a lowly geared balance sheet; and a highly concentrated (non-firm) 
sector which suggests that acquisitions are less likely and so there would be less 
need for a conservative balance sheet. 
Firm HH index 
value (as per the 
SIC code) 
i) the HH value for the firm based on equity gearing that is derived from market-
based enterprise values weighted by the equity gearing (being 1 minus the actual 
gearing)  
 ii) the HH value for the firm based on market-based enterprise values without any 
weighting but excluding the subject firm 
 iii) the HH value for the firm based on sales but excluding the subject firm 
   Expected sign “+/–” It is not so obvious how this relationship might work.  For a company wishing 
to be acquisitive, it might be the case that gearing is positively related to firm HH 
index value since larger companies can support more debt although the sign of 
the coefficient of size is negative (as reported in Chapter 2). 
In addition to the above variables and to avoid under-specification biases, those explanatory variables 
included in the regression equations in Chapter 2 are included here: the definitions of these variables 
are set out in Table 2.5 and are listed below together with the expected signs of their coefficients. 
The market to 
book value ratio 
Expected sign: “+” to reflect the results of Chapter 2. 
Regulation 
dummy 
Expected sign: “+” to reflect the results of Chapter 2. 
Size Expected sign: “–” to reflect the results of Chapter 2. 
Commercial 
paper dummy 
Expected sign: “+” to reflect the results of Chapter 2. 
Abnormal 
earnings 
Expected sign: “+” to reflect the results of Chapter 2. 
Average asset life Expected sign: “–” to reflect the results of Chapter 2. 
Fixed asset ratio Expected sign: “+” to reflect the results of Chapter 2. 
In addition to the company specific variables and to reflect debt market conditions, the following 
variables are included as in Chapter 2 and the definitions of these variables are set out in Table 2.5.  
Yield curve, Bond spread, Inflation and Short-term real interest rate are included and the expected sign 
of each of these variables is “–“. 
As in Chapter 2, to take account of a policy of adjusting capital structure to a target, lagged values of 
the dependent variable are included as explanatory variables. 
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Similar signs should be expected for relative gearing although the relationship 
between relative gearing and the control variables is likely to be weaker than for the 
relationship between a conventional measure of gearing and the control variables. 
 
4.3.4.2 Model equations 
The regression equation used to test each hypothesis is set out below under each of 
the hypotheses. 
 
Static models do not provide for delays in adjusting capital structure as is argued 
above in relation to the use of bridge financing.  Accordingly, a lagged value of the 
dependent variable is included as an explanatory variable.  The subscripts indicate 
firm (i) and time (t). 
 
Hypothesis 1: Company gearing is positively related to the non-firm HH index value 
(where the non-firm HH index value is calculated using i) equity gearing; ii) market-
based enterprise values; and iii) sales); 
 
Gearbki,t =  + β1Gearbki,(t-1) + β2MTBVi,t + β3Regi,t + β4Sizei,t + β5CPDi,t + β6Abegsi,t + 
β7AALi,t + β8FARi,t + β9Ycurvet + β10Bondspreadt + β11Inflationt + β12Shortintt + 
β13NonFHHi,t + β14FHHi,t + εi,t           (4.4) 
 
Dependent variable: Gearbki,t = gearing (measured using book values). 
Independent variables: 1) Gearbki,(t-1) = lagged value of Gearbki,t; 2) MTBVi,t = market 
to book value ratio; 3) Regi,t = regulation dummy; 4) Sizei,t = natural logarithm of the 
enterprise value; 5) CPDi,t = commercial paper dummy; 6) Abegsi,t = abnormal 
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earnings; 7) AALi,t = average asset life; 8) FARi,t = fixed asset ratio; 9) Ycurvet = yield 
curve; 10) Bondspreadt = bond spread; 11) Inflationt = inflation; and 12) Shortintt = 
short-term interest rate; 13) NonFHHEi,t = the non-firm HH index value calculated 
using i) equity gearing; ii) market-based enterprise values; and iii) sales as described 
above; and 14) FHHEi,t = firm HH index value calculated using i) equity gearing; ii) 
market-based enterprise values; and iii) sales as described above.  The error term is 
εi,t. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Relative company gearing is positively related to the non-firm HH index 
value (where the non-firm HH index value is calculated using i) equity gearing; ii) 
market-based enterprise values; and iii) sales); 
 
RelGbki,t =  + β1RelGbki,(t-1) + β2MTBVi,t + β3Regi,t + β4Sizei,t + β5CPDi,t + β6Abegsi,t 
+ β7AALi,t + β8FARi,t + β9NonFHHi,t + β10FHHi,t + εi,t        (4.5) 
 
Dependent variable: RelGbki,t = gearing (measured using book values) and expressed 
as a proportion of sector gearing. 
Independent variables: 1) RelGbki,(t-1) = lagged value of RelGbki,t; 2) MTBVi,t = market 
to book value ratio; 3) Regi,t = regulation dummy; 4) Sizei,t = natural logarithm of the 
enterprise value; 5) CPDi,t = commercial paper dummy; 6) Abegsi,t = abnormal 
earnings; 7) AALi,t = average asset life; 8) FARi,t = fixed asset ratio; 9) NonFHHEi,t = 
the non-firm HH index value calculated using i) equity gearing; ii) market-based 
enterprise values; and iii) sales as described above; and 10) FHHEi,t = firm HH index 
value calculated using i) equity gearing; ii) market-based enterprise values; and iii) 
sales as described above.  The error term is εi,t. 
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4.3.4.3 Methods of estimation 
A more detailed description of the selection of estimation procedures is set out in 
section 2.3.3.3 of Chapter 2. 
 
The two methods highlighted in Flannery and Hankins (2013) as the most efficient, 
namely fixed effects and system GMM, are used here and the procedure in relation 
to system GMM used in that paper (using Stata's “xtdpdsys” command, two steps, 
with all the independent variables specified as "predetermined" and the maximum 
number of lags restricted to two or, in some cases, more where it is necessary to 
increase the number of lags to generate satisfactory AR(2) statistics) is followed. 
 
4.3.4.4 Descriptive statistics 
Summary statistics are set out in Table 4.4 and correlation statistics in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.4 Summary statistics  
This table sets out the summary statistics for the HH firm and non-firm values and for 
relative gearing 
   
Obser-
vations Median Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Var-
iance 
Skew 
-ness Kur-tosis 
Min-
imum 
Max-
imum 
HH equity 
gearing        
  
Firm value 114,838 0.000 0.033 0.134 0.018 5.350 32.653 0.000 0.936 
Non-firm 
value 114,768 0.217 0.288 0.288 0.053 1.345   4.348 0.014 1.000 
HH market 
value          
Firm value 115,389 0.000 0.031 0.126 0.016 5.387 33.148 0.000 0.888 
Non-firm 
value 114,756 0.208 0.278 0.224 0.050 1.389 4.523 0.017 0.999 
HH sales 
value          
Firm value 170,361 0.000 0.017 0.075 0.006 6.143 42.640 0.000 0.584 
Non-firm 
value 170,298 0.161 0.218 0.189 0.036 1.810 6.458 0.126 0.963 
Relative 
gearing 169,922 0.765 1.19 1.871 3.502 3.594 18.16 0.000 11.902 
Definitions of the variables are set out in Table 4.3.  Descriptive statistics of the control variables not 
listed above are in Table 2.6. 
 
 
As is to be expected, the firm HH values and the range of values (as evidenced by the 
standard deviation) are significantly less than the non-firm HH values. 
 
Correlation statistics for these variables with the other variables in the regression 
equation (see Table 4.3) are set out in Table 4.5.  
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Table 4.5 Correlation statistics  
The table sets out the correlation statistics for relative gearing and the firm and non-firm HH 
values against the variables in the left-hand column below 
 
Relative 
gearing 
Firm HH 
(equity 
gearing) 
Non-firm 
HH (equity 
gearing) 
Firm HH 
(market 
value) 
Non-firm 
HH (market 
value) 
Firm HH 
(sales) 
Non-firm 
HH (sales) 
Firm HH (equity 
gearing) -0.033*** 
      
Non-firm HH 
(equity gearing) 0.025*** 0.226*** 
     
Firm HH (market 
value) -0.029*** 0.965*** 0.214***  
   
Non-firm HH 
(market value) 0.022*** 0.294*** 0.960*** 0.291*** 
   
Firm HH (sales) -0.027*** 0.819*** 0.227*** 0.844*** 0.289*** 
  
Non-firm HH 
(sales)  0.036*** 0.276*** 0.764*** 0.276*** 0.800*** 0.258*** 
 
Gearing (book 
values) 0.843*** -0.014*** -0.020*** -0.008*** -0.024*** -0.009*** -0.005** 
Market to book 
value ratio 0.355*** -0.045*** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.079*** -0.019*** 
Regulation -0.019*** -0.031*** -0.113*** -0.035*** -0.125*** -0.042*** -0.154*** 
Size -0.121*** 0.221*** -0.064*** 0.229*** -0.064*** 0.234*** -0.081*** 
Short-term credit 
rating  -0.030*** 0.189*** 0.015*** 0.199*** 0.020*** 0.187*** -0.006** 
Abnormal 
earnings 0.182*** -0.052*** -0.003 -0.053*** -0.007** -0.053*** 0.021*** 
Average asset life -0.089*** 0.017*** -0.061*** 0.019*** -0.063*** -0.020*** -0.092*** 
Fixed asset ratio -0.008*** -0.001 -0.107*** 0.002 -0.108*** -0.022*** -0.153*** 
Yield curve 0.014*** 0.016*** -0.001 0.014*** -0.005* 0.018*** 0.032*** 
Bond spread 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.005* 0.019*** 0.023*** 
Inflation 0.004*** -0.008** 0.005 -0.006*** 0.012*** -0.008** -0.004 
Short-term interest 
rate -0.017*** -0.030*** 0.016*** -0.028*** 0.015*** -0.031*** -0.055*** 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Definitions of the variables are set out in Table 4.3.  Descriptive statistics 
of the control variables not listed above are in Table 2.6 and correlations in Table 2.7. 
 
 
The alternative measures of the HH index are highly correlated as might be expected 
(firm values with firm values and non-firm values with non-firm values).  There is a 
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significant but lower degree of correlation between the firm and non-firm HH values 
for all three HH definitions.  Where a company is facing higher non-firm HH values (ie 
more concentration) it is more likely that the firm itself is large and vice versa. 
 
The non-firm value can be included in the regression equation explaining gearing that 
was tested in Chapter 2 in the context of the analysis of the coefficient of the market 
to book value ratio thereby ensuring that control variables figure in the model 
specification employed in this part of the thesis.  For completeness, the firm HH value 
is also included.   
 
The correlations between the HH index values and the other independent variables 
within the equation are, with a few exceptions, statistically significant although small 
in value (other than the HH values).  The firm HH values are positively correlated with 
the size variable as is to be expected but the non-firm HH values are negatively related 
to company size.   
 
The regulation dummy variable is negatively (and significantly) correlated with all the 
firm and non-firm HH values suggesting that regulated sectors are not highly 
concentrated. 
 
The fixed asset ratio and average asset life show low levels of correlation with the firm 
HH values but larger negative correlation with non-firm HH values that are statistically 
significant.  
 
4.3.5 Results 
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The three measures of the HH index are used in the regression analysis (using the 
equations described above). 
 
The results of the regression testing hypothesis 1 that gearing is positively related to 
the non-firm HH values (based on the equity gearing version) are set out in Table 4.6.  
The results support the hypothesis. 
 
In the case of the non-firm HH value (based on equity gearing), although the fixed 
effects method does not produce a significant coefficient, system GMM does (a more 
significant result) and it is a positive coefficient as predicted by the hypothesis and 
thus confirming that companies facing lower (higher) degrees of concentration have 
lower (higher) levels of gearing.   
 
In the case of the firm HH values (based on equity gearing), the fixed effects coefficient 
is negative and significant (at the 5% level) but is not significant using the system GMM 
methodology.  Where the results from fixed effects and system GMM are in conflict, 
the latter result is superior although this result is not directly related to the hypothesis. 
 
However, the construction of the firm HH value based on equity gearing involves 
multiplying the firm HH value based on market values by the equity gearing ratio or “1-
gearing ratio”.  So, in a regression equation where the dependent variable is gearing 
and one of the independent variables involves a product that includes the factor “1-
gearing ratio”, a negative coefficient is to be expected.  So, this result must be treated 
with caution and more weight place on the other versions of the firm HH values that 
do not involve equity gearing. 
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The coefficients of the independent variables other than the firm HH and non-firm HH 
index values track the results in Table 2.12 in Chapter 2: this is to be expected since 
the model equations are identical save for the inclusion of the HH index variables. 
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Table 4.6 Determinants of gearing (equity gearing HH index case) 
This table sets out the regression results of gearing based on book values 
against the variables in the left-hand column including the firm and non-firm HH 
values computed using the equity gearing version of HH (hypothesis 1) 
Independent variables Fixed effects System GMM 
Dependent variable (1-year lag) 0.495*** 0.567*** 
 (44.15) (33.15) 
Dependent variable (2-year lag)  -0.0349*** 
 
 (-2.742) 
Market to book value ratio 0.0207*** 0.0160*** 
 (21.18) (15.31) 
Size -0.0126*** -0.00857*** 
 (-6.287) (-4.026) 
Commercial paper dummy 0.0149*** 0.00644 
 (3.412) (0.873) 
Abnormal earnings 0.0127*** 0.00597*** 
 (7.575) (3.783) 
Average asset life -0.00391*** -0.00243*** 
 (-10.16) (-5.194) 
Fixed asset ratio 0.288*** 0.378*** 
 (15.34) (15.96) 
Yield curve -1.458*** -0.639*** 
 (-11.91) (-7.029) 
Bond spread -0.121 -0.192*** 
 (-1.107) (-2.632) 
Inflation -1.413*** -0.639*** 
 (-13.68) (-7.752) 
Short-term interest rate -1.379*** -0.521*** 
 (-13.27) (-6.891) 
Firm HH value (equity gearing) -0.0274** 0.00234 
 (-2.399) (0.147) 
Non-firm HH value (equity gearing) -0.00194 0.0318*** 
 (-0.286) (4.077) 
Regulation dummy - 0.309*** 
 
 (5.677) 
Constant 0.180*** 0.0376*** 
 (13.77) (2.953) 
F test 309.6***  
Adjusted R squared 0.325  
Hausman p value 0.00***  
Wald test p value  0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  0.20 
Sargan statistic  0.00 
Observations 83,892 77,740 
Number of groups 12,447 11,807 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - as 
pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test statistic 
is not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, 
the variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the variables are set 
out in Table 4.3.   
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Table 4.7 sets out the results of the test of hypothesis 1 that gearing is positively 
related to the non-firm HH index values (calculated using market values) – a repeat of 
the regression analysis reported in Table 4.6 but with a different version of the HH 
index value.  The results again support hypothesis 1. 
 
In the case of HH values computed using market values, the fixed effects methodology 
reports no statistically significant coefficients for either firm HH value or the non-firm 
HH value.  However, system GMM produces statistically significant coefficients for all 
independent variables.  The coefficient of the non-firm HH index value is positively 
related to gearing as hypothesised.  These results suggest that gearing increases as 
non-firm sector concentration increases (as hypothesised).   
 
In the case of the firm HH index value, this is also positively (and significantly) related 
to gearing.  This might reflect an increase in borrowing related to an increase in size 
since size and the firm HH index value are positively correlated (see Table 4.5).  
However, size is negatively related to gearing as reported in Table 4.6. 
 
The coefficients of the independent variables other than the firm HH and non-firm HH 
index values track the results in Table 2.12 in Chapter 2: this is to be expected since 
the model equations are identical save for the inclusion of the HH index variables. 
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Table 4.7 Determinants of gearing (market value HH index case) 
This table sets out the regression results of gearing based on book values against the variables in 
the left-hand column including the firm and non-firm HH values computed using market values 
(hypothesis 1) 
Independent variables Fixed effects System GMM 
Dependent variable (1-year lag) 0.495*** 0.568*** 
 (44.11) (33.09) 
Dependent variable (2-year lag)  -0.0327** 
  (-2.571) 
Market to book value ratio 0.0207*** 0.0161*** 
 (21.14) (15.52) 
Regulation dummy - 0.293*** 
  (5.279) 
Size -0.0130*** -0.0086*** 
 (-6.437) (-4.068) 
Commercial paper dummy 0.0146*** 0.00704 
 (3.322) (0.956) 
Abnormal earnings 0.0128*** 0.0062*** 
 (7.592) (3.941) 
Average asset life -0.0039*** -0.0025*** 
 (-10.17) (-5.153) 
Fixed asset ratio 0.289*** 0.379*** 
 (15.36) (15.80) 
Yield curve -1.459*** -0.662*** 
 (-11.83) (-7.342) 
Bond spread -0.124 -0.170** 
 (-1.122) (-2.347) 
Inflation -1.410*** -0.654*** 
 (-13.56) (-7.954) 
Short-term interest rate -1.378*** -0.514*** 
 (-13.16) (-6.895) 
Firm HH value (market value) 0.0098 0.0364** 
 (0.843) (2.161) 
Non-firm HH value (market value) -0.0035 0.0392*** 
 (-0.438) (4.836) 
Constant 0.181*** 0.0358*** 
 (13.69) (2.782) 
F test 308.3*** 
 
Adjusted R squared 0.326 
 
Hausman p value 0.00*** 
 
Wald test p value 
 
0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 
 
0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
 
0.227 
Sargan statistic 
 
0.00 
Observations 83,467 77,334 
Number of groups 12,427 11,787 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - 
as pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test 
statistic is not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for 
collinearity, the variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the 
variables are set out in Table 4.3.   
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Table 4.8 sets out the results of the test of hypothesis 1 that gearing is positively 
related to the non-firm HH index values (calculated using sales) – a repeat of the 
regression analyses reported in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 but using a different version of the 
HH index value.  The results support hypothesis 1. 
 
The coefficient of the non-firm HH value (based on sales) coefficient is significant 
and positive but only in the system GMM analysis and not fixed effects.  Significant 
and positive coefficients for the firm HH values based on sales in both fixed effects 
and system GMM analyses are produced.   
 
The coefficients of the independent variables other than the firm HH and non-firm HH 
index values track the results in Table 2.12 in Chapter 2: this is to be expected since 
the model equations are identical save for the inclusion of the HH index variables. 
 
Taking these results as a group, there is support for the hypothesised positive 
relationship between gearing and non-firm concentration.  An alternative method to 
test the hypothesis is to consider relative gearing rather than absolute gearing.  This 
approach is tested in the next three sets of results. 
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Table 4.8 Determinants of gearing (sales HH index case) 
This table sets out the regression results of gearing based on book values against the variables in 
the left-hand column including the firm and non-firm HH values computed using sales (hypothesis 1) 
Independent variables Fixed effects System GMM 
Dependent variable (1-year lag) 0.495*** 0.561*** 
 (44.18) (32.30) 
Dependent variable (2-year lag)  -0.0371*** 
  (-2.881) 
Market to book value ratio 0.0207*** 0.0164*** 
 (21.17) (15.47) 
Size -0.0130*** -0.00942*** 
 (-6.469) (-4.409) 
Commercial paper dummy 0.0146*** 0.00785 
 (3.346) (1.088) 
Abnormal earnings 0.0127*** 0.00571*** 
 (7.576) (3.598) 
Average asset life -0.00389*** -0.00248*** 
 (-10.11) (-5.176) 
Fixed asset ratio 0.288*** 0.372*** 
 (15.37) (15.45) 
Bond spread -0.129 -0.166** 
 (-1.177) (-2.246) 
Inflation -1.407*** -0.614*** 
 (-13.56) (-7.674) 
Short-term interest rate -1.376*** -0.457*** 
 (-13.04) (-5.934) 
Firm HH value (sales) 0.0324* 0.0890*** 
 (1.954) (3.592) 
Non-firm HH value (sales) -0.00981 0.0642*** 
 (-0.906) (4.400) 
Regulation dummy - 0.271*** 
  (5.195) 
Yield curve -1.453*** -0.606*** 
 (-11.82) (-6.643) 
Constant 0.181*** 0.0404*** 
 (13.62) (3.008) 
F test 309.5***  
Adjusted R squared 0.325  
Hausman p value 0.00***  
Wald test p value  0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  0.188 
Sargan statistic  0.00 
Observations 83,900 77,747 
Number of groups 12,447 11,808 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - as 
pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test statistic 
is not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, 
the variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the variables are set out 
in Table 4.3.   
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Table 4.912 sets out the results of the first test of hypothesis 2 that relative gearing is 
positively related to the non-firm HH index values (calculated using equity gearing) – 
a repeat of hypothesis 1 except that relative gearing rather than gearing is used.  The 
results support hypothesis 2. 
 
The impact of using relative gearing is that statistical significance increases for the 
coefficients of the non-firm HH factors which have the expected negative signs (under 
both fixed effects and system GMM).  The firm HH coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant reflecting the presence of gearing on both sides of the 
regression as discussed in relation to hypothesis 1. 
 
The coefficients of the independent variables other than the firm HH and non-firm HH 
index values track the results in Table 2.12 in Chapter 2: this is to be expected since 
the model equations are identical save for the inclusion of the HH index variables and 
the use of relative gearing rather than absolute gearing which produces larger 
coefficients.  
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Table 4.9 Determinants of relative gearing (equity gearing HH index case) 
This table sets out the regression results of gearing based on book values against the variables in 
the left-hand column including the firm and non-firm HH values computed using equity gearing 
(hypothesis 2) 
Independent variables Fixed effects System GMM 
Dependent variable (1-year lag) 0.506*** 0.592*** 
 (44.27) (29.32) 
Dependent variable (2-year lag)  -0.0350** 
  (-2.419) 
Dependent variable (3-year lag)  -0.0194* 
  (-1.662) 
Market to book value ratio 0.0778*** 0.0625*** 
 (18.20) (12.81) 
Regulation dummy - 0.577*** 
  (3.063) 
Size -0.0489*** -0.0375*** 
 (-5.533) (-3.925) 
Commercial paper dummy 0.0548*** 0.0181 
 (3.258) (0.657) 
Abnormal earnings 0.0538*** 0.0178*** 
 (6.984) (2.598) 
Average asset life -0.0141*** -0.00654*** 
 (-8.718) (-3.326) 
Fixed asset ratio 1.101*** 1.030*** 
 (12.95) (10.03) 
Firm HH value (equity gearing) -0.0908* -0.157** 
 (-1.784) (-2.154) 
Non-firm HH value (equity gearing) 0.122*** 0.151*** 
 (3.171) (3.281) 
Constant 0.399*** 0.167*** 
 (8.188) (2.960) 
F test 362.5***  
Adjusted R squared 0.307  
Hausman p value 0.00***  
Wald test p value  0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  0.103 
Sargan statistic  0.00 
Observations 83,873 70,622 
Number of groups 12,447 10,898 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - as 
pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test statistic 
is not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, 
the variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the variables are set 
out in Table 4.3.  Here, a lag of 3 years for the dependent variable has been included to ensure a satisfactory 
Arrellano-Bond AR(2) statistic.   
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Table 4.10 sets out the results of the test of hypothesis 2 that relative gearing is 
positively related to the non-firm HH index values (calculated using market values) – 
a repeat of hypothesis 1 except that relative gearing rather than gearing is used.  The 
results again support hypothesis 2. 
 
The coefficients of the non-firm HH index values have the expected negative signs 
(under both fixed effects and system GMM) and are statistically significant as 
hypothesised.  The firm HH coefficients are both positive but statistically significant 
only in system GMM. 
 
The coefficients of the independent variables other than the firm HH and non-firm HH 
index values track the results in Table 2.12 in Chapter 2: this is to be expected since 
the model equations are identical save for the inclusion of the HH index variables and 
the use of relative gearing rather than absolute gearing which produces larger 
coefficients.  
 
  
Chapter 4 A Strategic Approach to Capital Structure 
326 
 
Table 4.10 Determinants of relative gearing (market value HH index case) 
This table sets out the regression results of gearing based on book values against the variables in 
the left-hand column including the firm and non-firm HH values computed using market values 
(hypothesis 2) 
Independent variables Fixed effects System GMM 
Dependent variable (1-year lag) 0.507*** 0.592*** 
 (44.42) (29.44) 
Dependent variable (2-year lag)  -0.0363** 
  (-2.494) 
Dependent variable (3-year lag)  -0.0184 
  (-1.577) 
Market to book value ratio 0.0780*** 0.0634*** 
 (18.20) (13.06) 
Regulation dummy - 0.537*** 
  (2.904) 
Size -0.0506*** -0.0389*** 
 (-5.669) (-4.167) 
Commercial paper dummy 0.0544*** 0.0204 
 (3.200) (0.751) 
Abnormal earnings 0.0541*** 0.0188*** 
 (7.004) (2.698) 
Average asset life -0.0142*** -0.00749*** 
 (-8.693) (-3.830) 
Fixed asset ratio 1.106*** 1.040*** 
 (12.96) (10.04) 
Firm HH value (market value) 0.0767 0.182** 
 (1.305) (2.410) 
Non-firm HH value (market value) 0.145*** 0.220*** 
 (3.282) (4.680) 
Constant 0.394*** 0.153*** 
 (7.935) (2.686) 
F test 363.9***  
Adjusted R squared 0.308  
Hausman p value 0.00***  
Wald test p value  0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  0.12 
Sargan statistic  0.00 
Observations 83,456 70,252 
Number of groups 12,427 10,875 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable here - 
as pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The Hansen test 
statistic is not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 2.3.3.3.  To test for 
collinearity, the variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  The definitions of the 
variables are set out in Table 4.3.  Here, a lag of 3 years for the dependent variable has been included to 
ensure a satisfactory Arrellano-Bond AR(2) statistic.   
Table 4.11 sets out the results of the test of hypothesis 2 that relative gearing is 
positively related to the non-firm HH index values (calculated using sales).  The results 
support the hypothesis.  The results in Table 4.11 indicate statistically significant and 
positive coefficients for the non-firm HH values based on sales in both fixed effects 
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and system GMM.  There is a positive and significant coefficient for the firm HH value 
under the fixed effects analysis. 
 
Using the coefficients that have been estimated using fixed effects and assuming that 
the non-firm HH index value ranges between the 10th and 90th percentile, the impact 
on relative gearing is approximately 7% (based on equity gearing) rising to 
approximately 14% (based on sales values) demonstrating the economic significance 
of the relationship.  (A change of one standard deviation in the non-firm HH index value 
(based on sales) produces a change of only 3% of one standard deviation of relative 
gearing but, that variable has a high standard deviation.) 
 
As with the system GMM estimates of the coefficient of the non-firm HH values in the 
regression equation including absolute gearing, these results support the hypothesis 
indicating that companies faced with low levels of concentration are more likely to have 
lower levels of gearing and thereby have the opportunity to be able to pursue a strategy 
of acquisition. 
 
The coefficients of the independent variables other than the firm HH and non-firm HH 
index values track the results in Table 2.12 in Chapter 2: this is to be expected since 
the model equations are identical save for the inclusion of the HH index variables and 
the use of relative gearing rather than absolute gearing which produces larger 
coefficients.  
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Table 4.11 Determinants of relative gearing (sales HH index case) 
This table sets out the regression results of gearing based on book values against the 
variables in the left-hand column including the firm and non-firm HH values computed using 
sales (hypothesis 2) 
Independent variables Fixed effects System GMM 
Dependent variable (1-year lag) 0.505*** 0.561*** 
 (44.26) (25.60) 
Dependent variable (2-year lag)  -0.0429*** 
  (-2.801) 
Dependent variable (3-year lag)  -0.0203 
  (-1.603) 
Dependent variable (4-year lag)  -0.0132 
  (-1.367) 
Market to book value ratio 0.0781*** 0.0686*** 
 (18.26) (12.02) 
Regulation dummy - 0.686*** 
  (3.570) 
Size -0.0515*** -0.0488*** 
 (-5.808) (-4.614) 
Commercial paper dummy 0.0504*** 0.00738 
 (2.967) (0.247) 
Abnormal earnings 0.0529*** 0.0132* 
 (6.877) (1.833) 
Average asset life -0.0141*** -0.00690*** 
 (-8.682) (-3.360) 
Fixed asset ratio 1.117*** 1.106*** 
 (13.11) (9.993) 
Firm HH value (sales) 0.393*** 0.241 
 (3.922) (1.028) 
Non-firm HH value (sales) 0.334*** 0.410*** 
 (5.250) (4.590) 
Constant 0.356*** 0.182*** 
 (7.105) (2.880) 
F test 362.5***  
Adjusted R squared 0.307  
Hausman p value 0.00***  
Wald test p value  0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  0.23 
Sargan statistic  0 
Observations 83,856 62,764 
Number of groups 12,447 9,848 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The Sargan test result is unreliable 
here - as pointed out in Roodman (2009b) it is not infallible and cannot be relied on too faithfully.  The 
Hansen test statistic is not reported here as it is not available in xtdpdsys – see discussion in section 
2.3.3.3.  To test for collinearity, the variance inflation factors were computed and were all less than 10.  
The definitions of the variables are set out in Table 4.3.  Here, a lag of 4 years for the dependent variable 
has been included to ensure a satisfactory Arrellano-Bond AR(2) statistic. 
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4.4 Conclusions 
The contributions identified in this Chapter are listed at the beginning of this Chapter 
and in Chapter 1.  Here, the main findings are presented more briefly with more 
emphasis on the empirical tests conducted. 
 
The key contribution is to highlight the incentives that managers have to engage in 
empire building and that such a strategy is facilitated by a conservative capital 
structure that reflects the degree of concentration among the other companies in the 
sector: faced with a low (high) degree of concentration, companies have lower (higher) 
gearing.  This result is supported empirically.  
 
A conservative balance sheet facilitates debt financing on a short-term basis (to be 
followed by refinancing – as described in Chapter 3 in relation to the pecking order 
solution): this has two important advantages for management interested in pursuing 
acquisitions: first, speed and secondly the management of information asymmetry. 
 
A lowly geared balance sheet means that the company can compete without any 
disadvantage for acquisitions within the sector in a way that enhanced the chances of 
the company to grow because growth provides two important personal advantages for 
managers: first, a successful acquisition is likely to lead to better remuneration due to 
the increase in size; and secondly, the increase in size reduces the risk of their 
employer becoming a target for another acquirer which can lead to some loss of 
welfare if the manager becomes a cost saving in a takeover of his employer. 
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Management also benefit in other ways from a conservative balance sheet.  Less 
gearing enhances their personal welfare by reducing the risk of financial distress which 
can lead to reduced welfare.    
 
Managers’ personal welfare is also enhanced by making the company stronger in 
terms of its relationships with other key stakeholders such as suppliers and customers 
that prefer to interact with counterparties with strong balance sheets. 
 
In terms of competition, a further advantage of a conservative balance sheet is that 
the company can compete with other companies in the sector in terms of price or by 
offering longer credit periods to customers or in some other way.  The company with 
the strongest balance sheet is best equipped to lead competitive action in this way. 
 
These considerations suggest that capital structure should consider both the 
acquisition policy of the company and the relative financial strength of the other 
companies in the sector. 
 
This approach runs contrary to the ideas contained in the two main theories of capital 
structure – pecking order and trade-off theories.  This strategic approach suggests 
that companies that are candidates to make acquisitions will have lowly geared 
balance sheets. 
 
The example of leveraged buy-outs is given to explain the difference between the 
capital structure of listed companies and those of leveraged buy-outs.  The difference 
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can be explained by the difference in incentive arrangements in place that supports 
the arguments presented here.   
 
The leveraged buy-out structure shows how much tax shelter can be generated when 
the amount of debt is maximized: but this is not the capital structure adopted by listed 
companies.  This demonstrates that listed companies do not maximize the amount of 
tax shelter that can be generated in contradiction to the trade-off theory. 
 
The combination of market power and financial power is defined as firepower and a 
new variable is created which is a derivative of the Hirschman Herfindahl index which 
is computed on this basis and, for robustness, using sales and company market 
values.  The hypothesis that is tested is that companies that face low levels of 
concentration tend to have lower gearing.  This strategy enables such companies to 
compete as a potential purchaser when acquisition opportunities arise. 
 
This is tested empirically using gearing and, to counteract sector factors that affect 
gearing, relative gearing is used.  The empirical results confirm that gearing is 
positively related to the level of concentration among other companies in the sector 
implying that companies facing lower market power among other companies in the 
sector tend to have lower levels of relative gearing which helps them pursue 
acquisition strategies against their competitors; and, that the firepower approach 
provides a contrast to the trade-off theory of capital structure.  The trade-off theory 
implies that as bigger companies offer less risk that the trade-off (between tax shelter 
and financial distress costs) should occur at higher levels of gearing – and gearing is 
positively related to size.  However, the firepower approach provides a different 
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perspective implying that companies will make choices about capital structure that 
take account of both strategic considerations and the personal objectives of managers. 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
The conclusions presented here are extracted from the more detailed conclusion 
sections at the end of each Chapter. 
 
5.1 Summary of findings  
The contributions identified in this thesis are listed in Chapter 1 and at the beginning 
of each Chapter.  Here, the main findings are presented more briefly with more 
emphasis on the empirical tests conducted. 
 
The key contribution of Chapter 2 is to show that the under-investment problem arises 
when there are transfers in value between debt-holders and shareholders caused by 
the financing mix of the external financing for the investment rather than the 
investment itself and that such transfers can be reversed by a post-investment 
adjustment in capital structure that restores the gearing ratio prior to the investment.  
This solution is simple with low costs and is preferable to the solutions proposed in 
Myers (1977) of shortening debt maturity of reducing gearing – both of which have 
significant associated costs and reduce flexibility. 
 
There is evidence that is taken to support the solution in Myers (1977) – the negative 
relationship between debt maturity and gearing and the market to book value ratio.  
Two explanations are put forward – the on-off model and the structural model both of 
which predict the observed negative relationship.  This is tested empirically using 
gearing ratios based on book values that confirm a positive relationship between 
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gearing and the market to book value thus contradicting the solution in Myers (1977) 
and confirming the explanations put forward. 
 
The key contribution of Chapter 3 is to show i) that transfers in value from debt-holders 
is not sustainable as a strategy since debt investors will react to a strategy that seeks 
to disadvantage them by demanding either higher returns or greater restrictions on the 
company or both; and ii) that information asymmetry that restricts the issue of new 
shares (at a price that represents an under-valuation) can be managed by using a 
number of alternatives to conventional debt such as bridge financing in a way that 
removes the rationale for the pecking order theory.   
 
Empirical results support the idea that temporary increases in debt occur but that such 
increases are followed by reductions in gearing in each of the two years following the 
year in which a financing deficit occurs that is financed by an increase in debt as 
proposed in the pecking order theory. 
 
The key contribution of Chapter 4 is to highlight the incentives that managers have to 
engage in empire building and to explain how that such a strategy is connected to 
capital structure.  The pursuit of acquisitions is facilitated by a conservative capital 
structure that reflects the degree of concentration among the other companies in the 
sector: faced with a low (high) degree of concentration, companies have lower (higher) 
gearing.   
 
This is tested by comparing the capital structure (gearing and relative gearing) of an 
individual company to the degree of concentration in the sector faced by that company 
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(the concentration among the other companies).  The Hirschman-Herfindahl index is 
computed in several different ways including one version labelled firepower which 
seeks to combine market power and financial power.  The results demonstrate a 
significant relationship between relative gearing and the degree of concentration faced 
by a company for all three versions of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index. 
 
5.2 Recommendations and implications 
There are some clear implications for capital structure policy.  To avoid any transfer of 
value to debt-holders (as in the under-investment problem) companies should 
maintain a constant gearing ratio and avoid transactions that might be interpreted by 
investors as a permanent reduction in gearing as this would transfer value to the debt-
holders. 
 
A policy of constant capital structure will discourage debt-investors form believing that 
any improvement or reduction in gearing or credit quality that occurs is a permanent 
change.  This will mean that the value of debt should not be affected by changes in 
gearing since the expectation (based on a belief in the observed capital structure 
policy of constant gearing) is that such changes in gearing are temporary and will be 
corrected by a subsequent adjustment to capital structure.  This will ensure that any 
value transferred will always be recaptured.  By signalling the intention to maintain a 
stable capital structure by means of the company’s track record and by publishing 
statements on capital structure, debt-holders will regard any transfers of value in their 
favour as temporary and therefore they will be small in magnitude. 
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Companies will be unable to seek transfers of value from debt-holders (to 
shareholders as in the over-investment problem) without risking adverse reactions 
from lenders that could lead to an increase in the cost of debt, possible reduced access 
to debt markets and reduced flexibility.  These disadvantages will be significant.  So, 
the best policy is to maintain constant capital structure thus reassuring debt investors 
that they will not suffer an adverse transfer of value. 
 
The exact meaning of “constant capital structure” is also something that could be 
interpreted in a flexible way.  Companies usually indicate their policy on capital 
structure in ways which avoid language that is very precise as this reduces their 
flexibility.  There is also the need to adjust capital structure from time to time and there 
is no real timetable for this – it is a question of arranging an adjustment in a way that 
does not encourage investors to think that any past change in capital structure away 
from the target is permanent.  The opportunities for adjustments are not always 
frequent so deviations away from the mean are possible without giving the impression 
that such deviations are permanent.  Management will be able to indicate their plans 
by means of signals in their communications with investors and can make additional 
comments where the adjustment to capital structure is delayed. 
 
Such a policy is entirely consistent with models of capital structure that suggest that 
gearing ratios revert to a target as in Jalilvand and Harris (1984). Ju, Parrino, 
Poteshman and Weisbach (2005) develop a contingent claims model to assess a 
constant capital structure in a trade-off setting.  Their model suggests that the costs of 
deviations from the target are relatively small and that infrequent adjustments to capital 
structure targets are likely to be reasonable for most firms. 
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The above considerations do not suggest a particular level of gearing but rather a 
constant level of gearing.  The alternative solutions to the information asymmetry 
problems described in Chapter 3 include the use of bridge financing.  To be able to 
use bridge financing, the company should maintain reserve debt capacity so that 
bridge financing is always available should it be required – this suggests a 
conservative debt policy and provides a rationale as to why companies do not 
maximise the tax savings that could occur at higher levels of gearing, an issue that 
has figured in various parts of the literature. 
 
The pecking order theory and the trade-off theories are not supported by the evidence 
presented above. 
 
5.3 Limitations 
The dataset employed here is comprehensive and for a reasonably long time period.  
However, it is restricted to North America.  A useful extension would be to other major 
markets.  An advantage of Compustat data (for North America) is the availability of 
debt maturity details.  In other jurisdictions, there are data limitations and the only 
choice for measuring debt maturity is to use debt with a maturity longer than 1 year as 
a proportion of total debt (see examples in the Appendix to Chapter 2). 
 
One of the ideas discussed in the Introduction was the feature of corporate finance 
research wherein some phenomena hold weakly in broad panels but strongly in narrow 
samples.  This suggests an approach that seeks to identify narrow samples rather 
than analyse broad panels.  The example of large dividend increases and large 
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gearing increases in Cooper and Lambertides (2016) was given in the introduction.  
The example of self-sustainers was described in Chapter 3. 
 
This suggests that narrow samples might offer more precise results.  This method has 
been followed in some ways in the analysis of the financing deficit which was restricted 
to companies with a positive financing deficit and an increase in gearing. 
 
In Chapter 4, the regression equation might be extended to include a dummy variable 
relating to the acquisition policies of each company as in Uysal (2011) as this might 
link capital structure policy decisions more closely to acquisition intentions. 
 
5.4 Further research 
There is always scope for further work.  Some obvious areas are described below. 
 
Those companies with high market to book value ratios tend to have fewer balance 
sheet assets and more expenses – this relationship could usefully be examined further 
to support the analysis in the simple on-off model in Chapter 2. 
 
The empirical analysis of bridge financing solutions in relation to the pecking order 
theory could be extended to examine acquisition transactions and their financing.  This 
might enable the bridge financing process to be identified more precisely rather than 
by looking in a large dataset that includes other companies not pursuing such 
strategies in the absence of information asymmetry. 
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One modification to the firepower approach that would address the narrow/broad 
sample approach would be to attempt to distinguish predators from prey to see if there 
were differences in capital structure. 
 
The measurement of gearing could be modified to take account of size.  Since larger 
companies are less risky than smaller companies (other things being equal) a simple 
gearing ratio will not capture this difference in credit quality.  A large company with 
25% gearing is much less risky than a small company with the same level of gearing.  
Perhaps the introduction of a credit rating or shadow rating might lead to increases in 
the precision of the analyses. 
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